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ABSTRACT 
Risk based approaches are gaining currency as industry looks for rational, efficient and 
flexible approaches to managing their structures and equipment. When applied to inspection 
and maintenance of industrial assets, risk based approaches differ from other approaches 
mainly in their assessment of failure in its wider context and ramifications. These advanced 
techniques provide more insight into the causes and avoidance of structural failure and 
competing risks, as well as the resources needed to manage them. Measuring risk is a 
challenge that is being met with state of the art technology, skills, knowledge and experience. 
 
The thesis presents risk based approaches to solving two specific types of problem in the 
management of offshore structures and equipments. The first type is finding the optimum 
timing of an asset life management action such that financial benefit is maximised, 
considering  the cost of the action and the risk (quantified in monetary terms) of not 
undertaking that action. The approach presented here is applied to managing remedial action 
in offshore wind farms and specifically to corroded wind turbine tower structures. The second 
type of problem is how to optimise resources using risk based criteria for managing 
competing demands. The approach presented here is applied to stocking spares in the shipping 
sector, where the cost of holding spares is balanced against the risk of failing to meet demands 
for spares.   
 
Risk is the leitmotiv running through this thesis. The approaches discussed here will find 
application in a variety of situations where competing risks are being managed within 
constraints. 
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PREFACE 
The thesis presents research conducted from 2006 to 2009 under the Engineering and Physical 
Sciences Research Council (EPSRC)’s Doctorate of Engineering (EngD) scheme. The thesis 
fulfils the requirements of an EngD degree at the Centre for Innovative and Collaborative 
Engineering (CICE) at Loughborough University, one of centres operating the EPSRC’s 
EngD scheme. The research was based at TWI Ltd, Cambridge, the industrial sponsor of the 
doctorate. Funding for the research was obtained from EPSRC and TWI Ltd, Cambridge. 
 
At the core of the EngD is the solution to one or more significant and challenging engineering 
problems within an industrial context. The thesis here has an underlying theme of risk based 
approaches to decision-making with reference to life management of assets. Risk based 
approaches as applied to the life management of offshore wind farms and spares inventory 
management are discussed in the thesis.  There is a collection of technical papers appended to 
this thesis. The papers form an integral part of the research and should be read in conjunction 
with the main text. The papers are referenced from within the discourse wherever required. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 THEME  
This thesis describes research relating to risk based* life management of offshore structures 
and equipment. The kinds of offshore structures being considered include ships and tankers, 
oil rigs, subsea pipelines and other types of offshore installation and equipment such as FPSO 
(Floating Production Storage and Offloading) vessels, offshore CCS (Carbon Capture and 
Storage/ Sequestration) depots and offshore wind farms. The efficient management of these 
structures and equipment during their life to ensure fitness-for-service with optimum financial 
return on investment is an important duty for owners and operators. 
Offshore structures and equipment are often complex and operate in a hostile environment. 
They may be more susceptible to failure and their failure may have different implications in 
relation to that of their on-shore counterparts. These aspects mean that processes for life 
management established for on-shore structures and equipment may not be applicable to 
structures and equipment offshore, where a different treatment might be more appropriate.  
Life management includes all activities that can affect the life of an asset such as: design, 
manufacturing quality, operations, monitoring, integrity assessment, inspection, maintenance, 
repair, refurbishment, renewal, upgrading, replacement and decommissioning decisions. 
There is a continuum of approaches to life management requiring increasing levels of 
information and discrimination: the run-to-failure (and replace) approach at one end of the 
spectrum, to the relatively more advanced risk based approach at the other end of the 
spectrum. There are intermediate approaches such as reactive maintenance, rule-based (or 
                                                 
* In this thesis, for convenience, this often repeated term is used without the hyphen as in ‘risk-based’. 
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time-based) and condition-based approaches. The relatively recent risk based approaches are 
driven by industry needs for a more flexible, efficient, and rational basis to life management. 
1.2 AIM AND OBJECTIVES  
The aim of the research described in this thesis is to develop new methods for the life 
management of assets using risk based principles, with particular application to offshore 
structures and equipment. This aim has been achieved through specific projects at TWI, two 
of which are described in this thesis. These two projects and their objectives are as below.  
 The first project develops a risk based approach to the life management of offshore 
wind farms. Here, the objective is to find the optimum time of repairing/ replacing a 
degraded structure identified as high risk so that the long term financial benefit is 
maximised, taking into account the expected failure rate and a number of constraints. 
The method is demonstrated using the wind turbine tower structure as the component 
at risk of failure due to the action of a specific damage mechanism - corrosion.  
 The second project develops a risk based approach to spares inventory management 
such that the costs involved in holding spares and the risks involved in not doing so 
are within user specified constraints. Here, the objective is to find the optimum level 
of spares of different kinds an industrial enterprise should advance order given that 
failures (requiring these spares) may occur in service. The application of this approach 
is to a fleet of cargo ships where parts of different kinds are required to be stocked to 
keep ships available for service.   
1.3 THE STRUCTURE   
The structure of the thesis, chapter 2 onwards, is depicted in figure 1-1. 
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Chapter 2 sets out the common risk based attributes of the methodologies described in the 
sections that follow. It starts with introducing the terms and concepts used in this work: there 
is a description of risk in its broadest sense; this is followed by a discussion on risk based 
principles, life management of assets and the characteristics of offshore structures and 
equipment.  
It then discusses risk based approaches as applied to life management including the planning 
of inspection and maintenance. The reasons why the bath tub curve, widely used in reliability 
engineering, often with some modification, provides a theoretical framework for life cycle 
management of assets is then discussed. The chapter refers to appendix E which contains 
further details of topics mentioned in the text. Appendix F contains a discussion of the risk 
matrix technique of qualitative risk analysis.  
Chapters 3 and 4 describe two projects that are central to the research described in this thesis. 
In figure 1-1, these are shown in highlighted boxes.  
 Chapter 3 describes parts of a project on risk based life management of offshore wind 
turbines. This project developed a risk based life management methodology to find the 
optimum trade-off between run-repair-replace costs and the expected cost of failure in 
offshore wind farms, and produced prototype software to implement the same. In this 
thesis, the focus of discussion is the risk based run-repair-replace decision-making 
methodology aimed at maximising the net present value (NPV) of the investment. For 
demonstration, the methodology has been applied to address corrosion of the tower 
structure. There are two appendices referred to in Chapter 3. 
o Appendix A is a paper on this project presented at the 2007 Offshore 
Mechanics and Arctic Engineering (OMAE) Conference.  
o Appendix G describes wind turbines. 
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 Chapter 4 describes a project to develop a risk based spares inventory management 
system. In this project, a model for managing risk was developed to find the optimum 
level of spares of different kinds a major industrial enterprise should advance order  
given that failures requiring these may occur in service. The particular application was 
a fleet of cargo ships where parts of different kinds are required to keep ships available 
for service. There are two appendices relating to this project. 
o Appendix B is a working paper presented at the 2008 International Mechanical 
Engineering Congress and Exposition (IMECE), USA.  
o Appendix C is a paper, describing further progress, presented at the 2009 
Engineering Structural Integrity Assessment (ESIA-10) conference, 
Manchester, UK. 
Chapter 5 discusses the salient common features in the application of the risk based 
approaches presented in the previous chapters and comments on their uptake and relevance. 
The practical issues in applying the research and possibilities for further work are also 
considered. 
Chapter 6 sums up the thesis with concluding remarks. 
1.4 OTHER RELEVANT STUDIES 
The research presented here is directly or indirectly influenced by 
 Courses undertaken: 
o MSc level course ‘Renewable Energy Technology’ at Cranfield University, 
2006. 
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o MSc level course ‘Structural Analysis’ conducted by Professor Silberschmidt 
(completed Feb, 2008) at Loughborough University. 
o ‘Research, Innovation and Communication’ module offered to doctoral 
candidates at Loughborough University. 
 Conferences attended/ presented at: 
o Attendance at ‘Using Probability Modelling in Structural Integrity 
Assessments’ seminar organised by the Royal Academy of Engineering, 
London, 9 June 2006. 
o Attendance at ‘Risk Analysis and Structural Reliability’ course at 
MARSTRUCT, Glasgow, and 20- 22 of November 2006. 
o Conference presentation: Palisade Users’ conference, 23-24 April 2007, 
London. Presentation titled ‘Monte Carlo Simulation (MCS) Technique for a 
Probabilistic Implementation of Structural Engineering Procedures’. 
o Conference paper presentation: ‘A Practical Approach to Risk Based Life 
Management of Offshore Wind Farms’. ASME- Offshore Mechanics and 
Arctic Engineering Conference, San Diego, 10-15 June 2007. 
o Conference presentation: ‘Maximising Net Present Value of Investment in the 
Maintenance of Assets’ at Palisade Users’ Conference, London 22-23 April 
2008. 
o Conference paper presentation: ‘A Risk Based Methodology for Spare Parts 
Inventory Optimisation’, ASME IMECE conference, 3 -6 Nov 2008, Boston, 
USA. 
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o Conference paper presentation: ‘Optimisation of resources for managing 
competing risks’, ESIA10- Engineering structural integrity assessment: present 
goals- future challenges, 19-20 May 2009. 
 Supervision: 
o Professors Vadim V Silberschmidt (Loughborough University) and John D 
Andrews (previously at Loughborough University). 
o John B Wintle (TWI Ltd) and Julian B Speck (previously with TWI Ltd). 
 
1.5 INDUSTRIAL HOST: TWI LTD  
TWI Ltd is the industrial host of this engineering doctorate. TWI Ltd is an independent, not -
for- profit distributing, membership-based, engineering research and consultancy 
organisation. TWI's mission is to deliver world-class service in joining materials, engineering 
and allied technologies to meet the needs of a global membership and its associated 
community.  
This research draws heavily on my work done within the Asset Integrity Management section 
of the Structural Integrity Technology Group (SITG) at TWI Ltd, Cambridge where I have 
been based. The Asset Integrity Management section provides a variety of services to the 
petrochemical and process industry. These services include: providing consultancy for 
optimising inspection and maintenance, implementing risk based management principles, 
assessing fitness for service (FFS) against code requirements, and providing plant integrity 
courses in FFS, Risk Based Inspection (RBI), degradation and repairs. 
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2 RISK BASED LIFE MANAGEMENT OF ASSETS 
2.1 FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS 
2.1.1 THE NATURE OF RISK  
Risk is an intangible concept. It can be looked at from various perspectives and has 
connotations depending on the context in which it is used. From one perspective it is a 
combination of the probability of harm and the severity of that harm (ISO/ IEC Guide 
51:1999 1999).  
 
A more encompassing description of risk is obtained by considering it to be inherent in any 
action and, indeed, inaction. Many organizations increasingly apply risk management to 
optimise the decisions regarding potential opportunities that need to be acted upon. In this 
sense, risk has a broader meaning than mentioned above. The ISO/ IEC guide on risk 
management vocabulary defines risk as the combination of the probability of an event and its 
consequence (PD ISO/IEC Guide 73:2002 2002). The document notes that risk is generally 
used only when there is at least a probability of negative consequences, and in some 
situations, risk arises from the possibility of deviation from the expected outcome or event.  
 
This description of risk is all including: most actions do have potentially negative 
consequences; actions often assume normal conditions, deviations from which result in 
outcomes that are different from what was expected. Where quantitative risk modelling is 
involved, normal conditions may entail mean values (in statistical terms). Deviations from 
normal, or the degree of (or the lack of) confidence in input values to the model, may depict 
risk.  
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In the context of this thesis, ‘risk’ is used in its broadest sense, to mean the combination of the 
probability of an event and its consequence. The consequences are usually negative and 
quantified in some way.   
 
Risk is a complex entity: it cannot be measured easily as it involves probability and 
prediction. There are two components to our inability to precisely determine risk- these are 
variability and uncertainty in the inputs to risk analysis.  Variability, also called as “aleatory 
uncertainty” or “stochastic variability”, is the effect of chance and is a function of the system, 
not reducible through further study or further measurement, but may be reduced by changing 
the physical system. Uncertainty, also called as “epistemic uncertainty” or “fundamental 
uncertainty” is the assessor’s lack of knowledge (level of ignorance) about the parameters that 
characterise the physical system that is being modelled (Vose 2008).  
 
The comment made in a political risk management context offers another perspective “There 
are known knowns. These are things we know that we know. There are known unknowns. 
That is to say, there are things that we know we don't know. But there are also unknown 
unknowns. There are things we don't know we don't know” (Rumsfeld 12 February 2002). 
Unknown unknowns are the result of total ignorance. Known unknowns can be construed as 
knowing the variability in the inputs, at best, or, at least knowing that certain variables 
affecting the outcome are likely to change in ways not easily foreseeable. Taleb calls 
unpredictable events ‘Black Swans’ and suggests that instead of trying to predict them in 
vain, we need to adjust to their existence (Taleb 2007).  
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2.1.2 MEASURES OF RISK 
Whilst accepting that the inputs to risk analysis may not always be precise or definite or, 
indeed, lacking (not available) or retrospectively (post-event) realised as missing (not 
conceived of), this thesis does not dwell on the moot issues relating to forecasting or 
prediction. Research presented here is more influenced by the study of the management of 
risk than by the study of risk: the focus is on how to make the best use of available 
information in the management of risks. 
 
Probability or likelihood, mentioned above, is the extent to which an event is likely to occur. 
Mathematically, probability is a real number between 0 and 1 indicating the occurrence of a 
random event. It can be related to the long-run relative frequency of occurrence or to a degree 
of belief that the event will occur. Degrees of belief about the likelihood of an even can also 
be expressed in classes or ranks such as Very Low, Low, Medium, High and Very High. 
 
Consequence is the outcome of an event (an occurrence of a particular set of circumstances). 
Consequences can be positive or negative but are always taken as negative in a safety context. 
As in likelihood or probability, consequences can be quantitative or qualitative. 
 
In the context of this thesis, risk will involve the probability or the likelihood of failure of a 
component or a system of components to fulfil its design purpose in a given time frame and 
under given operating conditions. Where the two components of risk i.e. the likelihood and 
the consequence of a failure event are quantitatively expressed, risk will be expressed in terms 
of ‘expected loss’. Expected loss can be defined quantitatively as the product of the 
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consequences (C) of a specific incident and the probability (P) over a time period or 
frequency of its occurrence (Andrews, Moss 2002): 
                                                                                                                                         (2.1) 
 
Qualitatively, a set of events can be graded depending on their likelihood and the impact of 
their occurrence. The risk matrix technique, discussed later on, is mainly a qualitative one, 
although it can have quantitative values. 
 
The risk of an event, expressed qualitatively (High, Medium, Low, for example) or 
quantitatively (in absolute terms), is often evaluated as relative to some other event. For 
example, the risk (of death) posed by a particular surgery may be compared to the risk of 
death by accident prevalent in the area; indeed, it may also be compared to the risk of not 
undergoing surgery.  
 
Risks here broadly fall in the following three categories: Occupational risks that impact 
personnel engaged in industry; Societal risks that impact the people and the environment; 
Financial risks that arise from loss of capital assets, production and compensation. 
2.1.3 RISK MANAGEMENT 
Risk management is coordinated activities to direct and control an organization with regard to 
risk. It includes risk assessment which is the overall process of risk analysis and risk 
evaluation. Risk analysis is the systematic use of information to identify sources of risk and to 
estimate it. Risk evaluation is the process used to compare estimated risk against given risk 
criteria to determine the significance of risk (API 2002a).  
.PCR 
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2.2 ASSETS AND THEIR MANAGEMENT 
2.2.1 OFFSHORE STRUCTURES AND EQUIPMENT 
Ships and tankers, offshore oil rigs, sub sea pipelines and other offshore installations such as 
FPSO (Floating Production Storage and Offloading) vessels, offshore CCS (Carbon Capture 
and Storage/ Sequestration) depots are all offshore structures or equipment. These differ from 
their counterparts on land in a number of ways: one crucial difference is that the nature of 
risk, in terms of both the likelihood of failure and the consequences of the same, offshore is 
different to that onshore. 
 
Often offshore structures are complex, large and operate in a hostile environment. Without 
life management, they are more susceptible to failure. At times they have a higher degree of 
novelty than onshore structures. Some structures, for example, FPSO vessels, are often 
converted ships not designed for this new purpose and need special attention; some of their 
design aspects may be outside Class rules.  
 
In terms of occupational risks, for serious crises personnel offshore have more limited escape 
routes and need to rely on support from land that might not be forthcoming for a variety of 
reasons. Societal risk, in case of offshore structures is usually restricted to the marine 
environment. However, there are instances where pollution has affected people in coastal 
areas. Breakdowns at sea often take longer to rectify: they may entail waiting for suitable 
weather windows or dry docking a ship, for example. Thus there is often a prolonged period 
of production loss leading to financial loss.  
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The nature of risk for different structures differs: ships may be able to change course to avoid 
extreme loading, whereas fixed structures such as oil rigs may be subject to more extreme 
loading. Wind turbine structures are fixed but carry a rotating wind turbine adding to the type 
of loading normally experienced by offshore structures. Some structures like oil rigs may 
have a contingent of personnel whereas others such as wind farms are usually unmanned. 
2.2.2 ASSET MANAGEMENT 
Asset integrity management (AIM) includes all actions that enable an asset to perform its 
function effectively and efficiently whilst safeguarding life and the environment. ‘Asset 
integrity management ensures that the people, systems, processes and resources which deliver 
integrity are in place, in use and fit for purpose over the whole life-cycle of the asset. The 
objectives of an AIM system are the delivery of business requirements to maximise return on 
assets, whilst maintaining stakeholder value and minimising business risks associated with 
accidents and loss of production’ (Bureau Veritas). 
There are various documents pertaining to the practice of AIM. In response to demand from 
industry for a standard for asset management, there is a publicly available specification (PAS) 
first published in 2004 and superseded in 2008. The document (BSI 2008) lists terms and 
definitions, and provides a framework for AIM. Another good practice guide in asset 
management is by CIRIA (Construction Industry Research and Information Association) 
(CIRIA 2009).  
The objectives of AIM mentioned above are typical in the engineering industry. As is evident, 
AIM usually includes both safety and reliability driven risk management as well as 
commercially driven risk management. This is in contrast to practices in the financial sector 
where risk management is usually purely driven by commercial or business considerations 
and indeed, the metrics used to measure such risk reflects this.  
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2.2.3 THE PRACTICE OF ASSET MANAGEMENT 
 
The practice of asset integrity management is not new. However, it is only recently that it is 
increasingly being recognized as a distinct set of business processes, disciplines and 
professional practices. This recognition is in no small part due to the complexity of the assets 
and the linkages between various asset systems created in industry- such systems require a 
holistic/ integrated view for them to operate safely and efficiently. 
Factors such as more experience in operating assets, a better understanding of failures, more 
computing power to create and run sophisticated models, IT systems and better condition 
monitoring techniques are helping in increasing the effectiveness of asset integrity 
management.    
Within asset management, there are strategies and techniques to implement these strategies. 
For example, risk based inspection (RBI) is a strategy and some of the tools to implement this 
strategy are simulation, HAZOPS, Probabilistic analyses, and FFS assessments. There are a 
number of commercially available tools to provide inputs or to aid decision making in asset 
management. For example, there are tools developed by Decision Support Tools Ltd such as 
APT© (Asset Performance Tools) toolkits developed for Inventory and purchasing decisions, 
maintenance/ inspection scheduling, etc.). SIL (Safety Integrity Level) assessments are formal 
classification methods that provide a record of a quantified assessment of the probability of 
failure on demand of a safety system taking into account the consequences of such failure. 
SILs often form a part of a Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) that is then fed into a 
decision-support tool. TWI has Riskwise© software aimed at implementing risk based 
approaches (following various ASME/ BSI codes or bespoke practices) in the inspection and 
maintenance of assets such as power plants, refineries and pipelines. 
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The discussion above and in previous sections shows that asset management requires people 
who can take a wider multi-disciplinary perspective. Apart from engineering knowledge and 
skills, an awareness of the larger context in which an asset is operating is often required. As 
pointed out by the Woodhouse Partnership, asset management needs skills such as reliability 
and maintenance engineering, root cause failure analysis, life cycle costing, project/ change 
management that have traditionally not been the focus of engineering degrees (The 
Woodhouse Partnership Ltd, 2008).  However, now distinct engineering disciplines such as 
systems engineering, reliability engineering and operations management are dedicated to 
looking at these aspects in greater detail. 
 
2.2.4 LIFE MANAGEMENT OF ASSETS  
‘Equipment or structure begins to age as soon as it is built. Cyclic stresses cause fatigue and 
looseness. High temperature causes creep. Erosion and corrosion cause thinning and 
weakening. Thus age in many ways degrades, deteriorates and destroys’ (ASME International 
2003a).  
 
Life management includes all processes that manage the ageing of assets during their life. The 
HSE report on plant ageing (Wintle et al. 2006) segments ageing management into:  
 
(a) Setting up an organizational structure to manage ageing 
 
This includes taking responsibility for and control of the process of managing assets, 
establishing a company culture, strategy, systems for knowledge management and retention, 
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and taking care of human factors such as competencies required, training, succession planning 
etc. 
 
(b) Identification of ageing 
 
This includes establishing damage types and mechanisms, assessing the rate and accumulation 
of damage, assessing age related risk factors, and inspection and non-destructive testing. 
 
(c) Addressing ageing 
 
This includes assessing fitness-for-service and remaining life. Fitness-for-service of an asset 
is its adequacy to meet specified performance criteria for a period of continued service taking 
into account degradation and other changes that may have occurred or that are postulated to 
occur in future. Maintenance, repair and modifications, revalidation of equipment, planning 
for spares, reviewing schemes of examination and condition monitoring, and determining the 
end of equipment life, usually using a financial criterion, are also part of ageing management. 
 
‘Ageing’ in the current context is the process of deterioration and damage taking place since 
the equipment or structure was new. Ageing may not necessarily be a symptom of old age. 
Relatively new equipment may have undergone more ageing than equipment that was put into 
service earlier. Assessing ageing- knowing the current state of assets and assessing future 
condition, bearing in mind the factors that influence the onset, evolution and mitigation of 
degradation- is a very significant part of life management.  
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Assessing ageing for life management poses challenges to those responsible for it: different 
components (of a system) age differently and at a different rate; a single component may age 
differently and at a different rate over a period of time; the consequences of failure of one 
component may be different to those of another; and, different components may have 
different costs and techniques associated with managing them. Thus there are competing risks 
of failure and finite resources to manage them. Moreover, in certain situations, condition 
monitoring and inspection, the two main inputs to risk analysis within life management may 
not be achievable effectively and with precision.  
 
Life management of assets is a critical activity: it can optimise performance within constraints 
such as costs, reliability and safety. It has a direct bearing on the availability of assets for 
production. 
2.2.5 ROLE OF INSPECTION AND MAINTENANCE IN LIFE MANAGEMENT 
It is necessary to assess Ageing to establish the state or condition of equipment that could 
justify its continued service, re-rating, repair, or scrapping. Inspection provides information 
regarding the current state of equipment. This information is helpful in reassessing risk. For 
example, inspection may reveal that a particular damage rate is more than initially assumed in 
a risk assessment leading to revised estimates. Inspection per se does not reduce risk: it is an 
integral part of risk management that may lead to risk reduction by informing further action 
such as maintenance and repair. The risk based inspection planning process followed by API 
(API 2002b) is shown in figure 1-2.  
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Maintenance includes all activities that sustain or protect equipment for it to remain fit for 
service. In terms of the bath tub curve discussed in the next section, maintenance prolongs the 
useful life of equipment.  
 
Figure 2-1: Risk based inspection planning process (API recommended practice 580)  
2.2.6 DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO LIFE MANAGEMENT 
Whilst there remains a need for traditional approaches to inspection and maintenance, it is 
increasingly felt that more advanced approaches are required. This is mainly due to two 
reasons: 
(a) To reflect the complexity and innovation involved in the assets. It is often seen that there 
are complex systems within systems with a lot of interaction between them. The innovation 
within systems means that experience based information- the main input to time based 
inspection and maintenance- is not available. For example, in the shipping industry, some 
aspects of design may fall outside the remit of traditional Class rules (that are experience 
based).  
(b) To operate at an optimal level within the competitive pressures faced by asset managers.  
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The more advanced approaches, as opposed to the rule-based or time-based traditional 
approaches, give operators some flexibility in the management of their assets whilst meeting 
the same objectives. The flexibility is as a result of undertaking actions not on a fixed 
schedule, but on factors such as the condition of the asset (symptoms of ageing). The risk 
based approach uses risk based criteria to prioritize efforts and make the optimum use of this 
flexibility.  
Generally, in refining and chemical process plants, a relatively large portion of risk is 
concentrated in a smaller percentage of equipment (API). It thus makes sense to focus 
resources on the high risk components of a plant. It must be noted the development of such 
condition based approaches to AIM has been aided, in no small measure, by advances in NDT 
and information and communication technology.  
Inspection and maintenance strategy have followed an evolutionary continuum from the more 
time based traditional approaches to the advanced ones such as risk based (figure 2-2, adapted 
from (Lee et al. 2006)).  
 
Figure 2-2: Continuum of approaches leading up to risk based approaches 
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The figure above shows some attributes of the main approaches to life management.   
 Time-based approaches are those in which specified action is required at some point of 
time; often there are industry standards stipulating when or how frequent the action is 
required. The approach is also called the rule-based approach as this approach is 
prescriptive and the scheduling of the concerned action is not at the discretion of the 
operator. These rules or standards are based on industrial experience and are 
influenced by historical data; in this sense, the rules assume that the asset is operating 
in industry-wide average conditions.  
 Condition-based approaches are those in which action is informed by the condition of 
the asset. Relative to the rule-based approach, the approach here is more case-by-case, 
i.e., based on current state of the asset and on local conditions.  
 The more advanced risk based approach prioritises action based on the risk profile of 
various components within a system; the aim here is to focus resources on the 
components that are deemed more risky. Relative to other approaches, this is a more 
sophisticated approach to asset management in that, apart from factors considered in 
the previous approaches, here the context in which the asset (or a component within a 
system) is being operated is also considered.  
Risk based approaches in a way often add a third dimension to failures. Apart from the 
likelihood and consequence of failures, these approaches, by focussing resources on 
high risk components, consider the manageability aspects of failures within resource 
constraints. These approaches often answer the question: how to best manage the risk 
from failures within a system of components, given the resources available?  
In the interest of continuity, mention must be made of some other approaches, each having 
their own bias. Reliability Centred Maintenance (RCM) is a subset of risk based maintenance 
Risk Based Life Management of Offshore Structures and Equipment 
 
36 
in that maintenance is optimised taking into consideration the effect the equipment has on 
plant reliability. Here, reliability can be quantitatively expressed as the probability that an 
item (component, equipment, or system) will operate without failure for a stated period of 
time under specified conditions. Reactive Maintenance (RM) is an approach in which 
maintenance is performed only when the machine fails or shows signs of failing. Run-to -
failure policy is one in which the equipment is run until it breaks down effecting RM or 
resulting in discarding the equipment, for example, a satellite. 
The above discussion shows that the level of sophistication in various approaches to 
maintenance (asset life management, in general) increases from the run-to-failure policy to the 
risk based approach. 
2.3 RISK BASED APPROACHES TO LIFE MANAGEMENT  
2.3.1 BACKGROUND 
Increased competition is a major driver for cost effective approaches to the life cycle 
management of assets. One such approach is the risk based approach where ‘risk’ involves the 
likelihood of failure of an equipment, component, or structure to fulfil its function and the 
consequential impact of such a failure.  
 
Life cycle management is particularly crucial for a plant in the Useful stage and the Ageing 
stage of its life cycle as depicted in the classic bathtub curve shown in figure 2-3. Figures 2-4 
and 2-5 have been adapted from the HSE report on plant ageing (Wintle et al. 2006). The bath 
tub curve is the idealized curve of the failure rate within a system of infinite components 
versus operating time. Depending on the failure rate, different phases can be discerned in the 
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lifetime of a system.  There are no fixed demarcations between these stages. Indeed, two 
systems commissioned together may be in different stages of their life cycle.  
 
Stage 1: ‘Infant Mortality’ 
  
As a system is put into service, initially the failure rate is high because of the so called 
‘teething’ problems (figure 2-3). The high failure rate during this stage could be because of 
one or the combination of the following: 
 
Figure 2-3: The bath tub curve and its components  
---- Early ‘infant mortality failure’ rate 
.... Wear-out failure rate 
___ Constant (random) failure rate 
 
Stage I: Infant mortality 
Stage II: Useful life 
Stage III: Ageing 
 
The curves in the figure do not use the same scale. 
Fa
ilu
re
 ra
te
 
Operating life 
Stage I Stage II Stage III Bath tub curve 
(Observed 
failure 
rate) 
Risk Based Life Management of Offshore Structures and Equipment 
 
38 
 
 
Figure 2-4: Variation in accumulated damage during equipment cycle 
 
 
Figure 2-5: Effect of periodic maintenance, inspection and repair on the risk of failure 
(Each saw-tooth represents an inspection being carried out on the piece of equipment; figures 2-3, 2-4 and 2-5 
are not drawn to the same scale) 
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 Incorrect application 
 Installation flaws 
 Inherent weakness in component design and material that manifests itself as a failure 
when service conditions are experienced initially 
 fabrication defects not identified by Quality Control/ Manufacturing NDT or 
inspection 
Some of these issues can be remedied at the first examination normally carried out within the 
initial years of operation. The first examination can be used to confirm the reported as-
manufactured condition, and to provide a benchmark against which damage found in future 
examinations could be assessed for life predictions. 
Run-repair-replace decision making as part of life management, in the current context, 
focuses on the stages that follow this initial post commissioning stage. This is because unlike 
the initial post commissioning stage in which failures are due to teething problems, in other 
stages most of the failures (not counting random failures) are attributable to the action of in-
service damage mechanisms.  
 
Stage 2: Useful life  
 
As the name suggests this is the most productive stage of the system. Teething problems have 
been identified and fixed and the equipment is predictable, reliable and has a low rate of 
failure or issues requiring attention. Inspection and maintenance is aimed at prolonging the 
useful life stage of a system.   
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Stage 3: Ageing 
By this stage the equipment is nearing the end of the low damage rate phase. Damage 
accumulated in the previous two stages manifests itself in as an increasing failure rate. At this 
stage, run-repair-replace decisions entailing a more proactive approach towards inspection, 
fitness for service and remnant life assessment of the component needs to be taken.  
 
From the viewpoint of accumulated damage (figure 2-5), equipment in Stage 1, when new or 
after repairs, manufacturing or installation, may contain defects that may trigger an increased 
rate of degradation during service. In Stage 2, although failure rates are nearly constant, 
damage is accumulating. This accumulated damage manifests itself in an increasing failure 
rate in Stage 3.  
2.3.2 FACTORS INFLUENCING THE BATH TUB CURVE 
There are practitioners who find the bath tub curve elusive to observe in practice. This could 
be due to the following reasons: 
 
 The bath tub curve has its origins in reliability studies in the electronics industry. A 
system of electronic components does not normally undergo the sort of inspection and 
maintenance that other engineering structures/ equipment would. Figure 2-3 shows the 
effect of inspection, maintenance and repairs on the risk of failure. 
 The rates of degradation may be highly variable and non-linear depending on the 
degradation mechanism and local operating conditions. On the one hand wall thickness 
due to corrosion may proceed at a constant rate (though not always), on the other hand, 
the number and size of creep and fatigue cracks and local corrosion tend to accelerate with 
time. There can be circumstances where the rate of degradation slows and even stops. 
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Corroding areas may build a layer of oxide that inhabits further attacks. Fatigue cracks 
may stop growing for sometime if subjected to an overload. 
A structure such as ship may age differently with a change in the operating condition: for 
example, a change in cargo, or a change in route. 
 The manner of operation, maintenance, inspection and repairs has a bearing on the rate of 
degradation. An asset may change hands, or maintenance personnel may change resulting 
in a change in the manner an asset is operated and maintained. Invasive work can 
introduce contaminants into the system thereby increasing the rate of degradation, 
temporarily or in the long run. Appropriate inspection, maintenance and repairs of 
damaged areas can reduce both the amount and the rate of change, while unnecessary 
work may have little benefit. 
 
Notwithstanding the above factors, in the life cycle management of assets, it is often useful to 
assume that damage will accumulate over time and manifest itself in terms of an increasing 
failure rate (figures 2-3, 2-4 and 2-5). This provides a theoretical framework on which to build 
a strategy for asset management. It is worth noting here that wear (accumulating as a function 
of hours of use, severity of use, and level of preventive maintenance) and deterioration (the 
gradual decay, corrosion, or erosion as a function of time and severity of exposure conditions) 
of an asset are major factors leading to the loss in value of the same over a period of time 
(Collier, Glagola 1998). In accountancy, this loss of value is represented by depreciation of 
the asset over the time. Thus, during the ageing phase of an asset, and at times the useful 
phase, run-repair-replace decisions typically consider not just FFS assessments, but also 
financial implications such as the cost of equipment failure, the cost of new equipment and 
the depreciation (in accountancy terms) calculated on the asset. The model in the next chapter 
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considers these factors in the run-repair-replace decision making in the management of 
offshore wind farms.  
 
Risk based maintenance approaches focus mainly on the useful and the ageing phases of a 
system. The assessment of risk forms part of what is known as asset management as discussed 
in chapter 1. The aim of risk based asset management is to assist companies in adopting a 
holistic approach to improve performance, dealing not only with the technical or commercial 
risks themselves but also the context in which they exist. 
2.3.3 THE CONCEPT OF TARGET RISK/RELIABILITY LEVELS 
Activities such as inspection, maintenance and repair aim at maintaining assets within 
identified acceptable risk/ reliability levels. Figure 2-6 shows the main approaches to 
establishing what acceptable level of risk / reliability is. 
 
 
Figure 2-6: The approach to establishing acceptable risk/reliability levels 
 
Acceptable probability of failure or 
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failures resulting in 
economic consequences 
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The first approach can be based on expert-opinion elicitation for want of real data or 
experience in operating the new type of structure/ equipment. There are formal procedures for 
doing this (O’Hagan, Anthony et al, 2006; Ayyub, Bilal M, 2001). 
The second approach, i.e. calibration to existing successfully used design codes, is the most 
commonly used approach as it provides the means to build on previous experiences (Ayyub, 
Bilal M., 2003). For example target reliabilities can be established by assessing those implied 
in current codes or rules provided by classification bodies and industry societies in similar 
applications. 
The third approach is based on finding the optimum trade-off between the economic costs of 
an action that mitigates risk and the cost (risk of failure) without that action. Here the aim is to 
minimise the total ‘expected cost’ of operating a plant (structure/ equipment). The next 
chapter shows how ‘expected cost’ is a useful measure of risk. 
The approaches are by no means always mutually exclusive in their application. The risk 
based approaches described in the following chapters aim to minimise expected costs while 
remaining within certain constraints including stipulated reliability/risk levels.  
 
2.3.4 GENERAL METHODOLOGY FOR RISK BASED LIFE MANAGEMENT 
This section discusses main features of a typical Risk based Life Management (RBLM) 
approach which includes the following: 
 
 System analysis 
 Qualitative risk assessment 
 Quantitative risk analysis  
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 Optimising inspection and maintenance 
 
(a) System analysis 
System analysis identifies system or subsystem components, boundaries and success criteria 
to be considered by the RBLM process being developed. It assembles, correlates and analyses 
system operation and failure information.  
 
Once system components are identified, boundaries established and success criteria defined, 
there are a number of formal procedures that facilitate understanding potential failures within 
the system. The objective here is to highlight components that are relatively more at risk of 
failure. Some of these techniques are discussed below. These techniques are not rigid in their 
structure: there are many variants depending on the situation in which they are used. 
 
High risk components that require more consideration need to be identified by formal 
engineering analyses techniques such as FMEA, FMECA, FTA and ETA.  Failure Modes and 
Effects Analysis (FMEA) identifies the component failure modes and impacts on the 
surrounding components and the system. Failure Modes and Effects Criticality Analysis 
(FMECA) is an extension of FMEA in that it formally, qualitatively or quantitatively, ranks 
components in terms of their relative failure criticality. Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is a 
graphical model created by reasoning that considers various combinations of events leading to 
the occurrence of some top event failure. Event Tree Analysis (ETA) is again a graphical 
model but is created by reasoning that considers initial events followed by other events 
leading to a final set of consequences. These techniques may be purely qualitative or may 
have some quantitative data too. Each of these techniques has advantages and limitations vis-
à-vis others. Tools such as FMEA, FTA and ETA provide different perspectives on risk and 
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are not competing tools; they often act in conjunction with each other to give a larger picture 
of risk.  Appendix E gives more details about the techniques discussed above. 
 
(b) Qualitative risk analysis 
Qualitative risk analysis is a technique of setting priorities by risk ranking system components 
into broad failure likelihood and consequence bands. The rankings are relative and based on 
the risk perception gained by experience or historical data captured by formal engineering 
techniques such as FMEA, FMECA, FTA and ETA as discussed above. Qualitative 
assessment creates a risk matrix that enables decision-makers to focus on highest risk for 
further action. This is the first step in thinking in terms of risk rather than just the probability 
or consequence of failure in isolation. Again, as it is a qualitative assessment, consequences 
like safety and environmental damage that are not easily quantifiable, may be factored in. 
This stage will act as a screening stage focusing any further quantitative assessment on the 
higher risk components. 
 
Appendix F describes the risk matrix technique which is a common qualitative risk analysis 
technique. In the appendix some variants of the risk matrix are also discussed- these are semi-
quantitative risk assessments. 
 
(c) Quantitative analysis 
Quantitative analysis replaces to the maximum possible extent, the qualitatively assessed 
likelihood and consequence estimates with numerical failure probability and consequence cost 
values. 
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Quantitative analysis is an elaborate exercise and is usually undertaken only to analyse those 
components that are identified as high risk by qualitative analysis.  Whilst consequence cost is 
relatively easy to quantify - in terms of repair/replacement cost, loss of revenue, etc., the 
likelihood (or probability) of failure of an asset over time is more complex to ascertain. 
Failure probability assessment is usually obtained from: 
 
1. Specific failure data – data that is class specific or plant specific and is locally 
available. It may be the best source but may not be available and/or statistically 
significant. 
2. Generic failure data - available from OEMs and industry experts, reflecting average 
operating conditions. 
3. Engineering analysis - Remaining life estimates using deterministic and 
probabilistic engineering tools.  
 
The quantitative analyses in the chapters that follow use mainly engineering analyses and 
generic data to arrive at the probability of failure of an asset over a period of time. Indeed, 
there are techniques such as those based on Bayesian statistics that can be used to combine or 
update data from various sources.   
 
(d) Optimising inspection and maintenance  
Optimising inspection and maintenance within RBLM involves finding the optimum trade off 
between the cost of undertaking an action (inspection, maintenance, repair or replace) and the 
risk of not taking that action expressed quantitatively in monetary terms or semi-
quantitatively. The optimisation shown in the following chapters takes into account 
constraints such as the available budget, acceptable risk and reliability. 
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The chapters that follow have the same underlying theme- risk based optimisation in the life 
management of assets. Risk, as mentioned earlier, involves the likelihood of failure and the 
consequence of the same. Optimisation is finding the optimum trade off between the expected 
cost (the risk) of failure and the cost of mitigating that risk within user specified constraints 
such as acceptable risk level and the budget available. 
Risk can be reduced to a specified acceptable risk level by reducing the likelihood of failure 
or the consequences of such a failure. This reduction or mitigation is achieved at a cost which 
in practice needs to be within a specific budget.  
Risk based optimisation of a system is different to that of an individual component. Some risk 
values of individual components may rise when the system risk is optimised. Indeed, if a 
maximum acceptable risk value for each component is specified, then the system risk can be 
optimised such that both individual and the overall system risks are within acceptable levels. 
The chapter on optimising spares inventory contains more details regarding system and 
individual risks. 
The risk based optimisation in chapter 3 is aimed at finding the optimum time of repairing or 
replacing an asset such that costs of doing so are balanced by the risks of not doing so. 
The risk based optimisation in chapter 4 is aimed at maintaining an inventory of spares at an 
optimum level by considering the costs of stocking spares and the costs of failure to meet a 
demand for the spares. 
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3 PROJECT 1: RISK BASED LIFE MANAGEMENT OF 
OFFSHORE WIND FARMS 
3.1 GENERAL APPROACH 
3.1.1 SCOPE  
This chapter describes a research project undertaken with the aim of reducing operation and 
maintenance (O&M) costs and increasing the operational reliability of offshore wind turbines. 
This is done by developing a Risk Based Life Management (RBLM) methodology for the 
operation and maintenance of offshore wind farms. This report uses the convention that the 
term ‘wind turbine’ refers to the entire installation and system (rather than just the turbine 
itself), and the term ‘wind farm’ to refer to a group of wind turbines operating together. 
The approach taken in the development of the RBLM methodology included the following 
tasks: 
 System analysis.  
 Qualitative assessment.  
 Quantitative analysis.  
 Optimising inspection and maintenance. 
 
These tasks are discussed from a generic viewpoint in the previous chapter. The discussion 
that follows in this chapter is regarding the application of the above to offshore wind farms, 
with focus on the use of quantitative analysis in optimising inspection and maintenance. Other 
tasks are briefly mentioned with links to relevant appendices for more details. 
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A paper titled ‘A practical approach to risk based assessment and maintenance optimisation of 
offshore wind farms’ presented at ASME’s Offshore Mechanics and Arctic Engineering 
(OMAE) conference, June 10-15, 2007, San Diego, USA is attached as Appendix A. 
 
3.1.2 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS 
The task started with understanding wind turbines. This included tracing the evolution of 
modern wind turbines, identifying key components, and looking at recent development in 
wind turbines. The task involved (1) conducting a literature review, (2) surveying wind 
turbine reliability databases and (3) eliciting expert opinion.  
Appendix G describes a review of literature to understand wind turbines. 
The survey of wind turbine reliability databases (an exercise that included processing of data 
to extract relevant failure statistics) and the elicitation of expert opinion - experts from OEMs 
and wind turbine operators - is the topic of a confidential report not included in this thesis. 
However, an overview of publicly available reliability databases that were considered in the 
report is given below. 
The survey of wind turbine reliability databases included the following: 
i) WindStats:  
WindStats Newsletter is a quarterly wind energy publication with news, reviews on wind 
turbine production and operating data from over 15,000 wind turbines. It publishes production 
and failure data of wind turbines from Denmark, Sweden and Germany.  
ii) The REISI (Renewable Energy Information System on Internet) database from ISET 
(Institute fur Solare Enertieversorgungstechnik), University of Kassel, Germany in 
conjunction with ‘Wind Energy Report Germany 2005): 
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ISET manages a central data base containing wind turbine operating data (from wind turbines 
funded under a project called ‘250 MW Wind’, and data from other turbines that is voluntarily 
reported). 
The data collected and processed by ISET is commercially available for the benefit of wind 
turbine operators and other interested parties. The Wind Energy Report Germany is the 15th of 
the annually published operational results from the WTs included in the 250 MW Wind 
funding programme. The programme initially started as 100 MW Wind programme in 1989 
and was later expanded to 250 MW in 1991. By 1996, 1500 WTs with a total rated capacity of 
350 MW were included in the programme. This programme provides one of the most 
comprehensive long- term operating databases in the world. The WMEP aims to collect data 
in a statistically useful way and evaluate it using uniform criteria for the benefit of the wind 
energy sector in Germany and elsewhere. 
iii) Data from Landwirtschaftskammer Schleswig-Holstein 
In this database, output data and failures of all turbines in the Schleswig-Holstein province of 
Germany are collected and presented. Data from about 500 turbines (57% of which are larger 
than 500kW) for the years 1999 and 2000 was extracted from the publicly available DOWEC 
project report (DOWEC).  
iv) Caithness wind farm information forum 
The forum (Caithness, date unknown) lists documented cases of wind turbine “accidents” that 
are found and confirmed through press reports or official information releases from the 1970s 
till recently.  
v) Information from ‘Guidelines on the environmental risk of wind turbines in the 
Netherlands’ 
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This report (Braam, Rademakers, 2002) analyses over 200 severe incidents and accidents 
from Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands. The data represents about 43,000 turbine years 
and calculates the frequency of occurrence of events relevant to risk assessment. 
The task resulted in identifying main components of wind turbines and parts more prone to 
failure and/ or having relatively higher consequence of failure. However, formal 
categorisation of components depending on their risk of failure took place in the next step. 
3.1.3 QUALITATIVE ASSESSMENT 
A qualitative risk assessment method specifically for wind turbine towers is captured in 
spreadsheet format, screenshots of which can be seen in the figures accompanying the text. 
The procedure for qualitative assessment is described below. 
 
Table 3-3 presents a list of the main components that construct a wind turbine.  The list, 
which can be customized for specific wind turbine designs, is created by conducting system 
analysis (as discussed above).  
 
Each of the identified components are individually considered and ranked in qualitative terms 
based on two criteria i.e. the likelihood of failure and the severity of the consequence of 
failure. Various factors contributing to the likelihood of failure and consequences are 
considered to get an overall likelihood factor and consequence ranking in qualitative terms. 
Many of these factors can be assessed using techniques such as FMEA, ETA and FTA that 
have been discussed in the previous chapter and/or referred to in the Appendices. 
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Factors contributing to the failure likelihood include: 
 Current condition of the component; 
 Design life consumed; 
 Number of active damage mechanisms; 
 Estimated rate of damage; 
 Efficiency of inspection; 
 Loading conditions; 
 Environmental conditions. 
 
Factors contributing to the consequence of a failure include: 
 Production loss (during downtime); 
 Secondary damage (knock-on effects); 
 Threat to personnel; 
 Rectification costs; 
 Impact on reputation; 
 Redundancy. 
 
This estimate is in qualitative terms and ranks from very low (VL) to very high (VH). 
(VL-very low, L- low, M medium, H- high and VH- very high) More ranks could be used to 
give the assessment further resolution if required. Likewise, more factors perceived to be 
affecting the ranking could be added to the work sheet. 
 
A possible qualitative ranking scheme for estimating the failure probability for a component is 
shown below:  
Risk Based Life Management of Offshore Structures and Equipment 
 
54 
Table 3-1: Ranking scheme for likelihood ratings 
Rank Description (expected failure rate of the component) 
Very high Failures continuously experienced 
High Failures occur frequently 
Medium Failures occur several times 
Low Unlikely but possible to occur during the lifespan 
Very Low Very unlikely; occurrence may not be experienced at all 
 
A possible qualitative ranking scheme for estimating the severity of the consequence of 
failure of a component is shown below:  
Table 3-2: Ranking scheme for consequence ratings 
Rank Description (expected cost of the consequence of failure) 
Very high Failure has a knock on effect on the entire operation thus causing massive 
production loss apart from rectification costs. Heavy-duty crane ships are needed 
for rectification. 
High Failure results in a stand-alone loss of production apart from rectification costs. 
Heavy-duty crane ships may be needed for rectification. 
Medium Failure results in production loss; damage is rectified using lighter crane ships 
Low Failure results in partial production loss; damage may be rectified using lighter 
equipment ship 
Very low Failure results in a very temporary production loss; damage is rectified by using 
light equipment 
 Project 1: Risk Based Life Management of Offshore Wind Farms 
 
 55 
Table 3-3: Qualitative risk ranking 
Component   Likelihood   Consequence 
Risk Score 
RPM 
Elec Control   High   Medium 48 
Gear Box   Low   Very High 40 
Yaw System   Low   Medium 24 
Entire Turbine   Low   Very High 40 
Generator   Medium   High 48 
Hydraulic   Low   High 32 
Grid Connection   Medium   Low 24 
Blades   Medium   Medium 36 
Brakes   High   Medium 48 
Axle/ Bearing   Medium   Medium 36 
Mech Control   High   Medium 48 
Entire Nacelle   Medium   Medium 36 
Coupling   Medium   Medium 36 
Tower collapse   Medium   High 48 
Foundation   Low   Very High 40 
 
For simpler systems it is possible to plot the risk on a risk matrix (discussed in Appendix F) in 
terms of the items assigned likelihood and consequence ratings as shown in the second and 
third columns of table 3-3. Usually systems are more complex and additional steps are 
required to assess risk. The next step imparts more discrimination to the risk assessment 
procedure used for complex systems such as wind turbines. 
The product of normalised numerical values for likelihood and consequence of failure gives a 
risk priority measure (RPM) or a risk score. This is shown in table 3-3, 4th Column. 
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RPM= (Normalised value of likelihood of failure) x (Normalised value of consequence of 
failure) 
The process of normalization is as follows: 
If VL, L, M, H and VH can be represented by 20,40,60,80 and 100, then the risk profile of an 
item, say the yaw system in table 3-3 above, which is ranked Low (40) on likelihood and 
Medium (60) on the consequence of failure, can be represented as 
24100/)60*40(  , 
where 24 is the RPM of the yaw system. It must be noted here that these values are relative 
values. 
A histogram uses the RPMs to prioritize components in terms of their risk and thereby 
highlight those components that need more attention, see figure 3-1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-1: Risk histogram 
 
As shown in the figure, the collapse of the tower is in itself not a frequent event, but the risk 
(RPM value 48) from such an event arises from the severity of the consequence. The blades of 
a wind turbine have a high likelihood of being damaged, but the consequence severity is not 
so high and hence the risk of such an event is less than that from a collapse of tower. (RPM 
Risk Histogram using Risk Priority Measure (RPM)
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value 36). The values here are for demonstration only. In certain areas, for example in the 
vicinity of human inhabitation or plant and machinery, the risk to life/ property posed by 
pieces of damaged blade flying off may be considerable. 
 
 
3.2 QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF WIND TURBINE TOWER 
3.2.1 CONCEPT  
As seen in the previous section, a qualitative risk assessment helps maintenance personnel to 
focus on high-risk components for further action. The next stage is to, as far as is practicable, 
conduct a quantitative risk analysis of the component(s) identified as being high risk. 
Quantitative analysis raises the decision making tool to a higher level of precision and risk 
discrimination.  
 
Quantitative analysis replaces the qualitatively assessed VL-VH failure likelihood and 
consequence estimates with a numerical failure probability and a numerical consequence 
value, usually represented by cost (£, $ etc.). For example, if the failure probability of a 
structure is 0.05 per year and the consequence cost of such a failure is £ 100,000, then risk in 
quantitative terms is the expected consequence cost should the failure of the structure occur,  
 
Risk (£/ year) = (Probability of Failure) x (Consequence cost of the failure) 
            = (0.05) x (100,000) 
            = 5000. 
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It must be noted that although not explicitly mentioned here or elsewhere, the failure 
probability considered above and in the wider context of this thesis is, in fact, a joint 
probability. It is, in effect, not just the probability of failure but the probability of a failure 
leading to the specific consequence in consideration. For example, consider a container 
containing an inflammable fluid being assessed. Assume that there is only one type of failure 
i.e. ‘Loss of containment’ leading to only two possible consequences- ‘No fire’ and ‘Fire’- as 
shown in figure 3-2. Then,  
 
 
 
Figure 3-2: The probability of occurrence of a specific consequence 
Probability of fire = (The probability of failure) x (The probability of ignition)                                              (3.1)     
 
Here, the probability of fire is a joint probability and not just the probability of failure. In the 
discussion here, unless indicated otherwise, the probabilities are probabilities of failure 
leading to the specific consequence under consideration. 
 
A quantitative analysis could have deterministic values, a range of values or a distribution to 
reflect the underlying uncertainty as input. A stochastic process is a process with an 
Loss of containment 
(Probability of failure)
No fire 
(Probability of non-ignition) 
Fire 
(Probability of ignition) 
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indeterminate or random element as opposed to a deterministic process that has no random 
element. In a stochastic process, inputs and/ or outputs are a distribution of values described 
by a probability function. For example, corrosion rate in a deterministic model may be 
0.3mm/year, whereas in stochastic model would be, say, a normal distribution, N (.3, 0.05) 
with mean 0.3 mm/year and a standard deviation of .05 mm/year. Most damage mechanisms 
are stochastic in practice and need to be evaluated as such.  
3.2.2 PROBABILISTIC REMAINING LIFE METHODOLOGY 
Failure probabilities are difficult to ascertain. There are a number of methods to obtain failure 
probability versus time data: 
 
a) Using specific failure information: One method is to use specific failure data that is 
plant, equipment or component specific, and is gathered from local sources such as 
maintenance and inspection histories. This is usually the best source of information because it 
is specific to local operating conditions such as weather, management strategy etc. However, 
such failure data may not be available, or if available, may not be statistically significant. 
Specific failure information can also be generated from industry experts 
 
b) Using generic failure data: This data is obtained from original equipment 
manufacturers (OEMs), industry experts or public sources. In a way, it is a collection of 
specific information. Although such a data set represents a range of operating conditions 
across a larger population of equipment, it is an excellent point of reference. The data is 
statistically more significant as it is taken from a bigger population of equipment across 
industries. Such databases exist in the Oil & Gas, power generation and aviation industries.  
 
Risk Based Life Management of Offshore Structures and Equipment 
 
60 
c) Conducting engineering analysis: There are methods for predicting damage rates and 
these can be incorporated in probabilistic models to calculate probabilities of failure. 
 
The procedure here considers engineering analysis to demonstrate the technique of using 
quantitative analysis as input to a risk model. A measurable degradation mechanism- 
corrosion- has been chosen for which a probabilistic degradation model has been created. A 
typical asset remaining life (RL) calculation has statistical distributions describing the damage 
rate, the materials properties and the current damage state. These distributions are inputs to 
the life calculation. In the technique described here, by using Monte Carlo Simulation (MCS) 
software, random values are selected from each input distribution. The calculation is repeated 
many times selecting random combinations of values from all inputs. Instances in which RL 
is negative are counted as failure to calculate the probability of failure. The sections that 
follow discuss the RL model further. 
 
A failure modes and effects analysis identified corrosion, fatigue and scouring as the 
significant degradation mechanisms affecting WT towers. The rate and action of these 
degradation mechanisms can be quantified in terms of a probabilised damage model and 
loading environment based on some assumptions. This quantitative assessment of failure 
probability can then be used as input into a model for optimising inspection and maintenance.  
 
In this work a risk model has been developed for corrosion but similar models could be 
developed for fatigue and scouring. A full analysis would take all these mechanisms into 
account. However, this work serves to illustrate the general approach. 
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3.2.3 DEGRADATION MECHANISMS 
From the failure modes and effects analysis the following mechanisms causing degradation to 
a WT tower structure were identified and are now discussed. 
(a) Fatigue 
The tower structure of a wind turbine is subjected to cyclic stresses causing fatigue. These 
stresses originate from sources including variations in the wind loading, the effects of waves 
and vibration induced by the movement of the turbine itself. The cyclic stresses cannot be 
easily calculated since the loads are not well defined, but an alternative is to measure the 
strain, or better still the fatigue damage, directly using strain gauges or a fatigue sensor 
system. 
 
There are a number of fatigue sensor systems in the market to assess fatigue in welded joints, 
which are the areas most susceptible to fatigue. One such sensor- CrackFirstTM - developed in 
a project funded by the DTI’s LINK Sensor and Sensor Systems for Industrial Applications 
Programme is briefly discussed here. (More information is available at 
http://www.strainstall.com/.) 
 
The fatigue sensor is installed on a welded steel structure. It indicates the portion of fatigue 
design life of the structure consumed. The sensors are so placed that they are subjected to the 
same loading history as the structure they are monitoring. They record the cumulative fatigue 
damage of the structure and thus enable engineers to estimate its remaining life. 
 
There are several ways of powering and interrogating the sensor. For remote locations, such 
as offshore wind farms, an on-board electronics unit that checks the sensor status and records 
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the same for download to a Bluetooth enabled PC (range of about 10 meters), can be used. 
Data in the following format (table 3-4) can be obtained from such a sensor:  
 
Table 3-4: Fatigue sensor output 
 
Reading 
(year) 
Fatigue design life 
consumed (%) 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
0 
 
0 
 
7 
 
10 
 
15 
 
28 
 
Estimates of the fatigue design life consumed at several points in the structure may be used in 
the sort of risk model for the failure of the structure as a whole, as described below. The 
probability of failure by fatigue increases with the amount of fatigue design life consumed. 
The output of the sensor can thus be used to estimate the probability of failure for the tower as 
a whole. 
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(b) Scouring  
Scouring results from the erosion of soil particles at or near the tower foundation caused by 
waves or currents. Scouring may affect the ultimate and fatigue load capacity of the tower 
structure. Equations to predict scouring and means of preventing scouring are given in the 
DNV Offshore Standard on Wind turbines (Det Norske Veritas June 2004). Again, the 
variations or uncertainties in the depth of scouring and the loading can be translated into a 
probability of failure by engineering analysis, but this was beyond the scope of this work.  
 
(c) Corrosion 
FMEA highlighted corrosion as one of the main damage mechanisms affecting the integrity of 
the structure of a wind turbine tower. There is no fixed value that is universally accepted for 
the corrosion rate of steel in ambient temperature sea water. Although corrosion rates are 
often treated as constant over time, some experts believe that the corrosion rate of steel in sea 
water decreases with time. 
The probabilistic model discussed in the next section assumes a hypothetical distribution for 
the corrosion rate. In practice, this distribution may be obtained by fitting a curve to the 
corrosion values obtained from historical data from similar structures operating in a similar 
environment 
Failure modes and effects analysis to identify consequences of damage to a wind turbine 
tower: 
The analysis here considers consequences to be business critical rather than safety critical. 
Hence, the cost of consequence will include repair or replacement costs and lost revenue 
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during downtime, all of which are relatively easy to quantify, see table 3-5.  The table is the 
result of a dedicated brainstorming session at TWI Ltd.  
 
3.2.4 QUANTITATIVE CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS 
 
Table 3-2 shows a ranking scheme for consequence ratings. A more comprehensive one with 
more quantitative assessment using FMEA is shown in table 3-5. The table is for illustration 
only. There may be some intangibles remaining or if quantified, may be approximate 
assessments; for example, ‘technology confidence loss’ may be quantified in some way- 
losing similar projects or a drop in the share value of the company.  
In the analysis that follows, for simplicity, the consequence considered and quantified is just 
the production loss. 
 
3.2.5 QUANTITATIVE PROBABILISTIC DAMAGE MECHANISM MODEL FOR 
FAILURE DUE TO CORROSION 
 
This thesis does not discuss the details of damage models for use in probabilistic analysis. 
Instead it illustrates a simple probabilistic damage mechanism model for general corrosion 
of the tower structure. Consider a structure subject to corrosion. For the sake of simplicity, 
assume that this is the only damage mechanism causing failure of the structure and that 
there is a breakdown of coating. The remaining life (RL) of the structure can be calculated 
as: 
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RL
CR
MATTc )(                                                                                                                 (3.2) 
Table 3-5: Identified consequences and associated costs of damage to a wind turbine tower 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
where, RL = remaining life (years); Tc = current thickness of the structure (mm);  
MAT = minimum allowable thickness to maintain integrity of the structure (mm); and  
CR = corrosion rate (mm/year). These terms are explained in more detail later in this 
section. 
If oT is the original nominal thickness of the structure, then at the end of t years, 
Failure Mode Effect Consequence category Consequence Cost (£k) Source/comment
Maintenance duration
Regulator penalties
Other turbines
Sea vehicles
local structures
Injury
Death
Installation of new structure
Repair and recommission
Insurance premium
Technology confidence loss
Lost production
Maintenance cost
Keep in service
Maintenance duration
Regulator penalties
Other turbines
Sea vehicles
local structures
Injury
Death
Installation of new structure
Repair and recommission
Insurance premium
Technology confidence loss
Lost production
Maintenance cost
Keep in service
Maintenance duration
Regulator penalties
Other turbines
Sea vehicles
local structures
Injury
Death
Installation of new structure
Repair and recommission
Insurance premium
Technology confidence loss
Lost production
Maintenance cost
Keep in service
Personnel
Maintenance costs
Reputation
Repair
Corrosion - 
Uniform Band in 
Splash Zone
Collapse
Find and Assess
Collapse
Scouring
Fatigue - 
Circumferential 
cracking
Collapse
Find and Assess
Find and Assess
Reputation
Repair
Production loss
Secondary Damage
Personnel
Maintenance costs
Reputation
Repair
Production loss
Secondary Damage
Production loss
Secondary Damage
Personnel
Maintenance costs
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tCRTT oc * .                                                                                                                                                                                                                   (3.3) 
The reliability of an element of a system can be determined based on a performance 
function that can be expressed in terms of basic random variables )( iX  for relevant random 
loads and structural strength (Ayyub, 2003). 
Mathematically, the performance function Z can be described as 
LRXXXZ n  ),...,,( 21                                                                                                                     ( 3.4) 
where, R is the resistance or strength and L is the load.  
The limit state can be defined as 
0Z  .                                                                                                                                                        ( 3.5 )  
 
Accordingly, when 0Z , the element is in the failure state, and, when 0Z , it is in the 
survival state. 
The limit state equation implied in equation (3.2), when remaining life is zero, can be 
expressed as 
0
)*()( 
CR
MATtCRT
CR
MATT
RL oc ,                                                                                                                                     (3.6) 
0*  MATtCRTo , which can be re-arranged to 
  0]*[  tCRMATTo .                                                                                                                          (3.7) 
where,  the first term represents structural strength (R) , and the second, load effect (L). 
A purely deterministic RL model would have each independent variable in equation 3.2 as 
a specific value. This assumes that these variables have no random or probabilistic aspects 
but can be defined in a fixed predictable fashion. In reality, there is considerable 
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uncertainty associated with these variables and each can be defined by a statistical 
distribution of values. 
The corrosion rate (CR) maybe derived from periodic in-service measurements of metal 
loss resulting from corrosion or from laboratory tests. In the calculations that follow, CR is 
assumed to be a normal distribution with a mean of 0.4mm/year and a standard deviation 
of 0.1mm/year, N (0.4, 0.1). These values are for demonstration only. As CR cannot be 
negative, the distribution is truncated to so that the lower boundary is greater than or equal 
to zero.  
The RL model has been created using the ‘@Risk’ software from Palisade Corporation. 
Figure 3-3 depicts the distribution for CR using the @Risk software. Numbers on the 
horizontal axis represent the corrosion rate in mm/year. (The percentage values on the 
horizontal axis show what percentage lie in a given range of values- this is not used in the 
below. The values on the vertical axis in figure 3-3 are also not used in the calculation 
below.) The distribution can also be obtained from fitting a curve to real values of CR as 
measured over a period of time and could well be a different kind of distribution. 
Normal(0.4, 0.1) Trunc(0,+inf)
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Figure 3-3: Corrosion rate (mm/year) distribution 
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Current thickness (Tc) is known from the most recent thickness measurements on the 
structure, say during the year of assessment. If recent thickness measurements are not 
available, Tc can be assumed to be equal to the original nominal thickness of the structure 
(To) as specified by the designer including tolerances, corrosion allowance, etc, and the RL 
calculated from the year of installation. For the purpose of demonstration, in the model, To 
is also a normal distribution, N (100, 1) i.e. with mean=100mm and standard 
deviation=1mm. 
MAT is the absolute minimum allowable thickness calculated by the designer to prevent 
failure by overload, collapse, etc as appropriate. In the illustration this value is 90 mm. 
‘Failure’ in this context is not having the minimum allowable design thickness (MAT) 
rather than actual physical collapse of the structure. The probability of not meeting MAT is 
greater than that of structural collapse as there is a factor of safety within the minimum 
design thickness, making the analysis conservative.  
In the method here, the statistical analysis tool - Palisade’s @RISK for Microsoft Excel-  is 
used to describe all the independent variables probabilistically, and RL is then calculated 
using Monte Carlo Simulation (MCS) technique. In this way, the calculated RL by MCS is 
actually a distribution of values, so that the annual probability of failure (the failure rate 
per year) over time can be obtained. This annual probability of failure, in the current 
context, is effectively the proportion of surviving population of structures from the 
previous year that is expected to fail within the year under consideration. 
 Annual probability of failure )0(  RLP                                                                                          (3.4) 
For example, see figure 3-4 that shows an assessment of the annual probability of failure of 
a tower structure with (1) an initial (in the year of installation i.e. 2000) thickness of 100 
mm with some deviation described by N(100,1); (2) Expected CR as N(0.4, 0.1) with 
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negative values truncated; (3) MAT as 90 mm. The number of iterations is set to 1000. 
This means that for year 2000, 1000 values for CR and Tstart are selected from the 
respective stipulated distributions. These initial values are used in calculations for the year 
2000 and all the subsequent years.  
 
Figure 3-4: Screenshot of inputs and outputs of the corrosion model 
For every year, equation 3.2 is used to calculate the annual probability of failures. For 
example, in the year 2013, 
TcTstart  8.94 , where 94.8 in effect represents the mean of 1000 iterations; 
MATTc  too has 1000 values. 
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The algorithm counts the number of times MATTc  is negative or zero; in this case 7 times 
out of a total of 1000 iterations. These are the times when, as per equation 3.2, .0RL  
Percentage values give )0( RLP  as shown in column 5 in figure 3-3. 
This annual probability of failure (failure rate) versus time curve is used in the next stage 
in which the timing of an action (repair/ replacement) can be optimised such that financial 
benefit is optimised.  
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Figure 3-5: The annual probability of failure versus time curve 
3.3 RISK BASED FINANCIAL OPTIMISATION OF MAINTENANCE 
ACTION GIVEN A FAILURE TREND 
3.3.1 THE NEED FOR FINANCIAL CRITERION IN MAINTENANCE DECISION 
MAKING 
Maintenance projects are increasingly being evaluated by decision makers who need to 
understand the implications of various options in financial terms. Although predictive 
maintenance techniques have matured, the predictions are in engineering terms. Thus, there 
 Project 1: Risk Based Life Management of Offshore Wind Farms 
 
 71 
is a need to express the effects of engineering wear and tear in financial terms. In the 
current context, this is done by evaluating the cost of the consequences of failure owing to 
wear and tear of plant and machinery. 
 
3.3.2 THE DRIVERS FOR A CONSISTENT DECISION MAKING METHODOLOGY IN 
MAINTENANCE 
Many old plants, structures, capital equipment or components are in their Ageing period of 
life. However, increasing competition means many of them cannot be replaced and need to 
have their useful life extended. In addition, new components are often designed to operate 
with maximum efficiency, and are designed with lower “margins of error” against assumed 
operating conditions. 
Each action (or project) has costs associated with it. These costs are, in essence, 
investments made by the concerned asset owner with the expectation of certain return on 
the investment(s). The decision maker will normally be faced with a number of projects 
competing for such investments, and therefore needs to take decisions that maximise the 
returns on these investments. The most widely understood financial techniques to evaluate 
projects include ‘return on investment’, ‘pay-back period’ and ‘discounted cash flow 
(DCC)’ methods (Brealey, Myers 1991). These techniques have various strengths and 
weaknesses. The methodology here employs the net present value (NPV) technique that is 
a form of DCC analysis 
3.3.3  NPV IN FINANCIAL ANALYSIS 
In the current discussion, it is assumed that a project with a higher NPV is a better 
investment than a project with a lower NPV. The NPV of a project is the present (current) 
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value of the total future cash flows, i.e. the net of both positive (income) and negative 
(cost) cash flows.  NPV considers the time value of money by discounting all the cash 
flows, and it is calculated as follows: 
NPV = 


N
t
t
t rC
0
)1()(                                                                                                                          (3.5) 
N = project life (years); t = timing of cash flow (year); r = interest rate, or discount rate; 
and Ct = cash flow in year t. 
The future cash flows are ‘expected’ cash flows, as they do not occur with certainty. The 
uncertainty arises in the engineering analysis to calculate the probability of failure over 
time for the damage mechanism(s) of interest. 
The risk associated with any project is expressed in terms of its NPV by using expected 
values (EV). The EV of a failure event is the product of the probability of an event 
occurring and the cost of consequence of that event. The probability of an event and the 
cost of the consequence(s) of that event is directly assessed from prior quantitative  
analyses; the consequence cost is expressed in financial terms. 
Thus, the NPV of a project with uncertain outcomes is the sum of the expected values of 
all future discounted cash flows, as follows: 
 
NPV = 


N
t
t
tt rCp
0
)1()(                                                                                                                  (3.6) 
where, pt = the probability of the event occurring at time t. 
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3.3.4  THE RISK-BASED OPTIMISATION MODEL 
 
The optimisation maximises the NPV of the action (repair/replacement) under consideration. 
In this case, the optimisation finds the least negative value of NPV. Cash inflows are treated 
as positive and cash outflows as negative: 1) money spent on an action is negative, 2) failure 
consequence costs ((unplanned) outages due to failure- mainly production loss considered 
here, for simplicity) is also negative, but 3) failure costs avoided by undertaking the action 
under consideration are considered positive. 
Consider that our planning period is from t=0 to t=N and the year of assessment is t=0. Let us 
consider the NPV of an action undertaken in any year t=n. It is given by: 
NPV= (Expected present value of action undertaken in year t=n) + (Expected present value of 
costs due to outages prior to the action) + (Expected present value of costs due to 
outages avoided due the action)                                                                               (3.7) 
The first two terms in equation 3.11 are negative, the third is positive.  
Hence,  
NPV = { ])1()([ t
Nt
nt
Pt rC   

 +   [- t
nt
t
Btt rCp )1()(
0
 

 ]} + { t
Nt
nt
Btt rCp )1()(
1
 

]   }           (3.8) 
In equation (3.12), for the NPV of an action taken at time t=n, the following can be defined: 
CBt = Cash flows associated with production in year t; 
CPt = Cash flows associated with implementing the project in year t, including any tax credits 
(positive cash flow) on depreciation costs (Collier, Glagola 1998);  
N = the maintenance planner’s strategic planning period, i.e. from t=0 to t=N; 
n = year in which the action is proposed to be undertaken; 
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pt = probability of the event (failure leading to the particular consequence) occurring in year 
‘t’; and 
r = interest rate, i.e. the cost of money (finance). 
The optimisation algorithm calculates the year of maintenance action for which the NPV is 
maximum (least negative, in this case), subject to stipulated constraints.  
The maintenance action may be replacement or repair. In both cases, it is assumed that the 
cost of action includes the cost of initial problems (teething problems) and that once the 
equipment or structure is in place and functional, it begins its life cycle at a relatively very 
low failure rate. 
The key inputs to the optimisation model are as follows: 
(a) The annual probability of failure versus time values using which expected values are 
derived as per the formula discussed above; the failure trend is obtained from quantitative 
assessments. 
(b) The consequence cost of failure  (unplanned outage). 
(c) Interest rates and depreciation as applicable. 
(d) Any financial constraints, such as the annual maintenance budget limit. 
(e) Although not shown in the calculations here, any non-financial constraints, e.g. those on 
failure rates due to safety regulations. 
 
3.3.5 DEMONSTRATION OF THE MODEL 
The approach described above is demonstrated by evaluating three offshore wind turbine 
tower structures. The failure trend from a probabilistic corrosion model is presented in 
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figures 3-4 (spreadsheet calculations) and 3-5 (graphical presentation). How the Action 
NPV (depicted by the curve with triangles) changes with the failure trend (curve with 
square boxes; the same curve as shown in figure 3-5) is shown figure 3-6. The values are 
obtained using equation 3.7 for each year in the planning period. 
The NPV of an action to mitigate the probability of failure over the operating life of a 
structure/ equipment
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Figure 3-6: The optimum time of replacement of structure 1, given the cost of such action and the annual 
probability of failure over its operating life 
 
The optimised replacement time for Structure 1- year 2016- is shown in figure 3-6. This is 
the year in which the ‘Action NPV’ is the least negative.  
The figure depicts the application of risk based approach to undertaking run-repair-replace 
decision-making for structure 1. The probability of failure versus time curve derived from 
remaining life estimates on its own is often incomplete information to the decision maker. 
The Action NPV versus time curve generated by the risk based approach enables one to 
make a more informed maintenance decision by considering the consequences of failure 
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too. Thus the context in which the structure is operating and the implications of it failing 
feed into the process of run-repair-replace decision-making.   
The optimised action years for the other two structures are derived in the same way. This is 
shown in figure 3-7. It is seen that both structure 1 and structure 2 have the same year of 
replacement- 2016, and structure 3 has 2012 as the year of replacement. The figure shows 
a scenario in which the budget for repair/ replacement of structures in a wind farm is set to 
maximum of £ 6400,000 in any given year with an increase of 0.05 % every year. It is 
assumed that if this budget is not used in a given year on asset management actions within 
this wind farm, it is used elsewhere- there is no facility for a rollover. Due to this limit on 
expenses, if actions are taken as calculated, there would be deficits in the years in which 
the actions are taken.  
To address this, optimisation is carried out again (using Solver in Microsoft Excel). The re-
scheduled time of action is shown in figure 3-7. All actions are now within the allocated 
budget. However, the change in schedule comes at a price: the NPV decreases from the 
previously optimised value of - £ 7118677 to -£ 7148132. To take the analyses one step 
further this loss in NPV could be compared to the expected cost of borrowing to see if 
actions can be taken in the years as originally identified as the most optimum time. 
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Figure 3-7: Optimised action schedule leading to budget deficit arising due to two structures being 
replaced in the same year (2016) 
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Figure 3-8: Re-scheduling the year of action such that the costs lie within allocated budget 
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3.3.6 IN-SERVICE INSPECTION OPTIMISATION 
The model could be extended to inspection actions. Instead of the replacement cost of the 
component, the cost of in-service inspection would be considered. Since such actions 
(projects) are usually accounted for as ‘expenses’ in the year in which they occur, rather 
than as ‘investments’ (which would then be written-off over several years), tax credits 
from depreciated costs do not arise. Since inspection costs are relatively low compared to 
production loss it is expected that the model would suggest the optimum year of inspection 
to be the first year of the planning period. To address this, ASME (ASME 2003a) suggest 
the following course of action to optimise in-service inspection dates: 
 
1. Optimise the action date as if the action was replacement, 
2. Inspect the equipment before this calculated replacement date, 
3. Compare the actual component damage found during inspection, to the projected 
conditions, and then 
4. Replace the component if necessary, or re-calculate a new optimised replacement 
date. 
3.3.7 DISCUSSION  
In the RBLM optimisation model presented above, the following points warrant further 
discussion: 
(1) Multi-component optimisation 
It has been shown that the optimum year of replacement can be calculated when the net 
present value (NPV) of the maintenance action is maximised. If in a system of structures 
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there is a budgetary constraint that does not allow for a series of actions to be undertaken 
in a given strategic planning period, further optimisation can be undertaken using the 
approach. 
(2) Quantitative inputs 
The technique requires a quantitative assessment of degradation/ damage. This is at times 
expensive, time consuming and requiring simplifying assumptions to be made. 
As in all models, the outcome is sensitive to the variation in the inputs. This is all the more 
true in complex models in which inputs are not fixed and may be in the form of 
distributions. Volatility in the inputs may manifest in higher volatility and uncertainty in 
the outcome. Such levels of uncertainty may limit the applicability of such models. 
(3) RBLM models in complex systems 
For more complex systems with increasing number of components and constraints, non-
linear optimisation tools (e.g. those based on genetic algorithms) that are more powerful 
than the linear Solver in Microsoft Excel may be required. 
 (4) Direction of future relevant work 
There is scope for further work on deriving failure estimates using expert elicitation and 
combining failure probabilities using Bayesian methods to update prior probability 
distributions with other data sources, e.g. combining specific failure databases with expert 
knowledge. More research is needed in assessing the use of genetic algorithms for 
optimisation in complex systems. Finally, further work is needed to incorporate a wider 
range of in-service equipment damage mechanisms to optimise RBLM actions.  
(5) The application of risk based approaches such as the one presented here does not 
require as a pre-requisite that failure data be in shape of the bath tub curve mentioned in 
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the previous chapter. Although it is often useful to assume that damage will accumulate 
over time and manifest itself in terms of an increasing failure rate, real operational data 
may not indicate this for a number of reasons shown in 2.3.2. Risk based approaches use a 
measure of risk to undertake asset integrity methods. The risk in a system of assets may 
vary during its operational life and not follow a fixed trend. 
3.4 CONCLUSIONS FROM THE PROJECT 
The project developed a RBLM methodology for the management of offshore wind farms. 
The risk-model developed for implementing the methodology finds the optimum time of an 
action - repair/replacement- of a component at risk of failure under the action of 
degradation mechanisms such that financial benefit is maximised.  
To demonstrate the working of the model, a basic probabilistic model to obtain failure 
rates due to the action of an identified degradation mechanism- corrosion- has been 
developed. The focus in this chapter is on how to use this quantitative assessment of the 
probability of failure to undertake run-repair-replace decision-making such that the net 
present value (NPV) of such action is the maximum. 
The RBLM approach demonstrated for wind turbine tower structures of offshore wind 
farms can be used in asset life management in other industry sectors as well.  
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4 PROJECT 2: RISK BASED OPTIMISATION OF SPARES 
INVENTORY MANAGEMENT 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
4.1.1 THE CONTEXT 
All businesses need to manage risks. Almost always there are competing risks and finite 
resources available to manage them. The research described here proposes an innovative 
methodology to minimize risks within a budgetary constraint, or to minimize the budget 
required to operate at specified acceptable levels of risk. In the current context, there is 
demand for spare parts that needs to be met within available resources; the risk is the cost of 
not meeting a demand and having to bear the consequential cost, and the budget is the 
allocated financial resource to manage this risk. 
 
The research project presented here is in response to a real-life problem of developing a 
methodology for optimising the stocking of spare parts in the shipping sector. The research 
has benefitted from access to some databases used in spares management, and discussions 
with Shell International Trading and Shipping Company Limited (STASCO) and Lloyd’s 
Register (LR) regarding practical issues involved in the management of an inventory of spare 
parts. 
 
The method is applicable to any business in which demand (in-house or external) for goods or 
services is required to be met, subject to some constraints. The constraints are mainly the 
funds available for meeting the demand and/or the maximum acceptable risk of not meeting 
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the demand i.e. having a stockout. A reasonable assumption is that some data - historical data 
or forecast indicating the demand in a given period - is available.  
 
From the shipping industry where spares need to be stocked, to the hospitality sector where 
hotels need to order supplies, there is a requirement to prioritise the ordering within user 
specified constraints and often with limited demand forecast data. The model presented here 
provides an innovative risk based methodology to do the same.  
4.1.2 THE APPROACH 
The level of spares in an inventory has a direct bearing on machine availability. The 
availability of a machine is a function of the mean time to correct a failure which in turn 
depends upon, among other factors, the time to obtain a spare (to conduct repairs) or a 
replacement. The level of spares in a spares inventory is constrained by the cost of having 
stock and the penalty of being out of stock. In a competitive climate companies strive to keep 
their spares inventory at an optimum level to minimize the costs involved.  
This research presents a new approach - a risk based approach - to spares inventory 
management aimed at establishing an optimum level of spares such that financial benefit is 
maximized within accepted levels of risk, and the remaining (residual) risks are clearly 
identified. The discussion here presents a framework that enables consistent and auditable 
decision making in spares inventory management. 
Risk based approaches are used many sectors of industry and for prioritizing different types of 
actions; for example, there are risk based approaches in the process industry to manage 
maintenance and inspection and there are standards or guidance documents to implement 
these approaches (ASME International 2003b) (API Publication 2000) (API 2002a) (EEMUA 
2006).  
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As opposed to other approaches, in a risk based approach, actions are based on the risk 
estimate of various options. In the current context, this means maintaining an inventory at an 
optimal level depending on the risk profile of the spares in which the likelihood of a failure to 
meet the demand for a spare is considered in conjunction with the consequences of the failure 
to meet that demand. The optimal level is such that financial benefits are optimised, given 
risk-associated constraints. 
In the discussion below, some of the unique features of spares inventories vis-à-vis other 
types of inventories are mentioned at the outset. Then there is a section on typical costs 
associated with inventories followed by a brief note on the main principles underlying various 
current approaches to spares inventory management. The main body of the paper then 
presents the risk based methodology and the basic model that has been created to implement 
that methodology. This is followed by possible areas of further research and conclusions. 
This chapter draws on two technical papers that were presented at different stages of relevant 
research. These are referred to in the text and attached in Appendices mentioned below:  
Appendix B: "A risk based approach to spare parts inventory management", International 
Mechanical Engineering Congress and Exposition (IMECE) ASME, 2-6 November 2008, 
Boston, USA. 
Appendix C: "Optimisation of resources for managing competing risks", 10th International 
conference on Engineering Structural Integrity Assessment, 19-20 May 2009, Manchester, 
UK. 
4.1.3 SPARE PARTS INVENTORIES 
Spare parts inventories are maintenance inventories; they are used by maintenance personnel 
to keep machines available and exist to meet an internal (in-house) demand for spares. They 
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perform a different function compared to other inventories such as Work-in-progress (WIP) 
inventories and Finished Product Inventories. WIP inventories smooth out irregularities in 
production flow. These irregularities are caused by factors such as changes in product mix, 
equipment breakdowns, differences in production rates, between processes and material 
handling. Finished Product Inventories provide a buffer stock to protect against lead time 
demand, differences in quality levels, differences in machine production rates, labour 
troubles, scheduling problems, gap between capacity and demand and other well established 
production problems(Kennedy, Wayne Patterson & Fredendall 2002). 
Characteristics of spare parts inventories: Spares Inventories are hugely influenced by 
maintenance policies rather than customer usages that dictate WIP or Finished Product 
Inventories. For scheduled maintenance, the demand for spares is relatively more predictable 
and it may be possible to order parts to arrive just in time for use and indeed not stock such 
parts at all. For unplanned maintenance, a lack of some stock often means that the 
consequences of not keeping some stock include production loss and the extra cost incurred in 
procuring parts at short notice.  
There are other factors such as the amount of redundancy within a system, the availability of 
information from condition monitoring equipment, the inter-dependency of failure events, the 
possibility of demands being met by cannibalism and the effect of parts or machine 
obsolescence on the level of stock holding. There has also been research illustrating how other 
factors such as the organizational context of inventories, especially the responsibilities and 
authorities of the persons concerned, have a bearing on inventory management, (Zomerdijk, 
de Vries 2003). 
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4.1.4 TYPICAL COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH INVENTORIES 
Businesses like to avoid excess inventory as there are costs incurred in keeping stock. Some 
of these are: 
(a) Ordering and setting up costs: These are fixed costs that do not depend on the size of the 
order. For example, ordering costs would include paperwork and billing associated with the 
order. For parts made in-house, ordering and set up costs would include the cost of labour, 
setting up and shutting down the associated machinery.  
(b) Unit purchasing cost: This is the variable unit cost of a part or a component. If the part is 
manufactured in-house, It includes the variable labour cost, the overhead cost, and the raw 
material cost needed to produce a single unit. If this part is ordered from an external source, 
then the unit purchase cost must include the shipping cost. 
(c) Holding or carrying cost: These are essentially the inventory costs expressed in monetary 
value per unit part per year. It includes storage cost, insurance cost, taxes on inventory, and 
cost due to the possibility of spoilage, theft, or obsolescence. However, usually the most 
significant of the holding cost is the opportunity cost incurred by tying up capital in inventory. 
The opportunity cost is the return the company would expect on an investment elsewhere 
rather than in stock-holding. 
(d) Stockout costs: When a demand for a product or a part is not met on time, a stockout is 
said to have occurred. If it is acceptable for demands to be met at a later date, no matter how 
much later, it is said that demands may be back-ordered. If it is necessary for demands to be 
met on time, and if this is not achieved, then the scenario is a lost case one.  
In the current context, risk is the combination of the probability of a stockout event and its 
consequential cost, where a stockout is a lost case scenario. Such a stockout may result in 
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production loss, having to procure spares at an additional cost (‘distress cost’), knock-on 
failures requiring more parts and/or resulting in more production loss, regulatory penalty and 
other consequences such as loss of goodwill. Usually it is more difficult to measure the cost 
of a stockout rather than the cost of ordering, purchasing or holding.  
4.1.5 APPROACHES TO INVENTORY MANAGEMENT 
There are different approaches to Inventory Management. Prasad, categorizes inventory 
models into two: Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) and Materials Requirement Planning 
(MRP) (Prasad 1993). Under these, he classifies about ninety inventory models. The basic 
model in an EOR method determines, subject to a number of assumptions, an ordering policy 
that minimizes the yearly sum of ordering cost, purchasing cost, and the holding cost of a part 
in the inventory. The basic model in an MRP based method considers the relationship 
between a component that is demanded and other associated (sub) components that also need 
to be available in order to fulfil that demand.   
Winston classifies models as Deterministic EOQ Models, Probabilistic Models and other 
recent models such as MRP, Just-in-time (JIT) and Exchange Curves (Winston 1993). Of 
particular interest, within probabilistic models, is the ABC classification system devised by 
General Electric during the 1950s. Within this system, in its very basic form, items are 
stocked according to empirical studies that show that 5%-20% of all items stocked account for 
55%-65% of sales; these items are classified as Type A. Similarly Type B and Type C are 
items that account for a decreasing percentage of sales and are accordingly allocated lower 
priority in stocking.  
ABC classification system seems to be inspired by the Pareto principle that, in its original 
form, says that 20% of a quantity is responsible for 80% of some other quantity i.e. 
causes:effect = 20:80; for example, 20% of business clients may account for 80% of the sales. 
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Indeed, Pareto Analysis is a useful technique in decision making where many possible courses 
of action are competing for attention. Such an analysis can identify the most effective actions 
within available resources that give a total benefit as close to the maximum possible one. 
Pareto Analysis is a creative way of looking at causes of problems, but can exclude those that 
are initially small and may grow over time; thus, it must be used in conjunction with other 
analytical tools such as FMEA, ETA and FTA. 
To turn ABC classification on its head there is “The Long Tail” concept put forward by Chris 
Anderson (Anderson 2006). The assertion here is that products that are low in demand or have 
low sales volume can collectively make up a market share that rivals or exceeds the relatively 
few bestsellers and blockbusters, given a large enough store (stock) and distribution channels; 
this concept is gaining attention in a changing world with, inter alia, a shift to internet 
shopping and an increase in the demand for customised products.  
Nahmias looks specifically at repairable inventory systems and classifies existing models into 
three general classes: continuous review, periodic review and models based on cyclic queuing 
systems (Nahmias 1981). 
The risk based approach presented here is unique in that it does not completely fall in any of 
these categories although it might have some elements of the approaches listed above. 
4.1.6 RISK BASED APPROACH TO INVENTORY MANAGEMENT 
In the current context, the following terms have a special meaning: Risk is the combination of 
the probability of a stockout event and its consequence, where a stockout is an event when a 
spare is not available on demand. Qualitative risk analysis broadly covers methods that use 
engineering judgment and experience as the basis for the analysis of probabilities and 
consequences. Failure Modes, Effects, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) and Hazard and 
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Operability Studies (HAZOPs) are examples of qualitative risk analysis that become 
quantitative risk analysis when consequences and failure probability values are estimated.  
Quantitative risk analysis a) identifies and delineates the combinations of events that, if they 
occur lead to an undesired event b) estimates the frequency of occurrence for each 
combination c) estimates the consequences. The approach shown here is a semi-quantitative 
approach that captures best estimates from experts as well as raw historical data. The risk of a 
stockout referred here is relative risk, i.e. the risk of a stockout of a component or equipment 
in relation to each other. 
In the method described below, a risk profile of the spares is obtained by considering the 
likelihood of a failure to meet the demand for a spare in conjunction with the consequences of 
the failure to meet that demand. This risk profile is then used to find the optimal level of 
inventory such that financial benefit is maximized given an identified acceptable risk level. 
4.2 RISK OPTIMISATION MODEL 
4.2.1 UNDERLYING CONCEPTS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
The model presented here was developed to address a situation as follows. There is an 
inventory of spares to service a fleet of ships. There is demand for parts of different kinds to 
keep these ships available for service. There is cost involved in purchasing and holding these 
parts in the inventory, and a penalty (risk) in not meeting demands for spares (stockouts).  
 
There is some historical data available - in the form of the previous demands for each part 
within the timeframe considered. The question then is, what is the optimum numbers of the 
different parts the inventory should stock under the constraints of budget and/or acceptable 
risk of stockout? The risk model was developed using the principles of linear programming. 
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The model has two parts: Part 1 establishes some baseline values, and Part 2 optimises values. 
The implementation of the approach is shown by way of an example shown in figure 4-1. 
 
 
Figure 4-1: Minimise Total Risk Value (TRV) subject to given Total Stock Cost (TSC) constraint 
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4.2.2 PART 1: OBTAINING BASELINE VALUES: 
This part of the model aims at establishing baseline values for certain parameters for the 
purpose of optimising in the second part of the model. The model is shown in figure 4-1. In 
the inventory considered, there are 10 types of parts. The parameters with their descriptions 
are as follows: 
i unique number representing type of part; 
)(idealin  the number of parts that a company would ideally like to hold if it had no financial 
constraints to meet any possible demand that might reasonably be considered. (Other factors 
that influence managing stock, such as warehouse space requirements, spoilage, obsolescence 
can be factored in the model as shown later); the number is based on any or a combination of 
historical demand data, expert opinion and manufacturer’s recommendations. There are 
guidelines/ procedures for combining data from various sources using, for example, Bayesian 
inference (Clemen, Winkler 1999), (ASME 2003b).    
                the maximum demand within the timeframe the company expects to meet if it held 
stock without  financial constraints. 
i   ratio of the number of part i stocked, say, in , to the number the company would ideally 
like,  
    
)(ideali
i
n
n  
)(refi baseline value of i for planning purpose 
)(refin )()( idealirefi n = baseline number of part i, rounded to the nearest integer 
iC unit cost of part i  
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iCoS consequence of a stockout for part i  (weighted value) 
)( ixP probability of a stockout for part i ,  
 =
)
1
(
)(
ideali
refi
n
n                                                                                                                           (4.1) 
Where )()( )()( idealiirefii nxnPxP   
given that  
a) )(refin  is the quantity in stock and  
b) ix  is the number of that part demanded during the timeframe such that )(refii nx  , 
c) )(idealin is the ideal number of part i  in stock to meet maximum demand 
d) the number of parts demanded follow a discrete uniform distribution. 
 
The nature of distribution depends on what sort of data one has and what confidence one has 
in the available data. The uniform distribution is usually used when there is little or no 
available data. A uniform distribution assigns equal probability to all values between its 
maximum and minimum. Other distributions can also be used in the model created here. 
 
iRV Risk value associated with stockout of part i    = iCoS  )( ixP                                    (4.2) 
TSC = Total cost of stock for all parts ni(ref)    irefi Cn  )(                                                  (4.3) 
TRV = Total risk value associated with stockouts for all parts ni (ref)    iRV                         (4.4) 
(In the figures showing snapshots of the model, bTSC  and bTRV  are used in Part 1 of the 
model; the suffix ‘b’ is used to indicate baseline values.) 
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In the model, qualitative estimates of iCoS , Very High, High, Medium, Low, Very Low have 
been assigned values of 100, 80, 60, 40 and 20 respectively. In a more advanced model, these 
values would be a weighted average of values obtained by considering a number of 
consequence or impact factors. One such possible scheme is described later and shown in the 
figure 4-5.  
4.2.3 PART 2: OBTAINING OPTIMISED VALUES: 
Part 2 of the model optimises the number of each part held in stock from the reference values 
selected in Part 1 subject to specified constraints using a linear programming tool. The 
optimised values contain the subscript ‘o’. For example, ion  is the optimised value of units of 
part i to be held in the inventory. 
4.2.4 WORKING OF THE MODEL 
At the outset, in Part 1 of the model, a suitable value for )(refi is assumed; in figure 4-1, this 
is 0.90. )(refi  (shown in the highlighted box with a small circle towards its top right corner) 
is a fraction of the ideal number of parts (a wish list) that a manager of an inventory would 
like to hold given that there will be demands necessitated by failures requiring these parts. 
This starting assumption is necessary to find baseline values for Total Stock Cost (TSC) and 
the Total Risk Value (TRV) of the inventory, say, bTSC  and bTRV  respectively where,  
bTSC irefi Cn  )(                                                                                                                (4.5) 
bTRV  iRV                                                                                                                                                  (4.6) 
This part of the model establishes the correspondence between three critical values (1) the 
reference stock level as denoted by the ratio )(refi  , (2)  the total cost of the stock as denoted 
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by bTSC  (in monetary units) and (3) the unitless bTRV   denoting a measure of risk associated 
with the inventory.    
The initial value of  )(refi  , 0.9, can be changed at any stage to bring the bTSC  to a feasible 
level, if not so already.                                                                    
The values above are, in essence, baseline values that establish what is an acceptable level of 
overall risk and the associated cost of stock holding at that level. Part 1 of the model 
determines these baseline values as a starting point, and part 2 of the model carries out the 
linear optimisation. In the model demonstrated here, the Linear Programming (LP) is through 
the Solver add-in to Microsoft Excel.  
4.2.5 EXAMPLE APPLICATIONS  
The model has three modes of operation performing three distinct functions. These are:  
(A) Minimize Total Risk 
Figure 4.1 shows the results when Total Risk Value (TRV) is minimized subject to a given 
budget for the purchase of stock, i.e. (TSC). As seen, TRV reduces from 87 before 
optimisation to 16 after optimisation. Note that the portfolio of parts in the inventory has 
changed from the baseline or reference case. For example, for part 8 the initial reference 
holding of 9 has increased to 11, and instead of 9 of part 3, the optimised holding is only 2. 
Correspondingly, the RV of these parts has also changed. 
(B) Minimize Total Cost 
Figure 4-2 shows the results when budget for the purchase of stock (TSC) is minimized 
subject to maintaining the reference level of (assumed tolerable) Total Risk (TRV). As shown 
in the figure, the TSC comes down to £304,500 from £422,500, given a Total Risk Value 
Risk Based Life Management of Offshore Structures and Equipment 
 
96 
tolerance of 87. Again, the portfolio of parts in the inventory has changed from the baseline or 
reference case, but in a different way to that for minimising Total Risk above. Individual 
changes in the number of each part stocked and its contribution to Total Risk can be observed. 
(C) Minimize Total Risk Value (TRV) or Total Stock Cost (TSC) subject to maximum 
individual risk constraints 
Although optimisation has been carried out as described above, there may be some 
components for which the risk associated with a particular part may be considered too high to 
be acceptable to the decision maker. For example, as shown in figure 4-1, the optimised RV 
for part 3 i.e. oRV3  is 16; this is an expensive part of VL stockout consequence, but the 
likelihood value of a stockout relative to other parts is high at 8.03 o . Similarly, in figure 4-
2, Part 3 has a stockout likelihood of 1.00 (100%).  
Such a high probabilities of stockout may be deemed too high by the decision maker 
especially when they are substantially different to that implied by )(refi  that was assumed in 
part 1 of the model that established baseline values. It may be noted here that 9.0)( refi  
implies a reference stock level that plans to meet 90% of the maximum considered demand, 
i.e., 10% of maximum demand is expected not to be met resulting in a stockout probability of 
10%. In these cases the decision maker would be likely to want to hold a greater number of 
these parts than the optimisation in modes A or B would suggest, even though the 
consequence of a stockout may be low.  
To address the issue of having types of parts with a relatively very high probability of 
stockout, one more constraint is added to the above optimisation process. This is by way of 
adding  a  maximum  acceptable   stockout  probability, max)( ionP  for  each  of  the  optimised  
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Figure 4-2: Minimise Total Stock Cost (TSC) subject to a tolerable level of Total Risk Value (TRV) 
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Figure 4-3: Minimise Total Risk Value TRV) subject to i) a maximum Total Stock Cost (TSC) and ii) a 
maximum probability of stockout  
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number of parts, ion . This constraint is shown in the highlighted box with two concentric 
circles towards its top right corner in figure 4-3. 
In figures 4-1 and 4-2, max)( ioxP is mentioned but the value is 1.0. This means that a stockout 
probability of 100% (a certainty) is acceptable so, in effect, it is not a constraint. Imposing a 
constraint on the probability of stockout of any type of part when holding an optimised 
number, max)( ioxP  (shown in figures 4-3 and 4-4), means that however low impact a failure 
to meet a demand for a part is, a minimum stock level will be maintained.  
Figures 4-3 and 4-4 repeat the optimisation with the same values as in figures 4-1 and 4-2 
with the added constraint of. 3.0)( max ioxP  As seen in figures 4-3 and 4-4, the additional 
constraint ensures that however ‘Low’ consequence a part maybe and however expensive it 
may be, it will be stocked within the stipulated level (0.7 or 70% of expected maximum 
demand, in this case) of tolerable risk both at a system level (as indicated by Total Risk 
Value) and at the individual or component level (as indicated by various )( ioxP  values). 
However, as shown in the figures, this extra risk mitigation effected by the constraint 
3.0)( max ioxP  comes at a price. Figures 4-3 and 4-4 show that the Optimised Total Risk 
Value oTRV  is now 32 up from 16, and the Optimised Total Stock Cost oTSC is £375,500 up 
from £304,500.  
The paper in Appendix B shows how max)( ioxP  impacts oTSC and oTRV when TSC is being 
minimised. [In the paper, (1) TSC  as mentioned here is termed as TSV (Total Stock Value) 
and (2) max)( ioxP as mentioned here is termed as (max)i ] 
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Figure 4-4: Minimise Total Stock Cost (TSC) subject to i) a maximum Total Risk Value (TRV) and ii) a 
maximum probability of stockout  
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4.3 DISCUSSION OF THE SPARES MODEL 
4.3.1 ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT OF NOT MEETING A DEMAND FOR A PART 
It is at times difficult to quantify the full implications of not meeting a demand for a part 
when required (stockout). Therefore, qualitative assessments of consequences or impact of 
stockout, despite the subjectivity involved, are often the best way to factor in certain 
intangibles, such as loss of orders or reputation. It is worth noting that the same model will 
work by directly putting in the likely impact cost (in monetary terms) of a failure to meet a 
demand for a particular spare.  
One can make such estimates more precise by fine-tuning the consequence part of the risk 
estimate. For example, CoS can be a weighted sum of various consequences factor values 
such as: extra cost of procuring a part on an urgent basis and the lead time under such 
circumstances, availability of technical personnel to effect repairs, knock-on effect of failure 
to meet a part on the general availability of the system and the risk of obsolescence of a part 
or the machine itself. Figure 4-5 shows how such an approach can be developed.  
 
Figure 4-5: Deriving CoS for a type of part from a number of factors 
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The approach consists of the following main steps:  
(1) Identify factors (termed as Impact Factors (IF) in figure 4-5) that impinge on failure to 
meet a demand for a type of spare. In the figure, these are lead time, availability of technical 
staff, knock-on failures and associated demands, potential for machine or spare redundancy 
and obsolescence  
(2) Ascribe weights to each of these impact factors to reflect their relative importance. These 
are 10, 10, 60, 15, and 5 for IF1 through to IF5 respectively.  
3) Determine relative importance values for VH, H, M, L or VL representing Very High, 
High, Medium, Low and Very Low. In the approach shown in the figure, these are 100, 80, 
60, 40 and 20 respectively.  
(4) The spare type is then assessed qualitatively- VH, H, M, L or VL - under each of the 
impact factors identified in step (1). The net result of this exercise is a total Impact Value or 
the CoS for the type of part under consideration.  
In the figure, the value ‘8’ in the first column is (10*80)/100. Weights need to total 100 as this 
is a relative assessment; the weighted total ‘84’ is the CoS value for that part. This process is 
repeated for each type of spare part that is under consideration in an inventory. The relative 
weights or values in step (2) and step (3) may or may not be the same for all parts. Indeed, 
impact factors also may differ with parts. 
4.3.2 THE STARTING ASSUMPTION REGARDING ‘IDEAL’ STOCK LEVEL TO MEET 
A MAXIMUM DEMAND LEVEL 
The starting assumption is necessary to set a baseline. A distinction must be noted: ‘ideal’ 
values here mean the hypothetical scenario in which the decision maker has no constraints; 
this is in contrast to optimal values or optimised values that are values that represent optimum 
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trade-offs, given the constraints that apply. The starting assumption is more in the nature of a 
carefully thought of scenario considering historical data, expert opinion or guesstimates.  
For example, if one has no incidence of a propeller failing in a particular fleet of ships, one 
might consider a bigger sample or use expert engineering judgement to assess demand. If one 
was charged with the responsibility of stocking grit for next year’s winter, one reasonable way 
to start assessing the demand would be to look at what has been the maximum demand in the 
past, say, five years and use this as a benchmark.  
4.3.3 CHANGES TO THE RATE OF DEMAND 
In the calculations carried out, this model uses a demand trend for each type of part in the 
period under consideration. The trend is considered fixed in this snapshot in time. The model 
in its current form is thus based on periodic reviews of the stockholding using prior 
experience.  
The assessment of the demand can be made continuous by using a moving average method for 
the demand trend. This would represent a continuous review model that may be more 
advantageous in some circumstances. The model can also be configured to take in statistical 
distributions other than the discrete uniform distribution in describing the demand for parts.  
The rate of demand for parts may well increase as structures or equipment get older. This 
change in the rate of demand is another factor that could be built into a spares inventory 
model. It would require a more sophisticated treatment of time dependent effects that is 
beyond the scope of this work. 
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4.4 CONCLUSIONS 
Research described here applies risk based principles to spares inventory management within 
the context of life management of offshore structures and equipment. It extends the risk based 
approach that is well established in other areas of industry. The example illustrates a 
technique of managing risk within user specified constraints as applicable to spares inventory.  
The approach outlined here has the potential to increase plant or system availability and 
manage business as well as operational risks. It is thus of wider interest to a number of other 
stakeholders including operators, maintenance personnel, regulators and insurance companies, 
and other industries. The methodology can also be used in other areas that impinge on 
structural integrity and asset management such as inspection and maintenance where 
competing risks (of failure) need to be managed within finite resources 
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5 DISCUSSION  
5.1 APPLICATION OF RISK BASED APPROACHES 
Risk based approaches offer a flexible, efficient and rational basis to life management of 
assets. The previous chapters discussed methodologies that used risk based criteria for 
decision making in the management of assets. The methodologies were applied in two 
different contexts: (1) in the undertaking of run-repair-replace decision-making in the 
management of offshore wind farms, and (2) in the optimal stocking of spares to cater for 
failures requiring these. Some of the features of the applications of the risk based approaches 
that stand out are as follows: 
 
(a) The use of risk based optimisation 
Risk based optimisation considers three aspects of failures: the likelihood, the 
consequence and the manageability of failures within the resources available. In the first 
application in the management of offshore wind farms, the approach shown aims at 
finding the optimum time of action (repair or replacement), given a budget, such that the 
cost of such action is less than or equal to the expected cost of failure without that action. 
In the second application, risk based optimisation is used to find the optimum number of 
spares of different kinds a company should advance order such that the cost of holding 
these spares and the expected cost (risk) of not holding these are within user specified 
limits. 
Risk based optimisation thus takes risk assessment to a more advanced level: from 
assessing risk to managing risk within the constraints that apply. 
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(b) Quantitative and qualitative risk models  
In both of the above applications, qualitative risk models have been used. In the first 
application, as a screening tool in order to focus attention on components that are 
perceived as more at the risk of failure, and in the second, to risk-profile spares such that 
those that are deemed to have a bigger impact are accorded higher priority in stocking 
them in an inventory. 
Qualitative risk models give a good system-wide perspective and usually involve plant 
personnel and experts. The screening out of low risk components and the flagging up of 
high risk component is useful: the identified high risk components can then be analysed 
using more advanced quantitative methods that usually require more resources. At times, 
for want of quantitative data, qualitative models are the only option available to risk 
assessors. 
In the application to spares inventory management, a semi-quantitative model using 
relative risk measures is used. This is to get over the difficulty of quantifying certain 
factors such as the risk of obsolescence of a spare part. The concept of relative risk helps 
in profiling the parts using a common denominator for risk. 
In engineering there is a justifiable bias towards measuring and quantifying entities. The 
American Petroleum Institute’s Recommended Practice 580 on risk-based inspection 
describes a ‘continuum of approaches’ ranging from the qualitative to quantitative, figure 
5-1. The figure depicts the level of detail in risk analysis corresponding to a purely 
qualitative approach on one end of the spectrum, to the purely quantitative one on the 
other, with intermediate approaches in between. Quantitative models do contain a higher 
level of details, but the accuracy of the model depends on the availability and the quality of 
the inputs.  Thus in some situations the use of qualitative or intermediate type of models is 
warranted. The ultimate test of any model is how closely it depicts reality. 
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Quantitative models can be classified into deterministic models and probabilistic models.  
Deterministic models have fixed (unique) value inputs that give fixed value outputs. 
Probabilistic (stochastic) models have inputs that have some randomness described by 
probability distributions; these distributions reflect the uncertainty or the level of 
confidence that one has in these inputs. The outputs of such models are also usually in the 
form of distributions. In the quantitative corrosion model described in chapter 3, the 
corrosion rate used is a probability distribution. The distribution for the demand for spares 
in chapter 4 is a uniform distribution. 
 
Figure 5-1: Continuum of risk analysis models 
5.2 LIMITATIONS AND CONSTRAINTS 
Risk based approaches to asset management enable operators to focus on components where 
the risk of failure is assessed to be the greatest. The very nature of risk means that these 
relatively more sophisticated approaches are subject to limitations and constraints, some of 
which are as follows: 
a) Input data relating to failure 
To quote from a famous book on risk management (Bernstein, 1996),  
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“The information that you have is not the information you want. 
The information you want is not the information you need. 
The information you need is not the information you can obtain. 
The information you can obtain costs more than you want to pay.” 
In risk based approaches to life management, such as in the management of offshore wind 
farms and spares inventory, it is assumed that relevant data regarding the mechanisms or 
observed frequency of failures is available and applicable to the equipment being considered. 
In practice, a lack of availability and applicability of failure data limits the efficacy of risk 
based approaches. Sometimes data is not in a suitable format. At times, the failure dataset 
(sample size) is too small for assessors to extract reliable statistical parameters.  
Generic failure databases, (usually from the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) or 
through generic databases such as, WindStats for onshore wind farms, or the GADS 
(Generating Availability Data System) from NERC (North American Electric Reliability 
Corporation) for power generating units), correspond to equipment operated under a range of 
industry conditions. Sources of information such as logbooks that provide information 
relating to specific equipment operating under specified conditions, and therefore containing 
potentially more relevant and applicable data, are often not available. There is an inherent 
problem in applying generic failure databases to make predictions for specific equipment 
because the variability of design and operating conditions within the population as a whole 
may not be representative. 
 
In order to determine the probability of failure from damage mechanisms (e.g. fatigue, 
corrosion, fracture, collapse, and extreme loads), distributions of the stochastic variables of 
material properties, loads etc are required. In order to obtain representative distributions, a 
large amount of experience and/ or experiments relevant to the application may be needed. 
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These entail the use of substantial resources, and, in practice, the confidence that may be held 
in such distributions may be questionable. 
 
b) Understanding of the degradation and failure processes 
Risk based approaches in the management of structures and equipment are limited by the 
current understanding of the degradation and failure processes. Although much advance has 
been made in understanding damage mechanisms such as fatigue, creep and corrosion, more 
research continues in these and other areas. There are on-going challenges to understand the 
effect of the operating environment, such as variable amplitude loading on fatigue, the 
kinetics of different corrosive media (e.g. sour products), and the creep in new alloys and 
welds.  
 
c) Uncertainty in assessing failure consequences 
Apart from the difficulty in assessing the likelihood of failure, the consequences of failure are 
also at times difficult to ascertain. In some cases, the postulated failure event has never 
occurred or is a very low probability event and there is therefore no or little prior experience 
to use. How should one treat extremely low probability but potentially high consequence 
events? One possible way is to design to fail-safe criteria such that failure does not result in 
the high consequence under consideration. Low probability- high consequence events are 
discussed in 5.3, under (c). 
Other uncertainties may arise for the following reasons: 
i) The impact of failure in complex systems with a number of interactions and 
correlations is difficult to assess. There may be multiple consequences such as loss of 
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property, life/injury, environmental damage, clean-up costs, production loss, 
reputational damage, legal costs and so on.  
ii) In systems operating in multiple- jurisdictions where different Class, regulations or 
laws apply, the consequences of a potential failure may be difficult to assess or open 
to more than one interpretation. As examples, litigation relating to the 1984 Bhopal 
gas tragedy in India is still ongoing; nuclear accidents and oil spills may involve a 
number of countries. 
iii) Assessing the consequences of potential failures resulting in the loss of lives is a 
complex matter. Although insurance companies have methods to quantify such events 
in financial terms, intangibles such as loss of reputation, loss of morale among 
employees may be difficult to measure. 
 
d) Requirement for specialist and trained personnel 
Engineering analyses, such as numerical modelling, that are often used to determine the 
probability and consequences of a failure event, usually requires specialist knowledge, skills 
and computing power. Personnel involved in day-to-day functioning of equipment do not 
usually have the expertise to conduct such engineering analyses; it may require trained people 
dedicated to this task in-house and/or expensive consultancy.  
 
e) Technical complexity 
Risk analyses can become very complex in a system with many components with 
interdependencies and correlations in factors affecting failure and its consequences. Often it is 
necessary to make simplifying or bounding assumptions. It may not be possible to analyse the 
whole range of failure events each with its set of consequences. Risk models, like other 
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models, are simplifications of reality; the predictions are subject to potential error. A 
combination of variables, each having some error, may result in considerable error.  
 
f) Subjectivity in qualitative assessments 
Qualitative risk assessments tend to be subjective. To ensure, as far as possible, consistent 
results, a suitable methodology that is auditable needs to be put in place. Formal processes to 
elicit expert opinion can reduce the impact of biases that may colour an expert’s outlook. 
 
g) Reliability of inspection and NDT techniques and application 
Non-Destructive testing and Condition Monitoring provide vital inputs to the life 
management of structures and equipment but have their own limitations.  Human factors, the 
probability of detection, the feasibility of sample size are some of the issues involved in 
inspection and NDT techniques. Condition Monitoring is not considered economical in some 
situations and the knowledge of the condition of a structure or equipment may not be good or 
up-to-date. 
 
h) Predicting risk 
Risk models identify potential risks and predict failures and their consequences based on 
some assumptions. It is important to note that these are predictions (expectations or expected 
values) involving probability and need to be treated as such. At times, events may not occur 
as predicted. There is a danger of this leading to a general disillusionment with such 
techniques.  
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i) Societal awareness of risk 
The risk based approaches described here should not be treated in isolation: they need to be a 
part of a wider culture of risk awareness informing people, processes and technology 
involved. There is a need to incorporate other perspectives apart from those that result from 
pure science and engineering analyses. In this context, human factors i.e. the role of humans 
in failures is a matter of ongoing research. There is also increasing interest in the role of 
organisation and its structure in managing risks.   
 
j) Managing risks optimally, not just cutting costs 
The philosophy behind risk based approaches is to optimise resources in the management of 
risks; the aim is to focus resources on components identified as having high risk of failure. 
Although a successful risk based approach will reduce failures and hence the costs resulting 
from failures, it is not and should not only be construed as a part of cost cutting exercise in the 
management of assets. 
 
k) Upfront costs in managing risks 
Reducing the level of risk often entails upfront costs that can be justified only in the long run; 
risk mitigation thus needs foresight and the ability to invest in a safer future even if this 
means foregoing immediate gains. Some companies are not prepared to make the investment 
in risk based approaches. 
 
l) Recognition of risk management professionals within business 
Risk management professionals become the focus of attention particularly when bad things 
happen or when risk management systems fail. They need to be taken seriously even during 
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normal times and, indeed, be rewarded for continued safe operations. Some companies do not 
sufficiently value their risk management professionals. 
 
5.3 FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS 
Research undertaken for this thesis shows that notwithstanding the limitations and constraints 
identified above, there is scope for further development within the field of risk based life 
management of structures and equipment. Some of the areas for development are described 
below: 
 
(a) Improving the quality (precision) of input data to risk assessment. 
Recent advances in equipment monitoring and better ICT (Information and Communication 
Technologies) are improving the quality of failure data that is being available for life 
management of structures and equipment. Operators increasingly find it in their interest to 
share failure data and there are a number of failure databases being set up to achieve this. The 
RISPECT (Risk Based Expert System for Through-Life Structural Inspection, Maintenance 
and New-Build Structural Design) project is an example of a number of stakeholders in the 
shipping industry coming together to share inspection and failure data. RISPECT involves the 
setting up of a hierarchy of databases (mainly comprising ship managers’ databases, 
classification bodies’ databases and a central statistical database) containing relevant shipping 
data and a number of modules that perform risk and reliability calculations using this data 
(The website http://www.rispect.org.uk/ contains more information).   Other databases 
containing failure data such as WindStats and NERC-GADS are the result of collaboration 
between various stakeholders in the relevant industry sector. 
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(b) Greater understanding of degradation mechanisms 
   With increasing experience and research, there is a trend of having a greater understanding of 
the degradation mechanisms involved in the ageing of assets. For example, understanding of 
fatigue requires experimental data. Faster computers have made it easier to make complex 
calculations and build complex models to link experiment to reality. The variability in the 
action of degradation mechanisms and the correlations between them are increasingly being 
calculated. 
 
(c) More attention on towards low probability- high consequence events 
There is increasing interest in low probability and high consequence events. Such events are 
difficult to manage as: a) these are by definition extreme events, hence experience of dealing 
with them is not always sufficient to draw lessons from and build a model on, and b) these 
events are often so rare that measures to prevent/ mitigate such individual unlikely events are 
not deemed cost-effective.   
Concerted action to deal with extreme events that have common severe consequences is often 
seen as a feasible way to prepare for such events. Industries have formed special networks to 
pool resources to prepare for such rare adversities. For example, a group made up of the ICE 
(Institution of Civil Engineers), the Royal Institute of British Architects, the Royal Institute of 
Chartered Surveyors, the Royal Town Planning Institute and the Landscape Institute, works 
together to manage and mitigate floods. The Fire and Blast Information Group (FABIG) is the 
result of offshore industry collaboration, following the Piper Alpha disaster, to collate and 
disseminate existing knowledge on hydrocarbon fires and explosions.  
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Governments too form special committees that include representatives from law enforcement 
bodies, the medical fraternity and others to respond to crises that are rare but require these 
common resources. 
Should every low probability- high consequence event be protected against? A balance is 
required between risk mitigation and acceptable consequences. Typically, a risk assessment is 
required to identify mitigation and acceptable costs. Some extremely low probability events 
may remain unforeseen and therefore not a part of any risk assessment model; the best 
approach in such circumstances is often to focus on responding to the new situation such that 
the impact of such event in minimized. 
 
(d) New applications of risk based methods 
Risk based methods are being used in a variety of areas in industry. For example, there is 
interest in using such risk based techniques to optimise inspection and maintenance in ships 
and FPSO vessels. 
 
(e) The need for a holistic approach to risk management  
There is increasing interest in taking a holistic view in managing risks. This includes better 
integration and coordination between people, processes and technology. This is done through, 
as examples, better training, policy-making and guidelines in handling interfaces within and 
between systems. 
 
(f) Stakeholders in risk management 
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Risk based approaches are, in large part, driven by the operators’ desire to allocate resources 
in a flexible, rational and an efficient way. However, their application is also influenced by 
legal and social forces. The role of regulation in the use of risk based approaches is gaining 
prominence. Public awareness regarding risk and its management in industry has never been 
higher. 
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6 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The following sums up the main points from the research undertaken within the remit of this 
Doctor of Engineering thesis 
 
1. Research presented here describes new applications of risk based approaches to two 
specific decision making situations involving the life management of structures and 
equipment:  
(a) Given a failure trend, when is the optimum time of action (repair/ replace a 
structure or equipment) such that the net cost of the action and the expected cost 
(risk) of failure is minimised and hence financial efficiency optimised?  The 
particular application was maintenance optimisation in the life management of 
offshore wind farms.  
(b) How many parts of different kinds, with each having its own associated 
stocking costs and stockout risks, should a major industrial enterprise advance 
order for stock to operate at optimum efficiency given that failures (requiring 
these) may occur in service? The particular application was a fleet of cargo ships 
where parts of different kinds are required to keep ships available for service.  
 
2. The optimisation techniques in risk management described in this thesis find the 
optimum trade-off between the cost of a risk mitigating measure and the expected cost 
(risk) of failure without that measure. They have the potential of being applied more 
widely within structural integrity and asset management, and indeed in any situation 
where competing risks need to be managed within finite resources. They may 
therefore find application in areas such as risk based inspection and maintenance, and 
more generally, in other areas of risk management in engineering. 
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3. The nature of risk poses a number of challenges to its assessors. Uncertainty in input 
data is likely to remain a limitation. The question then is how this uncertainty in data 
is accounted for in a risk assessment. The bottom-line in any assessment of risk is the 
application of scientific method to the maximum extent possible and the continual 
testing of prediction against empirical data. 
 
4. The application of risk based approaches to life management of assets is a relatively 
recent development. It is expected that in an increasingly competitive environment the 
uptake of these approaches will become more prevalent in industry. This is because 
risk based approaches offer rational, efficient and somewhat flexible ways of 
maintaining assets.   
 References 
 
 119 
7 REFERENCES 
Anderson, C. 2006, The Long Tail- Why the future of business is selling less of more, 1st edn, 
Hyperion, USA. 
Andrews, J.D. & Moss, T.R. 2002, "An Introduction to Reliability and Risk Assessment" in 
Reliability and Risk Assessment, Second edn, Professional Engineering Publishing, UK, 
pp. 9. 
API 2002a, Risk-based Inspection, API Recommended Practice 580, American Petroleum 
Institute, USA. 
API 2002b, Risk-based Inspection, API Recommended Practice 580, American Petroleum 
Institute, USA. 
API , API Risk Based Inspection Software [Homepage of Americal Petroleum Institute], 
[Online]. Available: http://www.api.org/Publications/rbi-software.cfm [2009, October/8]  
API Publication 2000, "Risk-Based Inspection, Base Resource Document" in , pp. 5-1-5-4. 
ASME 2003a, "10. Multiple component ranking based upon optimization" in Risk-based 
methods for equipment life management, CRTD Vol.41 ASMW, New York, pp. 151-152. 
ASME 2003b, Risk Based Methods for Equipment Life Management: A Step-by-Step 
Instruction Manual with Sample Applications, . 
ASME International 2003a, "Introduction: Risk Based Methods for Equipment Life 
Management" in Risk Based Methods for Equipment Life Management, CRTD Vol 41 
ASMW, New York, pp. 3-4. 
ASME International 2003b, "Risk Based Methods for Equipment Life Management, CRTD 
Vol 41" in ASMW, New York, pp. 3-4. 
Risk Based Life Management of Offshore Structures and Equipment 
 
120 
Ayyub, Bilal M. (2001) Elicitation of Expert Opinion for Uncertainty and Risks, Washington: 
CRC Press. 
Ayyub, Bilal M. (2003) Risk Analysis in Engineering and Economics, Washington: CRC 
Press 
Bernstein, Peter L. 1996, Against the Gods- The remarkable story of risk, John Wiley & Sons 
Inc, USA, pp.202. 
Brealey, R.A. & Myers, S.C. 1991, Principles of Corporate Finance, 4th edn, McGraw-Hill, 
New York. 
BSI 2008, PAS 55-1:2008 Asset Management- Part 1: Specification for the optimized 
management of physical assets, BSI, UK. 
Bureau Veritas , Asset Integrity Management. Available: 
http://www.bureauveritas.co.uk/wps/wcm/connect/bv_couk/Local/Home/bv_com_service
SheetDetails?serviceSheetID=2153&siteID=3&industryID=-
1&serviceCategoryID=1&preciseObjectID=-1&divisionID=-1&businessScopeID=-1 
[2009, September/9] . 
Burton, Tony; Sharpe, David; Jenkins, Nick and Bossanyi, Ervin. 2001, Wind Energy 
Handbook, pp.1-8 
Caithness wind farm information forum, date unknown, 
http://www.caithnesswindfarms.co.uk/ 
CIRIA 2009, Whole-life infrastructure asset management: Good practice guide for civil 
infrastructure, CIRIA, London. 
Clemen, R.T. & Winkler, R.L. 1999, "Combining Probability Distributions From Experts in 
Risk Analysis", Risk Analysis, vol. 19. 
 References 
 
 121 
Collier, A.C. & Glagola, R.C. 1998, "Chapter 16 Depreciation" in Engineering Economic and 
Cost Analysis, 3rd edn, Addison-Wesley, California, USA, pp. 439. 
Department of Trade and Industry. Future Offshore: A strategic framework for the Offshore 
Wind Industry, 2002 
Det Norske Veritas June 2004, Offshore Standard DNV-OS-J101; Design of Offshore Wind 
Turbine Structures, DNV, Norway. 
DOWEC; http://www.ecn.nl/docs/dowec/10048_004.pdf 
EEMUA 2006, Risk Based Inspection- A guide to effective use of the RBI process, EEMUA, 
UK. 
ISO/ IEC Guide 51:1999 1999, ISO/IEC Guide 51:1999 Safety aspects- Guidelines for their 
inclusion in standards, ISO/IEC. 
Kennedy, W.J., Wayne Patterson, J. & Fredendall, L.D. 2002, "An overview of recent 
literature on spare parts inventories", International Journal of Production Economics, 
vol. 76, no. 2, pp. 201-215. 
Lee, A.K., Serratella, G., Wang, G., Basu, R. & Spong, R. 2006, "Flexible Approaches to 
Risk-Based Inspection of FPSOs", Offshore Technology ConferenceU.S.A. 
Manwell, J. F., McGowan, J. G. and Rogers, A. L. Introduction: Modern Wind Energy and its 
Origins 2005 
Nahmias, S. 1981, "Managing Reparable Item Inventory Systems: A Review", TIMS Studies 
in the Management Sciences, vol. 16, pp. 253-277. 
O’Hagan, Anthony; Buck, Caitlin E., Daneshkhan, Alireza; Eiser, J; Garthwaite, Paul H.; 
Jenkison, David J., Oakley, Jeremy E.; Bakow, Tim. (2006) Uncertain Judgements: 
Eliciting Experts’ Probabilities (Statistics in Practice), UK, John Wiley & Sons Ltd 
Risk Based Life Management of Offshore Structures and Equipment 
 
122 
PD ISO/IEC Guide 73:2002 2002, Risk Management- Vocabulary- Guidelines for use in 
standards, BSI British Standards. 
Prasad, S. 1993, "Classification of inventory models and systems", International Journal of 
Production Economics, vol. 34, pp. 209-222. 
Putnam, G. C. Power from the wind 1948 
RISPECT home page, Available: http://www.rispect.org.uk/ [2009, November/ 21] . 
Rumsfeld, D. 12 February 2002, Former US Defence Secretary on the situation in Afganistan 
then. 
Taleb, N.N. 2007, The Black Swan, Penguin Books, UK. 
Vose, D. 2008, "Choice of Model Structure" in Risk Analysis, Third edn, John Wiley & Sons, 
Ltd, UK. 
Winston, L.W. 1993, Operations Research- Applications and Algorithms, Third edn, Duxbury 
Press, California, USA. 
Wintle, J., Moore, P., Smalley, S. & Amphlett, G. 2006, "Section 3 Identification of Ageing" 
in Plant ageing: Management of equipment containing hazardous fluids or pressure 
HSE, UK, pp. 43. 
(The) Woodhouse Partnership Ltd, 2008, ‘Education and Training in Asset Management’, 
www.twpl.com. 
Zomerdijk, L.G. & de Vries, J. 2003, "An organizational perspective on inventory control: 
Theory and a case study", International Journal of Production Economics, vol. 81-82, pp. 
173-183. 
 
 Appendix A: Paper 1 
 
 123 
APPENDIX A : PAPER 1 
 
Bharadwaj, U.R., Speck, J.B. & Ablitt, C.J. 2007, "A practical approach to risk based 
assessment and maintenance optimisation of offshore wind farms", Offshore Mechanics and 
Arctic Engineering (OMAE), ASME, June 10-15, 2007, San Diego, California, USA. 
Risk Based Life Management of Offshore Structures and Equipment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 Copyright © ASME 2007
Proceedings of OMAE2007 
26th International Conference on Offshore Mechanics and Arctic Engineering 
June 10-15, 2007, San Diego, California USA 
OMAE 2007-29260 
A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO RISK BASED ASSESSMENT AND MAINTENANCE 
OPTIMISATION OF OFFSHORE WIND FARMS 
 
 
Ujjwal R Bharadwaj 
Loughborough University  
Julian B Speck 
TWI Ltd, Cambridge 
Chris J Ablitt 
TWI Ltd, Cambridge 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Offshore wind farm managers are under 
increasing pressure to minimise life cycle costs 
whilst maintaining reliability or availability targets, 
and to operate within safety regulation. This paper 
presents a risk based decision-making methodology 
for undertaking run-repair-replace decisions with the 
ultimate aim of maximising the Net Present Value 
(NPV) of the investment in maintenance. The paper 
presents the methodology developed for the risk 
based life management of Offshore Wind farms 
under the remit of the CORLEX (Cost Reduction 
and Life Extension of Offshore Wind Farms) project 
funded by DTI (Department of Trade and Industry, 
UK) Technology Programme on Renewable Energy. 
Unlike traditional approaches to decision-making 
that consider either the probability of failure of a 
component or the consequence of failure in isolation, 
a risk-based approach considers both these aspects in 
combination to arrive at an optimal solution. The 
paper builds a basic Qualitative Risk Analysis 
methodology to highlight high-risk components that 
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are then investigated further by a Quantitative Risk 
Analysis.   The risk is now quantified in monetary 
terms and the time of action – replacement or 
maintenance- indicated by the model is such that the 
NPV of the action is maximized. The methodology is 
demonstrated by considering offshore wind turbine 
tower as the critical component and corrosion as the 
damage mechanism.  
Keywords: Offshore wind farms, Maintenance, Risk 
Based Decision Making, Quantitative Risk Analysis. 
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 Maintenance manages the process of ageing of a 
plant or machinery. Ageing is a process that is 
relentless and starts from the moment a product is 
manufactured or fabricated. The rate of failure 
versus time relationship is usually depicted by 
Figure 1. During the initial stage- the Infant 
Mortality stage, there are  ‘teething’ problems 
causing the failure rate to be high. The rate than falls 
as these problems – design, manufacturing defects, 
etc are identified and solved. In the second stage, 
which is the Useful Life stage, standard maintenance 
practices keep the failure rate almost constant. 
During the third and final stage of the plant- the 
Ageing stage, the failure rate rises mainly due to 
damage accumulated by ageing. At some point 
during this stage, high failure rate requires operators 
to consider replacing the plant. In practice, there are 
usually a number of such plants and a limited budget 
available to decision makers. 
This paper develops and demonstrates a risk-
based methodology to decide the optimum time of 
replacement or repair of a plant, given, a number of 
such plants, and limited budgetary support. 
The paper starts with a discussion on risk and its 
analyses- qualitative and quantitative, the concept of 
NPV, and moves on to the trade off involved in risk-
based decision-making within budgetary and safety 
constraints. 
 
2 RISK 
Risk has numerous definitions depending upon 
its use. Risk is a combination of the probability of an 
event and its consequence. (API 2002) It is a 
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deviation from the normal or expected. Numerically, 
it is a product of probability of an event occurring 
and the consequence of the event. 
 
3 THE RISK BASED APPROACH TO 
MAINTENANCE 
A risk-based approach considers failure in both 
its dimensions, taking cognizance of the two 
elements that constitute risk- the probability (or 
likelihood) of failure and the consequence of that 
failure. Figure 2 shows the two dimensional risk 
profiles of the components in an offshore wind 
turbine plant henceforth referred to as the plant. 
The probabilities and the consequences of failure 
of ten components have been determined and 
presented as points on a Risk Plot. An iso-risk line is 
also plotted representing a constant risk level as 
defined by the operator according to their perception 
of what is an acceptable threshold level of risk. The 
iso-risk line separates acceptable risk components 
from the unacceptable risk components, enabling 
plant managers to focus maintenance resources on 
the relatively more risky components. 
Risk analysis is the systematic use of information 
to identify sources of risk, and to estimate the risk of 
failure. It forms the basis for risk evaluation, risk 
mitigation and risk acceptance (or risk avoidance). 
The information used in risk analysis includes 
historical data, theoretical analysis, informed 
opinions and stakeholder concerns. 
 
 
4 RISK ANALYSIS METHODS 
Risk analysis methods are generally categorised 
as qualitative or quantitative. There may be an 
intermediate category (semi-quantitative) depending 
upon how quantitative the risk analysis is. The 
American Petroleum Institute’s Recommended 
Practice 580 on risk-based inspection describes a 
‘continuum of approaches’ ranging from the 
qualitative to quantitative, Figure 3. The figure 
depicts the level of detail in risk analysis 
corresponding to a purely qualitative approach on 
one end of the spectrum, to the purely quantitative 
one on the other, with intermediate approaches in 
between. 
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4.1 Qualitative Analysis 
This method uses engineering judgement and 
experience as the basis for risk analysis. The results 
of the analysis largely depend on the expertise of the 
user. The primary advantage of qualitative risk 
analysis is that it enables assessment in the absence 
of detailed numerical data. It is also the first 
pragmatic step to conduct a quantitative risk analysis 
by screening out components of less concern. 
Moreover, the results can serve as a reality check on 
the outcome of quantitative analysis. However, it is 
not a very detailed analysis and provides only a 
broad categorization of risk. Failure Modes, Effects 
and Criticality Analysis (FMECA), Hazard and 
Operability Studies (HAZOPS), and the Risk Matrix 
approach are examples of qualitative risk analysis. In 
the Risk Matrix(API Publication 2000) approach, the 
likelihoods and consequences of failure are 
qualitatively described in broad ranges (e.g. high, 
medium or low). Figure 4 shows the risk profiles of 
selected components of a wind turbine plant. The 
risk profiles are for demonstration only: in practice, 
the profiling is done by involving plant experts.   
 
4.2 Quantitative Analysis 
Qualitative risk assessments become less 
discerning when the system complexity increases, so 
quantitative analysis is usually required the risk 
discrimination of a system of components. 
Quantitative Analysis assigns numerical values to the 
probability (e.g. 10-5 failure events per year) and the 
consequences of failure (e.g. inventory released over 
1,100m2). Qualitative Analysis techniques such as 
FMECA and HAZOPS can become quantitative 
when the values of failure consequence and failure 
probability are numerically estimated. The numeric 
values can determined from a variety of references 
such as generic failure databases, elicited expert 
opinion, or calculated by specific engineering and 
statistical analysis.(ASME International 2003) There 
are statistical methods for combining data from 
various sources or updating data with additional 
information. (Jordan 2005)(Kallen, Noortwijk 
2005)(Khan, Haddara & Bhattacharya 2006) 
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In the current discussion, it is assumed that the 
structure of a wind turbine tower is of critical 
importance, as highlighted by the Qualitative 
Analysis in the previous section.  
For the Quantitative Risk Analysis method 
proposed in this paper, a failure frequency versus 
time curve, for the Ageing period of life is developed 
by engineering analysis of the structure for the active 
or potentially active in-service damage mechanisms, 
e.g. corrosion. The consequence of failure is in 
financial terms. For complex systems, event tree 
analysis is usually undertaken to determine the effect 
the particular component has on the system, to 
thereby resolve the individual cost of   consequence 
of the component’s failure. 
 
5. RISK BASED OPTIMISATION 
The next step is the calculation of the optimum 
action schedule or date, of the run-repair-replace 
action. This calculation weighs the financial benefits 
of maintenance action against the risk (as expressed 
in costs) of not taking the action. The ultimate aim is 
to maximise the net present value of the investment 
(i.e. the maintenance action) by adjusting the date of 
the action. 
 
6.DECISION-MAKING USING FINANCIAL 
CRITERION 
 
6.1 The need for financial criterion in maintenance 
decision making 
Maintenance projects are increasingly being 
evaluated by decision makers who need to 
understand the implications of various options in 
financial terms. Although predictive maintenance 
techniques have matured, the predictions are in 
engineering terms, and these are not easily 
understood by financially oriented decision makers. 
Thus, there is a need to express the effects of 
engineering wear and tear in financial terms. In the 
current context, this is done by evaluating the cost of 
the consequences of failure owing to wear and tear 
of plant and machinery. 
 
6.2 The drivers for a consistent decision making 
methodology in maintenance 
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Many old plants, structures, capital equipment or 
components are in their Ageing period of life. 
However, increasing competition means many of 
them cannot be replaced and need to have their 
useful life extended. In addition, new components 
are often designed to operate with maximum 
efficiency, and are designed with lower “margins of 
error” against assumed operating conditions. 
 
Each action (or project) has costs associated with 
it. These costs are, in essence, investments made by 
the concerned asset owner with the expectation of 
certain return on the investment(s). The decision 
maker will normally be faced with a number of 
projects competing for such investments, and 
therefore needs to take decisions that maximise the 
returns on these investments. The most widely 
understood financial techniques to evaluate projects 
include ‘return on investment’, ‘pay-back period’ 
and ‘discounted cash flow (DCC)’ methods.(Brealey, 
Myers 1991)  These techniques have various 
strengths and weaknesses. This paper employs the 
net present value (NPV) technique that is a form of 
DCC analysis.  
7. Maximizing NPV using Probabilistic Damage 
Mechanism Models 
 
7.1 NPV Financial Analysis 
In the current discussion, it is assumed that a 
project with a higher NPV is a better investment than 
a project with a lower NPV. The NPV of a project is 
the present (current) value of the total future cash 
flows, both positive (income) and negative (cost).  
NPV considers the time value of money by 
discounting all the cash flows, and it is calculated as 
follows: 
 
NPV = 


N
t
t
t rC
0
)1()(                                        (1) 
 
N = project life (years); t = timing of cash flow 
(year); r = interest rate, or discount rate; and Ct = 
cash flow in year t. 
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The future cash flows are ‘expected’ cash flows, 
as they do not occur with certainty. The uncertainty 
arises in the engineering analysis to calculate the 
probability of failure over time for the damage 
mechanism(s) of interest. 
The risk associated with any project is finally 
expressed in terms of its NPV by using expected 
values (EV). The EV of a failure event is the product 
of the probability of the event occurring and the cost 
of consequence of that event. 
The cost of consequence of a failure event is 
directly assessed from a prior quantitative 
consequence analysis, and it must be expressed in 
financial terms. 
 
Thus, the NPV of a project with uncertain 
outcomes is the sum of the expected values of all 
future discounted cash flows, as follows: 
 
NPV = 


N
t
t
tt rCp
0
)1()(                                 (2) 
 
pt = the probability of the event occurring at time 
t. 
 
7.2 Probabilistic Damage Mechanism Model 
This paper does not discuss the details of damage 
models for use in probabilistic analysis. Instead it 
illustrates a simple probabilistic damage mechanism 
model for general corrosion of the tower structure. 
Consider a structure subject to corrosion. Assuming 
this to be the only damage mechanism causing 
failure of the structure, the remaining life of the 
structure can be calculated as: 
 
RL = (Tc–MAT)  CR                                            
(3) 
 
RL = remaining life (years); Tc = current 
thickness of the structure (mm); MAT = minimum 
allowable thickness (mm); and CR = corrosion rate 
(mm/year). 
 
CR is derived from periodic in-service 
measurements of metal loss resulting from corrosion. 
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Tc is known from the most recent thickness 
measurements on the structure (or at the start of the 
structure’s life, Tc can be assumed to be equal to the 
original nominal thickness of the structure as 
specified by the designer including tolerances, 
corrosion allowance, etc). MAT is the absolute 
minimum thickness calculated by the designer to 
prevent failure by overload, collapse, etc as 
appropriate. 
 
The convention is to calculate RL in a 
deterministic manner, whereby each independent 
variable in Equation 3 is a specific value. This 
assumes that these variables have no random or 
probabilistic aspects but can be defined in a fixed 
predictable fashion. In reality, there is considerable 
uncertainty associated with these variables and each 
can be defined by a statistical distribution of values. 
 
In the method here, a statistical analysis tool (i.e. 
Palisade’s @RISK for Microsoft Excel) is used to 
describe all the independent variables 
probabilistically, and RL is then calculated using 
Monte Carlo Simulation (MCS) technique. In this 
way, the calculated RL by MCS is actually a 
distribution of values, so that the annual probability 
of failure (the failure rate per year) over time can be 
obtained. This probability versus times curve may 
then be used to derive the EV, where the EV of a 
failure event is the product of the probability of the 
event occurring and the cost of consequence of that 
event, at a specific point in time. 
 
7.3 Risk-based Optimisation 
The key inputs to the optimisation model are as 
follows: 
(a) The expected present value of the proposed 
action (replacement or repair of the asset); (b) The 
expected present value of inaction which is equal to 
the expected present value of the production losses 
avoided as the result of undertaking the proposed 
action; (c) Any financial constraints, such as the 
annual maintenance budget limit; and (d) Any non-
financial constraints, e.g. on failure rates due to 
safety regulations. 
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Thus, for the NPV of an action taken at time t=n, 
the following can be defined: 
 
CBt = Cash flows associated with production in 
year t; 
CPt = Cash flows associated with implementing 
the project in year t, including any tax credits 
(positive cash flow) on depreciation costs;(Collier, 
Glagola 1998) 
N = the maintenance planner’s strategic planning 
period; 
n = year in which the action is proposed to be 
undertaken; 
pt = probability of the event (failure)  occurring 
in year ‘t’; and 
r = interest rate, i.e. the cost of money (finance). 
 
In the current context, the NPV of action in any 
year ‘n’ is given by: 
 
NPV=(Expected present value of 
action)+(Expected present value of inaction)                                                    
(4) 
 
Assuming that cash outflows are negative and 
cash inflows are positive, and failure results in 
production loss,  
 
 
NPV = ])1()([
0
tnt
t
Pt rC   

 +  
  [- t
nt
t
Btt rCp )1()(
0


+ t
Nt
nt
Btt rCp )1()(
1


]  (5) 
 
The optimization algorithm calculates the year of 
maintenance action for which the NPV is maximum 
(least negative), subject to stipulated constraints.  
 
The maintenance action may be replacement or 
repair. In case of replacement, the 
equipment/component begins its life cycle from its 
Infant Mortality Stage through to the Ageing Stage. 
In the current model, it is assumed that repair 
improves the condition of the equipment such that it 
returns to a stage prior to the Ageing Stage i.e. the 
Normal Life Stage or, preferably, the Infant 
Mortality Stage. 
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8. In-service Inspection Optimisation 
 
The model could be extended to ‘inspection’ 
actions. Instead of the replacement cost of the 
component, the cost of in-service inspection would 
be considered. Since such actions (projects) are 
usually accounted for as ‘expenses’ in the year in 
which they occur, rather than as ‘investments’ 
(which would then be written-off over several years), 
tax credits from depreciated costs do not arise. Since 
inspection costs are relatively low compared to 
production losses, it is anticipated that the model 
would suggest the optimum year of inspection is the 
first year of the planning period. To address this, the 
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (Risk 
Based Methods for Equipment Life Management, 
CRTD Vol 41) has provided the following course of 
action to optimise in-service inspection dates: 
 
Optimise the action date, assuming the 
inspection cost is equal to the replacement cost; then 
Inspect the equipment before this calculated 
replacement date; then 
Compare the actual component damage found 
during inspection, to the projected conditions; and 
then 
Replace the component if necessary, or re-
calculate a new optimized action date, assuming the 
inspection cost is equal to the replacement cost. 
 
It is also possible to add value to the overall 
replacement decision-making in the Ageing period of 
life, by scheduling in-service inspections without the 
use of the model. Inspection findings may be used to 
revise the rate of damage (e.g., corrosion rate, CR), 
or corrective action can be taken to reduce the rate of 
damage (eg. maintenance painting to eliminate 
corrosion). Using the model described above, the 
NPV of such an action can then be compared with 
the NPV without such action, to appraise the 
inspection financially. 
 
9. Demonstration of the Model 
The approach described above was successfully 
demonstrated by evaluating three offshore wind 
turbine towers (i.e. the structures, and not the 
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rotating machinery). The failure frequency from a 
probabilistic corrosion model is presented in Figure 
5. The optimised replacement schedule for Structure 
#1 is shown in Figure 6. The year in which the 
‘ActionCost NPV’ is maximum has been calculated. 
NPV is obtained by considering the expected net 
present value of: (a) cash flows resulting from the 
replacement of the structure; (b) the avoided lost 
production outage cost due to replacement. The 
optimum action date for Structure #1 is 2013, Figure 
7. 
 
Figure 7 shows the application of risk based 
approach to maintenance of Structure #1. The 
probability of failure versus time curve derived from 
remaining life estimates on its own is incomplete 
information to the decision maker. The Action NPV 
versus time curve generated by the risk based 
approach enables the user to make a more informed 
maintenance decision by considering the 
consequences of failure too, in conjunction with the 
probability of failure. The optimal action date is the 
time when the NPV of the action in maximum (2013, 
for Structure #1). 
The optimized action years for the other two 
structures are derived in the same way. To determine 
the optimised action years for all the three structures 
within a budgetary constraint, the Solver in MS 
Excel was used. The resulting optimised schedule is 
shown in Figure 8.  
Figure 8 shows the replacement schedule for 
three structures Str#1, Str#2 and Str#3 as 2013, 2016 
and 2014 respectively. 
 
10. Limitations of the model 
Some of the immediately apparent limitations of 
this tool are as follows: 
For more complex systems with increasing 
number of components and constraints, non-linear 
optimization tools (i.e. based on genetic algorithms) 
more powerful than the linear Solver in Microsoft 
Excel may be required; 
There are economic dependencies in 
maintenance and inspection, so with increasing 
dependencies, the methodology will become more 
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complex and more computing power may be 
required for the analysis; and 
For safety critical systems, as opposed to 
business critical systems, where the target or 
acceptable levels of failure probability are of the 
order of 10-4 to 10-6 failures per year, the constraints 
on the failure probability may be so severe, as to 
cancel out any potential financial benefits from 
applying the methodology.  
This methodology is essentially for proposed 
action during the ‘Ageing Phase’ of a plant in which 
failure is primarily due to accumulated damage. Thus 
the method needs to be used in conjunction with an 
overall maintenance strategy rather than in isolation.  
 
11. Conclusions 
The paper describes and demonstrates work in 
progress of the DTI funded CORLEX project under 
the Technology Programme on Renewable Energy.  
Risk-based maintenance optimization requires a 
detailed analysis using quantitative techniques. The 
proposed methodology uses engineering analysis by 
developing a basic probabilistic damage mechanism 
model to obtain failure rates. The resulting failure 
rates over time, are used to calculate expected 
present values of cash flows before and after selected 
maintenance actions (e.g. equipment replacement). 
It has been shown that the optimum year of 
replacement can be calculated when the net present 
value (NPV) of the maintenance action is 
maximised. If there is a budgetary constraint that 
does not allow for a series of actions in a system of 
structures to be undertaken in a given strategic 
planning period, multi-component optimisation can 
be easily undertaken using the approach. 
Future work will focus on the derivation of 
failure rates using expert elicitation, as well as the 
combination of failure probabilities using Bayesian 
methods to update prior probability distributions 
with other data sources, e.g. generic failure databases 
with expert knowledge. The optimisation method 
currently used in the method will also be developed 
by exploring the practicalities of using off-the-shelf 
genetic algorithm solvers. Finally, further work will 
be undertaken to incorporate a wider range of in-
service equipment damage mechanisms, as well as 
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previous in-service inspection data, to optimise 
future inspection plans (i.e. coverage and schedule). 
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FIGURES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Failure rate of plant components versus age. 
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Figure 2: Idealised Risk Plot of several components within a plant. 
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Figure 3: Continuum of Risk Analysis methods. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Qualitative Risk Analysis using a Risk Matrix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Qualitative Risk 
 Analysis Quantitative Risk  
Analysis        Semi-qualitative Analysis
High
Low 
Detail  
Of  
Risk 
Analysis 
 16 Copyright © ASME 2007 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Probability of failure versus time 
 
 
 
Figure 6:Optimum time of replacement of Structure #1 
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Figure 7: Structure #1, Action NPV and Probability of Failure versus time 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Optimum schedule of replacement of three structures within budgetary constraints 
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ABSTRACT 
Spare parts inventories assist maintenance staff to keep equipment in operating condition. 
Thus the inventory level of spares has a direct bearing on machine availability, a factor that is 
increasingly important in capital-intensive industries. This paper presents a risk based approach 
for spare parts inventory optimization. 
At the outset, the paper highlights the unique features of maintenance inventories, such as 
spare parts inventories, compared to other inventories such as work- in- progress or finished 
product inventories. After a brief mention of the principles on which many of the current 
inventory management models are based and their limitations, the paper presents a risk-based 
methodology to spares inventory management. ‘Risk’ in the current context is the risk in 
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monetary terms that arises when a component (spare) is not available on demand. It is the 
expected value of loss, i.e., the product of the likelihood of unavailability of the spare from the 
inventory and an estimate of the consequence(s) of that unavailability. Given a budgetary 
constraint and the risk profile of a number of spares, the model gives an optimal inventory of 
spares.  
By basing the inventory on the risk profile of spares, the model includes factors that are not 
normally considered in various other models. The ultimate aim of the methodology is to have an 
optimal level of spares inventory such that machine availability, to the extent it is dependent on 
the level of spares inventory, is maximized subject to constraints. The methodology is expected to 
benefit both, operational and financial managers.  
 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
The level of spares in an inventory has a direct bearing on machine availability. The 
availability of a machine is a function of the mean time to correct a failure which in turn depends 
upon, among other factors, the time to obtain a spare (to conduct repairs) or a replacement. The 
level of spares in a spares inventory is constrained by the cost of holding stock and the penalty of 
being out of stock. In a competitive climate companies strive to keep their spares inventory at an 
optimum level to minimize the costs involved. This paper presents a new approach - a risk based 
approach - to spares inventory management aimed at establishing an optimum level of spares 
such that financial benefit is maximized within accepted levels of risk, and the remaining 
(residual) risks are clearly identified. The paper presents a framework that enables consistent and 
auditable decision making in spares inventory management. 
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Risk based approaches are used in other sectors of industry and for prioritizing different 
types of actions; for example, there are risk based approaches in the process industry to manage 
maintenance and inspection and there are standards or guidance documents to implement these 
approaches (1, 2, 3 and 4). As opposed to other approaches, in a risk based approach, actions are 
based on the risk estimate of various options. In the current context, this means maintaining an 
inventory at an optimal level depending on the risk profile of the spares in which the likelihood 
of a failure to meet the demand for a spare is considered in conjunction with the consequences of 
the failure to meet that demand. The optimal level is such that financial benefits are optimized 
given risk associated constraints. 
The paper discusses some of the unique features of spares inventories vis-à-vis other types of 
inventories. There is also a section on typical costs associated with inventories followed by a 
brief note on the main principles underlying various current approaches to spares inventory 
management. The main body of the paper then presents the risk based methodology and the basic 
model that has been created to implement that methodology. This is followed by limitations of 
the methodology, areas of further research and conclusions. 
 
2.0 SPARE PARTS INVENTORIES 
Spare parts inventories are maintenance inventories; they are used by maintenance personnel 
to keep machines available and exist to meet an internal demand for spares. They perform a 
different function compared to other inventories such as Work-in-progress (WIP) inventories and 
Finished Product Inventories. WIP inventories smooth out irregularities in production flow. These 
irregularities are caused by factors such as changes in product mix, equipment breakdowns, 
differences in production rates, between processes and material handling. Finished Product 
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Inventories provide a buffer stock to protect against lead time demand, differences in quality 
levels, differences in machine production rates, labor troubles, scheduling problems, gap between 
capacity and demand and other well established production problems(5). 
Characteristics of Spare parts inventories: Spares Inventories are hugely influenced by 
maintenance policies rather than customer usages that dictate WIP or Finished Product 
Inventories. For scheduled maintenance, the demand for spares is relatively more predictable and 
it may be possible to order parts to arrive just in time for use and indeed not stock such parts at 
all. For unplanned maintenance, a lack of some safety stock often means that the consequences of 
not keeping some safety stock include production loss. There are other factors such as the amount 
of redundancy within a system, availability of reliability information from condition monitoring 
equipment, dependency of failure events, possibility of demands being met by cannibalism and 
the effect of parts or machine obsolescence on the level of stock holding. There has also been 
research illustrating how other factors such as the organizational context of inventories, 
especially the responsibilities and authorities of the persons concerned, have a bearing on 
inventory management (6). 
 
3.0 SOME TYPICAL COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH INVENTORIES 
Ordering and setting up costs: These are fixed costs that do not depend on the size of the 
order. For example, ordering costs would include paperwork and billing associated with the order. 
For parts made in-house, ordering and set up costs would include the cost of labor, setting up and 
shutting down the associated machinery.  
Unit purchasing cost: This is the variable unit cost of a part or a component. If the part is 
manufactured in-house, It includes the variable labor cost, the overhead cost, and the raw material 
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cost needed to produce a single unit. If this part is ordered from an external source, then the unit 
purchase cost must include the shipping cost. 
 
Holding or carrying cost: These are essentially the inventory costs expressed in monetary 
value per unit part per year. It includes storage cost, insurance cost, taxes on inventory, and cost 
due to the possibility of spoilage, theft, or obsolescence. However, usually the most significant of 
the holding cost is the opportunity cost incurred by tying up capital in inventory. The opportunity 
cost is the return the company would expect on an investment elsewhere rather than in stock-
holding. 
Stockout costs: When a demand for a product or a part is not met on time, a stockout is said 
to have occurred. If it is acceptable for demands to be met at a later date, no matter how much 
later, it is said that demands may be back-ordered. In the current context, Risk is the combination 
of the probability of a stockout event and its consequence, where a stockout is an event in which 
a spare is not available on demand. If it is necessary for demands to be met on time, and if this is 
not achieved, then the scenario is a lost case one. In the current context, a lost case may result in 
production loss, regulatory penalty and other consequences such as loss of goodwill. Usually it is 
more difficult to measure the cost of a stockout rather than ordering, purchasing or holding costs. 
 
4.0 APPROACHES TO INVENTORY MANAGEMENT 
There are different approaches to Inventory Management. SM categorizes inventory models 
into two: Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) and Materials Requirement Planning (MRP). Under 
these, he classifies about ninety inventory models (7). WW classifies models as Deterministic 
EOQ Models, Probabilistic Models and other recent models such as MRP, JIT and Exchange 
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Curves (8). SN looks specifically at repairable inventory systems and classifies existing models 
into three general classes: continuous review, periodic review and models based on cyclic 
queuing systems (9). The Risk Based approach presented here is unique in that it does not 
completely fall in any of these categories although it might have some elements of the approaches 
listed above. 
 
5.0 THE RISK BASED APPROACH TO SPARE PARTS INVENTORY MANAGEMENT 
The Risk Based approach to Spares Inventory Management presented here is consistent with 
risk based decision making approaches used elsewhere, for example, in maintenance and 
inspection planning within the process industry.  
In the current context, the following terms have a special meaning: Risk is the combination 
of the probability of a stock out event and its consequence where a stockout is an event when a 
spare is not available on demand. Qualitative Risk Analysis broadly covers methods that use 
engineering judgment and experience as the bases for the analysis of probabilities and 
consequences of failure. Failure Modes, Effects, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) and HAZOPs 
are examples of qualitative risk analysis that become quantitative risk analysis when 
consequences and failure probability values are estimated. Quantitative Risk Analysis a) 
identifies and delineates the combinations of events that, if they occur lead to an undesired event 
b) estimates the frequency of occurrence for each combination c) estimates the consequences. 
The approach shown here is a semi-qualitative approach that captures best estimates from experts 
as well as raw historical data. The risk referred here is relative risk which is a comparative risk of 
components or equipment in relation to each other. 
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In the method described below, a risk profile of the spares is obtained by considering the 
likelihood of a failure to meet the demand for a spare in conjunction with the consequences of the 
failure to meet that demand. This risk profile is then used to find the optimal level of inventory 
such that financial benefit is maximized given an identified acceptable risk level. 
 
6.0 A BASIC MODEL TO IMPLEMENT THE APPROACH 
6.1 Underlying concepts 
The model has two parts: Part 1 establishes baseline values, and Part 2 optimizes values. The 
implementation of the approach is shown by way of an example shown in Figure 1. 
 
Part 1: Obtaining baseline values: 
This part of the model aims at establishing baseline values for certain parameters for the purpose 
of optimizing in the second part of the model. The parameters with their descriptions are as 
follows: 
 
i unique part number for identification; 
iF  Expected failures in a planning period based on historical data, expert opinion, generic data 
or a mix of these. There are guidelines/ procedures for combining data from various sources. (10) 
and (11); 
i ratio of part i in stock to the expected demand depending on )(refi ; 
)(refi reference (baseline) value of i for planning purpose; 
in irefi F)( = number of parts held in stock, rounded to the nearest integer; 
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iC net unit cost of part i ; 
iCoF consequence of a stockout for part i ; 
 
i Stockout frequency estimate for part i , assuming stock outs are proportional to stock levels 
     = 
i
i
F
n1                                                                    …Eq. 1 
iRV Risk value associated with part i   
        = (Quantified iCoF ) i                                             …Eq. 2 
 
TSV ii Cn                                                                  …Eq. 3 
TRV  iRV                                                                    …Eq. 4 
 
In the model shown below, qualitative estimates of iCoF , VH, H, M, L, VL have been assigned 
values 100, 80, 60, 40 and 20 respectively. In a more advanced model, these values would be a 
weighted average of values obtained by considering a number of consequence or impact factors. 
One such possible scheme is shown in the Appendix. 
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Figure 1: A basic Risk Based Spares Inventory Management Model 
 
Part 2: Obtaining optimized values: 
This part of the model contains optimized values obtained after using a linear optimizing tool 
using the values in Part 1 of the model, wherever applicable. The optimized values contain the 
subscript ‘o’. For example, ion is the optimized value of units of part i to be held in the inventory. 
)(refi  
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6.2 Working of the model: 
At the outset, in Part 1 of the model, an appropriate value for )(refi is assumed; in Figure 1, 
this is 0.95. )(refi is a percentage of the expected spare parts demand, necessitated by failures, to 
be held in the inventory. This starting assumption is necessary to find baseline values for Total 
Stock Value (TSV) and the Total Risk Value (TRV) of the inventory, say, bTSV  and bTRV  
respectively where,  
 
bTSV ii Cn                                                              …Eq. 5 
bTRV  iRV                                                                 …Eq. 6 
 
The values above are, in essence, baseline or reference values that establish what is an 
acceptable level of overall risk and the associated cost of stock holding at that level. Having 
established these baseline values as a starting point, we then move on to Part 2 of the model in 
which linear optimization is carried out. In the model demonstrated here, the Linear 
Programming is through the Solver add-in to Microsoft Excel.  
 
Linear programming: 
Linear Programming (LP) is a tool to solve optimization problems. Since the development of 
the simplex algorithm by George Dantzig in 1947, LP has been used extensively in academia and 
industry.  
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Formally, a LP problem is an optimization problem for which we do the following: 
i) We attempt to maximize (or minimize) a linear function of the decision variables (variables that 
describe the decisions to be made). The function that is to be maximized or minimized is called 
the objective function. 
ii) The values of the decision variables must satisfy a set of constraints. Each constraint must be a 
linear equation or a linear inequality. 
iii) A sign restriction is associated with each variable. For any variable ix , the sign restriction 
specifies either that ix  must be nonnegative ( 0ix ) or that ix  may be unrestricted in sign. (12)  
 
The optimization here is as follows: 
Minimize TSV such that bTRVTRV    
All values are integers and greater than zero. The optimized values for TSV and TRV are 
oTSV and oTRV  respectively. 
 
The Table shows values corresponding to two values of )(refi , 0.95 and 0.90. Consider the first 
row in the Table. This scenario is captured by Figures 1 and 2. 
 
Figure 1 shows the risk profile of the various components in the last column. Individual values of 
stockout consequence and frequency estimates can also be seen. Figure 2 graphically depicts the 
risk profile before and after optimization.  
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As shown in the above Figures 1 and 2, although optimization has been carried out as described, 
there may be some components for which the risk profile may be considered too high to be 
acceptable to the decision maker. For example, the RV for part 3 i.e. 3RV  is 20; this is a part of 
VL consequence, but the likelihood value of a stockout is very high at 00.13 o . Such a value 
may be deemed too high by the decision maker especially when it is substantially different to 
)(refi  that was assumed initially in Part 1 of the model 
Table: Baseline Values and Optimized Values 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)(refi  bTSV  bTRV  oTSV  oTRV (max)i
0.95 440000 63 340500 63 1.0 
0.95 440000 63 392000 62 0.3 
0.95 440000 63 411000 62 0.2 
0.95 440000 63 430500 57 0.15 
0.95 440000 63 ---- ---- 0.1 
      
0.9 422500 87 304500 87 1.0 
0.9 422500 87 309500 87 0.9 
0.9 422500 87 314500 87 0.8 
0.9 422500 87 319500 87 0.7 
0.9 422500 87 327000 86 0.6 
0.9 422500 87 342000 87 0.5 
0.9 422500 87 357500 86 0.4 
0.9 422500 87 375500 86 0.3 
0.9 422500 87 404000 85 0.2 
0.9 422500 87 ---- ---- 0.1 
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Figure 2: Risk Value of parts before and after Optimization 
 
Similarly, the risk level of Part 2 may be deemed unacceptable to the decision maker. To 
rectify this, one more constraint is added to the above optimization process by way of adding a 
maximum acceptable stockout likelihood value, (max)i .This means that however low impact a 
failure to meet a demand for a part is, a minimum stock level will be maintained. (max)i  for the 
scenario with values as indicated in the first row of the Table is 1.0 i.e. there is no upper limit to 
the stockout likelihood. In the subsequent values, (max)i  is changed to assess the impact on other 
parameters of interest. 
As a contrast to the above scenario (indicated in the first row of the Table), Figures 3 and 4 
show the results when )(refi =0.95 and (max)i  is 0.15 (scenario indicated in the fourth row of the 
Table). As shown, with an introduction of a constraint (max)i = 0.15, there is an increase in oTSV  
and a decrease in oTRV . The increase in oTSV  reflects the extra expense involved in maintaining 
a minimum level of inventory and the decrease in oTRV  reflects the decreasing risk profile of 
spares as stock holding is made to increase consistent with smaller values of (max)i  . 
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In the Table, for some scenarios there is no optimal solution for the associated baseline TSV 
and TRV. This is indicated by ---- in the respective cells of the Table. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Model with maximum acceptable stockout constraint 
 
The Table shows how the optimized values of TSV and TRV change when (max)i values are 
changed. To provide a better perspective, two values of )(refi have been used. 
(max)i  
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Figure 4: Risk Value of parts before and after Optimization  
It is observed that as (max)i  decreases, there is an increase in oTSV  and a general decrease in 
the oTRV values. oTSV  values increase as a minimum level of inventory has been stipulated 
regardless of the risk profile of a part. oTRV  values tend to decrease as the risk of stockout 
decreases. However, in one instance, shown by the highlighted row in the Table, somewhat 
counter intuitively and against the trend, the oTRV  increases. This is probably due to the constraint 
in the linear optimization that the optimum number of parts should be an integer.  
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Figure 5: Effect of Beta on optimized individual Risk Values of parts in the Spares Inventory 
 
15.0(max)i
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Figure 5 above shows the impact of change in Beta values on individual optimized Risk 
Values of parts. Here, the model described above was run for four values of Beta i.e., 0.15, 0.20, 
0.30 and 1.00. (max)i = 0.15 means that an expected stockout likelihood of up to 15% is 
acceptable; (max)i = 1.00 means that a total absence of stock of any spare is acceptable. The risk 
profiles of the ten parts (depicted by their Risk Values on the vertical axis) are shown. The 
horizontal axis depicts Part Number, the Consequence Value in brackets and the Cost Price of that 
part. For example, 1 (M) 1000, the first entry on the horizontal axis, stands for Part 1 with M 
Consequence Value and a Cost Price of 1000. For Part 1, the Risk Value reduces to zero as Beta 
increases. This is because the part is relatively of M consequence and cheap. With increase in 
Beta values, money is freed from elsewhere for this part to be stocked more. The same logic 
holds true for Part 2. Part 3 is expensive although of VL consequence. Hence an increase in Beta 
values raises its optimized Risk Value. Part 4 is accorded top priority as it is of VH consequence 
and is somewhat relatively cheaper. Part 5 is of VH consequence but because of its high cost 
cannot be stocked at the level of Part 4. Hence it has a Risk Value greater than that of Part 4 for 
different values of Beta. If one analyses other parts in Figure 5, the logic behind the methodology 
emerges. 
This discussion shows how a decision maker can get various perspectives on the risk profile 
of the inventory by using this methodology. The model shown here returns a list of optimal 
number of units of spares to be held in an inventory such that i) the corresponding expenses are 
minimized ii) the overall risk profile of the system (the inventory) is less than the reference one 
and iii) the risk associated with individual parts is less than a specified value. 
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7.0 SOME LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
The consequence or impact of a failure to meet a demand for a spare is a qualitative 
assessment in the model described above. It is worth noting that the same model will work by 
directly putting in the likely impact cost (in monetary terms) of a failure to meet a demand for a 
particular spare. However, it is at times difficult to quantify the full implications of such an event. 
Therefore, such qualitative assessments, despite the subjectivity involved, are often the best way 
to fully estimate the impact of an event. One can make such estimates more precise by fine tuning 
the consequences part of the risk estimate. For example, CoF (Consequence of Failure to meet a 
demand) can be a weighted sum of various consequences factor values such as: extra cost of 
procuring a part on an urgent basis and the lead time under such circumstances, availability of 
technical personnel to effect repairs, knock on effect of failure to meet a part on the general 
availability of the system and the risk of obsolescence of a part or the machine itself. The 
Appendix shows how such an approach can be developed. The approach consists of the following 
main steps: (1) Identify factors that impinge on a failure to meet a demand for a spare- impact 
factors (IF) - for each spare under consideration. In the table in the Appendix, these are lead time, 
availability of technical staff, knock-on failures and associated demands, potential for machine or 
spare redundancy and obsolescence (2) Ascribe weights to each of these impact factors to reflect 
their relative importance. In the table, these are 10, 10, 60, 15, and 5 for IF1 through to IF5 
respectively. (3) Determine relative importance values for VH, H, M, L or VL representing Very 
High, High, Medium, Low and Very Low. These are shown to be 100, 80, 60, 40 and 20 
respectively. (4) The spare is then assessed qualitatively- VH, H, M, L or VL - under each of the 
impact factors identified in step (1). The net result of this exercise is an aggregate Impact Value. 
This is ‘84’ in the example shown in the Appendix. This process is repeated for each spare that is 
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under consideration in an inventory. The relative weights or values in step (2) and step (3) may or 
may not be the same for all parts. Indeed, impact factors also may differ with parts. 
This model takes an expected demand for a period as given; the model in its current form is 
thus based on periodic reviews. The forecast can be made continuous by using a moving average 
method for the demand trend which can make this a continuous review model that may be more 
advantageous in some circumstances. The model can also be configured to take in probabilistic 
distributions as demand forecast. A more advanced version of this model is being developed 
along these lines. 
More work needs to be done to show how the approach shown here can be used in 
conjunction with more conventional ones such as the Economic Order Quantity (EOR) and the 
Materials Requirement planning (MRP) approaches.  
Attempts are underway to implement this methodology and present a case study. 
 
8.0 CONCLUSIONS 
This paper applies risk based principles to spares inventory management. It extends the risk 
based approach that is well established in other areas of industry and used for planning activities 
such as maintenance and inspection within process industry. Based on the risk profile of each 
part, the model shown here presents the most optimal combination of spares to be held in an 
inventory such that the cost of holding such an inventory is minimized subject to a stipulated 
maximum individual risk of a stockout of a part and an overall risk of stockout within a system. 
The approach outlined here has the potential to increase plant or system availability and manage 
business as well as operational risks. It is thus of interest to a number of industry stakeholders 
including operators, maintenance personnel, regulators and insurance companies.  
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APPENDIX  
DERIVING CONSEQUENCE VALUE FOR A PART FROM A NUMBER OF CONSEQUENCE (IMPACT) 
FACTORS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Where, 
the value ‘8’ in the first column is 
(10*80)/100 
Weights need to total 100 as this is a relative 
assessment 
The weighted total ‘84’ is the CoF value for 
that part 
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OPTIMISATION OF RESOURCES FOR MANAGING COMPETING RISKS 
Ujjwal R Bharadwaj*;  
John B Wintle; V V Silberschmidt; John D Andrews 
The model for managing risk presented in this paper was developed to address the problem of 
how many parts of different kinds of a major industrial enterprise should advance in order for 
stock to operate at optimum efficiency given that failures may occur in service. The particular 
application was a fleet of cargo ships where parts of different kinds are required to keep ships 
available for service. For example, spare propellers are expensive items to hold in stock, but 
the consequential costs of not having a spare when required can also be expensive. There is an 
optimum number of propellers that it is worth holding in order to balance the cost of stocking 
too many against the risk of a stock-out. Such risk optimization techniques, in general, find 
the optimum trade-off between the cost of a risk mitigating measure and the expected value of 
risk without that measure. They have the potential of being applied more widely within 
structural integrity and asset management, in any situation where competing risks need to be 
managed within finite resources. They may therefore find application in areas such as risk 
based inspection and more generally in other areas of risk management. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The level of spares in an inventory has a direct bearing on machine availability. The 
availability of a machine is a function of the mean time to correct a failure which in turn 
depends upon, among other factors, the time to obtain a spare (to conduct repairs) or a 
replacement. The level of spares in a spares inventory is constrained by the cost of holding 
stock and the penalty of being out of stock. In a competitive climate companies strive to keep 
their spares inventory at an optimum level to minimize the costs involved. This paper presents 
a new approach - a risk based approach - to spares inventory management aimed at 
establishing an optimum level of spares such that financial benefit is maximized within 
accepted levels of risk, and the remaining (residual) risks are clearly identified. The paper 
presents a framework that enables consistent and auditable decision making in spares 
inventory management. 
Risk based approaches are used in many sectors of industry and for prioritizing different 
types of actions; for example, there are risk based approaches in the process industry to 
manage maintenance and inspection and there are standards or guidance documents to 
implement these approaches (ASME [1], API [2], API [3] and EEMUA [4]).  As opposed to 
other approaches, in a risk based approach, actions are based on the risk estimate of various 
options. In the current context, this means maintaining an inventory at an optimal level 
depending on the risk profile of the spares in which the likelihood of a failure to meet the 
demand for a spare is considered in conjunction with the consequences of the failure to meet 
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that demand. The optimal level is such that financial benefits are optimized given risk 
associated constraints. 
The paper discusses some of the unique features of spares inventories vis-à-vis other types 
of inventories. There is also a section on typical costs associated with inventories followed by 
a brief note on the main principles underlying various current approaches to spares inventory 
management. The main body of the paper then presents the risk based methodology and the 
basic model that has been created to implement that methodology. This is followed by 
possible areas of further research and conclusions. 
SPARE PARTS INVENTORIES 
Spare parts inventories are maintenance inventories; they are used by maintenance personnel 
to keep machines available and exist to meet an internal demand for spares. They perform a 
different function compared to other inventories such as Work-in-progress (WIP) inventories 
and Finished Product Inventories. WIP inventories smooth out irregularities in production 
flow. These irregularities are caused by factors such as changes in product mix, equipment 
breakdowns, differences in production rates, between processes and material handling. 
Finished Product Inventories provide a buffer stock to protect against lead time demand, 
differences in quality levels, differences in machine production rates, labor troubles, 
scheduling problems, gap between capacity and demand and other well established production 
problems, Kennedy [5]. 
Characteristics of spare parts inventories: Spares inventories are hugely influenced by 
maintenance policies rather than customer usages that dictate WIP or Finished Product 
Inventories. For scheduled maintenance, the demand for spares is relatively more predictable 
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and it may be possible to order parts to arrive just in time for use and indeed not stock such 
parts at all. For unplanned maintenance, a lack of some safety stock often means that the 
consequences of not keeping some safety stock include production loss. There are other 
factors such as the amount of redundancy within a system, availability of reliability 
information from condition monitoring equipment, dependency of failure events, possibility 
of demands being met by cannibalism and the effect of parts or machine obsolescence on the 
level of stock holding. There has also been research illustrating how other factors such as the 
organizational context of inventories, especially the responsibilities and authorities of the 
persons concerned, have a bearing on inventory management, Zomerdijk and Jan [6]. 
SOME TYPICAL COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH INVENTORIES 
Ordering and setting up costs: These are fixed costs that do not depend on the size of the 
order. For example, ordering costs would include paperwork and billing associated with the 
order. For parts made in-house, ordering and set up costs would include the cost of labor, 
setting up and shutting down the associated machinery.  
Unit purchasing cost: This is the variable unit cost of a part or a component. If the part is 
manufactured in-house, it includes the variable labor cost, the overhead cost, and the raw 
material cost needed to produce a single unit. If this part is ordered from an external source, 
then the unit purchase cost must include the shipping cost. 
Holding or carrying cost: These are essentially the inventory costs expressed in monetary 
value per unit part per year. It includes storage cost, insurance cost, taxes on inventory, and 
cost due to the possibility of spoilage, theft, or obsolescence. However, usually the most 
significant of the holding cost is the opportunity cost incurred by tying up capital in inventory. 
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The opportunity cost is the return the company would expect on an investment elsewhere 
rather than in stock-holding. 
Stockout costs: When a demand for a product or a part is not met on time, a stockout is 
said to have occurred. If it is acceptable for demands to be met at a later date, no matter how 
much later, it is said that demands may be back-ordered. In the current context, risk is the 
combination of the probability of a stockout event and its consequence, where a stockout is an 
event in which a spare is not available on demand. If it is necessary for demands to be met on 
time, and if this is not achieved, then the scenario is a lost case one. In the current context, a 
lost case may result in production loss, regulatory penalty and other consequences such as 
loss of goodwill. Usually it is more difficult to measure the cost of a stockout rather than 
ordering, purchasing or holding costs. 
APPROACHES TO INVENTORY MANAGEMENT 
There are different approaches to Inventory Management. Prasad [7] categorizes inventory 
models into two: Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) and Materials Requirement Planning 
(MRP). Under these, he classifies about ninety inventory models. The basic model in an EOR 
method determines, subject to a number of assumptions, an ordering policy that minimizes the 
yearly sum of ordering cost, purchasing cost, and the holding cost of a part in the inventory. 
The basic model in an MRP based method considers the relationship between a component 
that is demanded and other associated (sub) components that also need to be available in order 
to fulfill that demand.   
Winston [8] classifies models as Deterministic EOQ Models, Probabilistic Models and 
other recent models such as MRP, Just-in-time (JIT) and Exchange Curves. Nahmias [9] 
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looks specifically at repairable inventory systems and classifies existing models into three 
general classes: continuous review, periodic review and models based on cyclic queuing 
systems. The Risk Based approach presented here is unique in that it does not completely fall 
in any of these categories although it might have some elements of the approaches listed 
above. 
THE RISK BASED APPROACH TO SPARE PARTS INVENTORY MANAGEMENT 
In the current context, the following terms have a special meaning: Risk is the combination of 
the probability of a stock out event and its consequence where a stockout is an event when a 
spare is not available on demand. Qualitative Risk Analysis broadly covers methods that use 
engineering judgment and experience as the bases for the analysis of probabilities and 
consequences of failure. Failure Modes, Effects, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) and 
Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOPs) are examples of qualitative risk analysis that 
become quantitative risk analysis when consequences and failure probability values are 
estimated. Quantitative Risk Analysis a) identifies and delineates the combinations of events 
that, if they occur lead to an undesired event b) estimates the frequency of occurrence for each 
combination c) estimates the consequences. The approach shown here is a semi-quantitative 
approach that captures best estimates from experts as well as raw historical data. The risk 
referred here is relative risk which is a comparative risk of components or equipment in 
relation to each other. 
In the method described below, a risk profile of the spares is obtained by considering the 
likelihood of a failure to meet the demand for a spare in conjunction with the consequences of 
the failure to meet that demand. This risk profile is then used to find the optimal level of 
inventory such that financial benefit is maximized given an identified acceptable risk level. 
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A BASIC MODEL TO IMPLEMENT THE APPROACH 
Underlying concepts 
The model has two parts: Part 1 establishes baseline values, and Part 2 optimizes values. The 
implementation of the approach is shown by way of an example shown in Figure 1. 
 
Part 1: Obtaining baseline values: 
This part of the model aims at establishing baseline values for certain parameters for the 
purpose of optimizing in the second part of the model. The parameters with their descriptions 
are as follows: 
i unique part number for identification; 
(max)in  Expected maximum number of spares required in a planning period, based on 
historical data, expert opinion, generic data or a mix of these. There are guidelines/ 
procedures for combining data from various sources (Clemen and Winkler [10], ASME [11]). 
i   ratio of part i in stock to the expected demand depending on )(refi ; 
)(refi reference (baseline) value of i for planning purpose (to obtain baseline values) ; 
in irefi F)( = number of parts held in stock, rounded to the nearest integer; 
iC net unit cost of part i ; 
iCoF consequence of a stockout for part i ; 
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i  Stockout frequency estimate for part i , assuming stock outs are proportional to stock 
levels 
     =
)
1
(maxi
i
n
n = )()( (max)iiii nxnPxP                                         (1) 
where )( ixP the probability of a stockout given that a) a quantity ix of that part may be 
required during the timeframe i.e. demand for that part b) in  is the quantity in stock c) 
(max)in being the maximum expected requirement of part i ; this is assuming that the demand 
for spares follows a uniform distribution. 
iRV Risk value associated with part i   
         = (Quantified iCoF ) i                                                                          (2) 
TSV ii Cn                                                                                               (3) 
TRV    iRV                                                                                                   (4) 
In the model shown above, qualitative estimates of iCoF , VH, H, M, L, VL have been 
assigned values 100, 80, 60, 40 and 20 respectively. In a more advanced model, these values 
would be a weighted average of values obtained by considering a number of consequence or 
impact factors. One such possible scheme is shown in the Figure 5. 
Part 2: Obtaining optimized values: 
This part of the model contains optimized values obtained after using a linear optimizing 
tool using the values in Part 1 of the model, wherever applicable. The optimized values 
contain the subscript ‘o’. For example, ion is the optimized value of units of part i to be held 
in the inventory. 
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Working of the model: 
At the outset, in Part 1 of the model, an appropriate value for )(refi is assumed; in Figure 
1, this is 0.90. )(refi  (shown in the highlighted box with a small circle towards its top right 
corner) is a percentage of the expected spare parts demand, necessitated by failures, to be held 
in the inventory. This starting assumption is necessary to find baseline values for Total Stock 
Value (TSV) and the Total Risk Value (TRV) of the inventory, say, bTSV  and bTRV  
respectively where,  
bTSV ii Cn                                                                                            (5) 
bTRV  iRV                                                                                                (6) 
The values above are, in essence, baseline or reference values that establish what is an 
acceptable level of overall risk and the associated cost of stock holding at that level. Having 
established these baseline values as a starting point, we then move on to Part 2 of the model in 
which linear optimization is carried out. In the model demonstrated here, the Linear 
Programming is through the Solver add-in to Microsoft Excel.  
The optimization here is as follows: 
Minimize TSV such that bTRVTRV   . All values are integers and greater than zero. The 
optimized values for TSV and TRV are oTSV and oTRV  respectively. 
Figure 1 shows the risk profile of various components in the last column. The figure shows 
Stockout Risk values associated with )(refi 0.90 both before and after optimization.  
Modes of operation: 
(A) Minimize Total Risk 
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Figure 1 shows the results when Total Risk is minimized subject to given budget. As seen the 
Total Risk Value reduces from 87 before optimization to 16 after optimization. 
(B) Minimize Total Cost 
Figure 2 shows the results when Total (inventory) Cost is minimized subject to a reference 
level of (tolerable) Total Risk. As shown in the figure, the Total Cost comes down to 304500 
from 422500, given a Total Risk Value tolerance of 87. 
Although optimization has been carried out as described, there may be some components 
for which the risk profile may be considered too high to be acceptable to the decision maker. 
For example, as shown in Figure 1, the RV for part 3 i.e. oRV3  is 16; this is an expensive part 
of VL consequence, but the likelihood value of a stockout relative to other parts is  high 
at 8.03 o . Similarly, in Figure 2, Part 3 has a Stockout likelihood of 1.00 (100%).  Such a 
value may be deemed too high by the decision maker especially when it is substantially 
different to that implied by )(refi  that was assumed initially in Part 1 of the model as part of 
establishing baseline values. It may be noted here that 9.0)( refi implies a reference stock 
level that expects to meet 90% of the expected maximum demand, i.e., other things being 
equal, 10% of expected maximum demand is expected not to be met: stockout would be at 
10%. 
(C) Minimize Total Risk or Total Cost subject to maximum Individual Risk constraints 
To rectify this, one more constraint is added to the above optimization process by way of 
adding a maximum acceptable stockout likelihood value for each of the parts, (max)i . This 
constraint is shown in the highlighted box with two concentric circles towards its top right 
corner in Figure 3. In Figures 1 and 2, (max)i  is mentioned but the value is 1.0 so that, in 
E S I A 1 0  
E n g i n e e r i n g  S t r u c t u r a l  I n t e g r i t y  A s s e s s m e n t :  p r e s e n t  g o a l s  –  f u t u r e  c h a l l e n g e s  
 
11 
© EMAS Publishing 2009 
effect, it is not a constraint. Imposing (max)i  constraint means that however low impact a 
failure to meet a demand for a part is, a minimum stock level will be maintained. Figures 3 
and 4 repeat the optimisation with same values as in Figures 1 and 2 with the added constraint 
of 3.0(max) i . As seen in Figures 3 and 4, the additional constraint ensures that however 
Low consequence a part maybe and however expensive it may be, it will be stocked within 
the stipulated level (0.7 or 70% of expected maximum demand, in this case) of tolerable Risk 
both at a system level (Total Risk Value) and at the individual or component level as 
indicated by the various io  values. However, as shown in the Figures, this extra risk 
mitigation effected by the constraint (max)i  comes at a price. Figures 3 and 4 show that the 
Optimised Total Risk value is now 32 up from 16, and the Optimised Total Cost is 375500 up 
from 304500.  
FURTHER RESEARCH 
The consequence or impact of a failure to meet a demand for a spare is a qualitative 
assessment in the model described above. It is worth noting that the same model will work by 
directly putting in the likely impact cost (in monetary terms) of a failure to meet a demand for 
a particular spare. However, it is at times difficult to quantify the full implications of such an 
event. Therefore, such qualitative assessments, despite the subjectivity involved, are often the 
best way to fully estimate the impact of an event. One can make such estimates more precise 
by fine tuning the consequences part of the risk estimate. For example, CoF (Consequence of 
Failure to meet a demand i.e., a stockout) can be a weighted sum of various consequences 
factor values such as: extra cost of procuring a part on an urgent basis and the lead time under 
such circumstances, availability of technical personnel to effect repairs, knock on effect of 
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failure to meet a part on the general availability of the system and the risk of obsolescence of 
a part or the machine itself. Figure 6 shows how such an approach can be developed. The 
approach consists of the following main steps: (1) Identify factors that impinge on a failure to 
meet a demand for a spare- impact factors (IF) - for each spare under consideration. In Figure 
6, these are lead time, availability of technical staff, knock-on failures and associated 
demands, potential for machine or spare redundancy and obsolescence (2) Ascribe weights to 
each of these impact factors to reflect their relative importance. In the table, these are 10, 10, 
60, 15, and 5 for IF1 through to IF5 respectively. (3) Determine relative importance values for 
VH, H, M, L or VL representing Very High, High, Medium, Low and Very Low. These are 
shown to be 100, 80, 60, 40 and 20 respectively. (4) The spare is then assessed qualitatively- 
VH, H, M, L or VL - under each of the impact factors identified in step (1). The net result of 
this exercise is an aggregate Impact Value. This is ‘84’ in the example shown in the Figure 5. 
This process is repeated for each spare that is under consideration in an inventory. The 
relative weights or values in step (2) and step (3) may or may not be the same for all parts. 
Indeed, impact factors also may differ with parts. 
This model takes an expected maximum demand for a period as given; the model in its 
current form is thus based on periodic reviews. The forecast can be made continuous by using 
a moving average method for the demand trend which can make this a continuous review 
model that may be more advantageous in some circumstances. The model can also be 
configured to take in probabilistic distributions as demand forecast. A more advanced version 
of this model is being developed along these lines. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
This paper applies risk based principles to spares inventory management. It extends the risk 
based approach that is well established in other areas of industry. The example illustrates a 
technique of managing risk within user specified constraints as applicable to Spares 
Inventory. Risks can be minimized subject to a given Budget (Maximum Total Cost), and 
Total Costs can be minimized subject to a specified tolerable level of Risk. The optimisation 
can be done at a system level (Total Cost and Total Risk) and it can be done at a component 
level too, thus affording the user to manage risks at different levels.  
The approach outlined here has the potential to increase plant or system availability and 
manage business as well as operational risks. It is thus of interest to a number of industry 
stakeholders including operators, maintenance personnel, regulators and insurance companies. 
The methodology can be used in other areas that impinge on the structural integrity and asset 
management such as Inspection and Maintenance where competing risks (of failure) need to 
be managed within finite resources.  
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
This research has been funded by the Centre for Innovative and Collaborative Engineering 
(CICE) at Loughborough University, UK in collaboration with TWI Ltd at Cambridge, UK 
via the Engineering Doctorate (EngD) scheme. Inspiration for developing this methodology 
came from a real life problem in the shipping sector brought to the notice of the lead author, 
courtesy of Lloyd’s Register, London, UK. 
E S I A 1 0  
E n g i n e e r i n g  S t r u c t u r a l  I n t e g r i t y  A s s e s s m e n t :  p r e s e n t  g o a l s  –  f u t u r e  c h a l l e n g e s  
 
14 
© EMAS Publishing 2009 
REFERENCES 
(1) ASME: Risk Based Methods for Equipment Life Management: A Step-by-Step 
Instruction Manual with Sample Applications (2003) 
(2) API: Risk Based Inspection, Base Resource Document, 2000, 5-1-5-4, American 
Petroleum Institute, USA 
(3) API: Risk-based Inspection, Recommended Practice 580, 2002, American Petroleum 
Institute, USA 
(4) EEMUA: Risk Based Inspection- A Guide to Effective Use of the RBI Process, The 
Engineering Equipment and Materials User’s Association, 2006, No 206:2006 
(5) Kennedy,W.J., Wayne Patterson,J., Fredendall, Lawrence D. International Journal of 
Production Economics, 2002, 76, 2, 201-215 
(6) Zomerdijk, Leonieke G., De Vries, Jan, An organizational perspective on inventory 
control: Theory and a case study, International Journal of Production Economics, 2003, 
81-82, 173-183 
(7) Prasad, Sameer, Classification of Inventory models and systems, International Journal of 
Production Economics, 1993, 34, 209-222 
(8) Winston, L. Wayne, Introduction to Operations Research, 1993, 3rd Edition, Duxbury 
Press, California, USA 
(9) Nahmias, Steven, Managing Repairable Item Inventory Systems: A Review, TIMS 
Studies in the Management Sciences, 1981, 16, 253-277 
E S I A 1 0  
E n g i n e e r i n g  S t r u c t u r a l  I n t e g r i t y  A s s e s s m e n t :  p r e s e n t  g o a l s  –  f u t u r e  c h a l l e n g e s  
 
15 
© EMAS Publishing 2009 
(10) Clemen, Robert T., Winkler, Robert L., Combining Probability Distributions from 
Experts in Risk Analysis, Risk Analysis, 1999, Vol. 19, No. 2 
(11) ASME: Risk Based Methods for Equipment Life Management: A Step-by-Step 
Instruction Manual with Sample Applications (2003), Chapter 9: Obtaining and 
Combining Data 
(12) Winston, L. Wayne, Introduction to Operations Research, 1993, 3rd Edition, Duxbury 
Press, California, USA, Chapter 3.1: What is a Linear Programming Problem? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
E S I A 1 0  
E n g i n e e r i n g  S t r u c t u r a l  I n t e g r i t y  A s s e s s m e n t :  p r e s e n t  g o a l s  –  f u t u r e  c h a l l e n g e s  
 
16 
© EMAS Publishing 2009 
FIGURES 
Minimize Total  Risk Value or Total Cost
Individual  Risk Profiles before  and after  Optimization
0
5
10
15
20
25
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Part No
R
is
k 
Va
lu
e
Original Risk Value Optimized Risk Value
 
Figure 1: Minimize Total Risk subject to given Budget 
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Figure 2: Minimise Total Cost subject to a tolerable level of Total Risk 
 
Figure 3: Minimize Total Risk subject to given Budget and individual Risk constraints 
(βi(max)) 
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Figure 4: Minimize Total Cost subject to a given tolerable level of Total Risk and individual 
Risk constraints (βi(max)) 
 
Where, the value ‘8’ in the first column is (10*80)/100, 
weights need to total 100 as this is a relative assessment, 
the weighted total ‘84’ is the CoF value for that part. 
Figure 5: Deriving Consequence Value for a part from a number of Consequence estimates 
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A RISK- BASED APPROACH TO ASSET INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT OF 
STRUCTURES AND EQUIPMENT 
Bharadwaj, U.R., Silberschmidt, V.V., Wintle, J.B. 
 
Abstract 
Purpose 
Inspection and maintenance of plant and machinery has traditionally been based on prescriptive 
industry practices. However, increased experience and a greater understanding of operational 
hazards is leading sections of industry to take a more informed approach to planning inspection 
and maintenance, targeting resources to reduce the risk to as low as reasonably practicable. The 
purpose of this paper is to present an approach to asset management to minimize risks in the most 
cost effective way. 
Methodology 
The methodology to implement the approach optimizes the decision-making for undertaking run-
repair-replace decisions with the ultimate aim of maximising the Net Present Value (NPV) of the 
investment on such actions. The risk-based approach to asset integrity management, as opposed 
to the more conventional approaches, assesses failure in its wider context by considering not just 
the likelihood of failure, but also the consequences should the failure event occur. 
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Findings 
The risk based presents a cost-effective way to minimise life cycle costs in the management of 
assets whilst maintaining reliability or availability targets, and operating within safety and 
environmental regulation.  
Practical implications 
In this paper, for demonstration, a wind turbine system consisting of a number of components 
including structural components is used. However, the methodology can be extended to any 
system in which components can be analyzed to provide the required inputs to the risk model. 
Originality/ Value 
At a time when competitive pressures force asset managers to prioritize their maintenance, the 
risk based methodology presented here is a rational, efficient and somewhat flexible way to asset 
integrity management. 
Paper type 
Research paper 
 
Keywords: Risk management, Maintenance, Asset management, Life Cycle Management, 
Operations Management. 
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1. Introduction 
Decisions within asset integrity management that include decisions regarding inspection, repair, 
maintenance and replacement have traditionally been based on a range of practices including the 
prescriptive time-based (rule-based) approach, the condition-based approach, Reliability Centred 
Maintenance (RCM) and Reactive Maintenance (RM). 
Whilst there will remain the need for traditional approaches to asset integrity management, it is 
increasingly felt that more advanced approaches are required to reflect the complexity and 
innovation involved in the assets, and to operate at an optimal level within the competitive 
pressures faced by asset managers. Risk based approaches, as opposed to many other approaches, 
give operators some flexibility in the management of their assets whilst meeting the same 
objectives. The flexibility is as a result of undertaking actions not on a fixed schedule or rule, but 
on some identified measures of risk. The risk based approach uses risk based criteria to prioritize 
efforts and make the optimum use of this flexibility. 
The uptake of risk based practices is growing as increased operational experience and a greater 
understanding of failures (and its consequences) lead some parts of industry to adopt a more 
informed approach to planning, targeting resources to reduce risk to  as low as reasonably 
practicable. Risk based approaches are used in many sectors of industry and for prioritizing 
different types of actions; for example, there are risk based approaches in the process industry to 
manage maintenance and inspection and there are standards or guidance documents to implement 
these approaches  (ASME, 2003; API, 2000; API, 2002; EEMUA, 2006).  
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This paper develops and demonstrates a risk-based methodology to estimate the optimum time of 
replacement or repair of a structure, in a system comprising a number of components, within 
constraints of the budget available, such that financial benefit of the action taken is maximised. 
The paper starts with a discussion on risk and its analysis as applied to asset integrity 
management in general, and moves on to the concept of risk measured in terms of expected 
values, the concept of NPV, and the trade- off involved in risk-based decision-making within the 
constraints that apply. 
2. The Risk Based Approach to asset integrity management 
Risk 
Risk has numerous definitions. Risk is a combination of the probability of an event and its 
consequence (API, 2002). It is a deviation from the normal or expected. Numerically, it is a 
product of probability of an event occurring and the consequence of the event. 
A risk-based approach considers failure taking cognizance of the two elements that constitute risk 
- the probability (or likelihood) of failure and the consequence of that failure.  
In the context of this paper, risk will involve the probability or the likelihood of failure of a 
component or a system of components to fulfil its design purpose in a given time frame and 
under given operating conditions. Where the two components of risk i.e. the likelihood and the 
consequence of a failure event are quantitatively expressed, risk will be expressed in terms of 
‘expected loss’. Expected loss can be defined quantitatively as the product of the consequences 
(C) of a specific incident and the probability (P) over a time period or frequency of its occurrence 
(Andrews and Moss, 2002): 
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 (1) 
 
Risk Analysis methods 
Risk analysis methods are generally categorised as qualitative or quantitative. There may be an 
intermediate category (semi-quantitative) depending upon how quantitative the risk analysis is. 
The API’s Recommended Practice 580 (API, 2002) on risk-based inspection describes a 
‘continuum of approaches’ ranging from the qualitative to quantitative. The level of detail in risk 
analysis corresponding to a purely qualitative approach, on one end of the spectrum, is low 
compared to the purely quantitative one on the other. There are intermediate approaches that may 
have both qualitative and quantitative attributes. 
 
Qualitative Analysis 
Engineering judgment and experience are the basis for risk assessment in a qualitative analysis. 
The results of the analysis largely depend on the expertise of the user. The primary advantage of 
qualitative risk analysis is that it enables assessment in the absence of detailed (and entailing the 
use of substantial resources) numerical data. It is also the first pragmatic step to conduct a 
quantitative risk analysis by screening out components of less concern, and is often the best way 
to take a system-wide view. However, it is not a very detailed method and provides only a broad 
categorization of risk. Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) (MIL-STD-
1629, 1980), Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOPS), and the Risk Matrix approach are 
.PCR 
7 
examples of qualitative methods. In the Risk Matrix, approach, the likelihoods and consequences 
of failure are qualitatively described in broad ranges (e.g. high, medium or low).  
 
Quantitative Analysis 
Qualitative risk assessments become less discerning when the system complexity increases. So a 
quantitative method is often required to achieve risk discrimination of a system of components. 
Quantitative Analysis assigns numerical values to the probability (e.g. 10-5 failure events per 
year) and the consequences of failure (e.g. revenue loss or inventory released over 1,000 m2). 
Qualitative Analysis techniques such as FMECA and HAZOPS can become quantitative when 
the values of failure consequence and failure probability are numerically estimated. This can be 
performed using a variety of references such as generic failure databases, elicited expert 
opinions, or calculated by means of specific engineering and statistical analysis (ASME, 2003). 
There are statistical methods for combining data from various sources or updating data with 
additional information, (Jordan, 2005), (Kallen and Noortwijk, 2005), (Thodi et. Al., 2009). 
 
In the current discussion, it is assumed that there is a system comprising a number of structures 
and a qualitative analysis has identified high-risk components.  For the sake of demonstration, 
consider the system as a wind turbine (comprising of electrical and structural components). 
Among high-risk components- the wind turbine tower structure- has been identified. For 
simplicity, wind turbine tower structure will be referred to as ‘structure’ in the discussion below. 
The paper now describes a methodology for performing quantitative analysis on the structure that 
has been identified as high risk and how the results of this analysis feeds into the planning/ 
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decision-making in integrity management of the system. Again, for the sake of simplicity, the 
decisions involved are run or replace. However, the same method can be extended to other plan 
other actions in asset integrity management such as repair and inspection. 
For the quantitative risk analysis method described in this paper, a failure frequency-time curve is 
developed by engineering analysis of the structure for the active or potentially active in-service 
damage mechanisms. Among the expected damage mechanisms, corrosion is chosen to 
demonstrate the methodology. The consequence of failure is in financial terms as it is assumed 
that the functioning of the structure is business-critical.  
 
Quantitative consequence analysis 
A possible scheme for quantitative assessment of consequences using FMEA is shown in Table 1. 
The table is for illustration only. There may be some intangibles remaining or if quantified, may 
be approximate assessments; for example, ‘technology confidence loss’ may be quantified in 
some way- losing similar projects or a drop in the share value of the company.  
In the analysis that follows, for simplicity, the consequence considered and quantified is just the 
production loss. 
 
3. Quantitative probabilistic damage mechanism model for failure due to corrosion 
This paper does not discuss the details of damage models for use in probabilistic analysis. Instead 
it illustrates a simple probabilistic damage mechanism model for general corrosion of the tower 
structure. Consider a structure subject to corrosion. For the sake of simplicity, assume that this is 
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the only damage mechanism causing failure of the structure and that there is a breakdown of 
coating. The remaining life (RL) of the structure can be calculated as: 
CR
MATTcRL )(                                                                                                               (2) 
Table 1: Identified consequences and associated costs of damage to a wind turbine tower 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
where, RL = remaining life (years); Tc = current thickness of the structure (mm);  
MAT = minimum allowable thickness to maintain integrity of the structure (mm); and  
CR = corrosion rate (mm/year). These terms are explained in more detail later in this  section. 
If To is the original nominal thickness of the structure, then at the end of t years, 
tCRToTc * . (3) 
Failure Mode Effect Consequence category Consequence Cost (£k) Source/comment
Maintenance duration
Regulator penalties
Other turbines
Sea vehicles
local structures
Injury
Death
Installation of new structure
Repair and recommission
Insurance premium
Technology confidence loss
Lost production
Maintenance cost
Keep in service
Maintenance duration
Regulator penalties
Other turbines
Sea vehicles
local structures
Injury
Death
Installation of new structure
Repair and recommission
Insurance premium
Technology confidence loss
Lost production
Maintenance cost
Keep in service
Maintenance duration
Regulator penalties
Other turbines
Sea vehicles
local structures
Injury
Death
Installation of new structure
Repair and recommission
Insurance premium
Technology confidence loss
Lost production
Maintenance cost
Keep in service
Personnel
Maintenance costs
Reputation
Repair
Corrosion - 
Uniform Band in 
Splash Zone
Collapse
Find and Assess
Collapse
Scouring
Fatigue - 
Circumferential 
cracking
Collapse
Find and Assess
Find and Assess
Reputation
Repair
Production loss
Secondary Damage
Personnel
Maintenance costs
Reputation
Repair
Production loss
Secondary Damage
Production loss
Secondary Damage
Personnel
Maintenance costs
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The reliability of an element of a system can be determined based on a performance function that 
can be expressed in terms of basic random variables )( iX  for relevant random loads and 
structural strength (Ayyub, 2003). 
 
Mathematically, the performance function Z  can be described as 
LRXXXZ n  ),...,( 21  (4) 
where, R is the resistance or strength and L is the load.  
 
The limit state can be defined as  
 (5)  
 
Accordingly, when 0Z , the element is in the failure state, and, when 0Z , it is in the survival 
state. 
The limit state equation implied in equation (3.2), when remaining life is zero, can be expressed 
as 
 
0
)*()( 
CR
MATtCRT
CR
MATT
RL oc
,  
 
0*  MATtCRTo , which can be re-arranged to 
 
 0]*[][  tCRMATTo . (6) 
 
11 
where,  the first term represents structural strength (R) , and the second, load effect (L). 
A purely deterministic RL model would have each independent variable in equation (2) as a 
specific value. This assumes that these variables have no random or probabilistic aspects but can 
be defined in a fixed predictable fashion. In reality, there is considerable uncertainty associated 
with these variables and each can be defined by a statistical distribution of values. 
 
The corrosion rate (CR) maybe derived from periodic in-service measurements of metal loss 
resulting from corrosion or from laboratory tests. In the calculations that follow, CR is assumed 
to be a normal distribution with a mean of 0.4mm/year and a standard deviation of 0.1mm/year, 
N (0.4, 0.1). These values are for demonstration only. As CR cannot be negative, the distribution 
is truncated to so that the lower boundary is greater than or equal to zero.  
 
The RL model has been created using the ‘@Risk’ software from Palisade Corporation. Figure 1 
depicts the distribution for CR using the @Risk software. Numbers on the horizontal axis 
represent the corrosion rate in mm/year. (The percentage values on the horizontal axis show what 
percentage lie in a given range of values- this is not used in the below. The values on the vertical 
axis in figure 1 are also not used in the calculation below.) The distribution can also be obtained 
from fitting a curve to real values of CR as measured over a period of time and could well be a 
different kind of distribution. 
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Figure1: Corrosion rate (mm/year) distribution 
 
Current thickness (Tc) is known from the most recent thickness measurements on the structure, 
say during the year of assessment. If recent thickness measurements are not available, Tc can be 
assumed to be equal to the original nominal thickness of the structure (To) as specified by the 
designer including tolerances, corrosion allowance, etc, and the RL calculated from the year of 
installation. For the purpose of demonstration, in the model, To is also a normal distribution, N 
(100, 1) i.e. with mean=100mm and standard deviation=1mm. 
 
MAT is the absolute minimum allowable thickness calculated by the designer to prevent failure 
by overload, collapse, etc as appropriate. In the illustration this value is 90 mm. ‘Failure’ in this 
context is not having the minimum allowable design thickness (MAT) rather than actual physical 
collapse of the structure. The probability of not meeting MAT is greater than that of structural 
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collapse as there is a factor of safety within the minimum design thickness, making the analysis 
conservative.  
 
In the method here, the statistical analysis tool - Palisade’s @RISK for Microsoft Excel is used to 
describe all the independent variables probabilistically, and RL is then calculated using Monte 
Carlo Simulation (MCS) technique. In this way, the calculated RL by MCS is actually a 
distribution of values, so that the annual probability of failure (the failure rate per year) over time 
can be obtained. This annual probability of failure, in the current context, is effectively the 
proportion of surviving population of structures from the previous year that is expected to fail 
within the year under consideration. 
 
Annual probability of failure )0(  RLP  (7) 
For example, see figure 2 that shows an assessment of the annual probability of failure of a tower 
structure with (1) an initial (in the year of installation i.e. 2000) thickness of 100 mm with some 
deviation described by N(100,1); (2) Expected CR as N(0.4, 0.1) with negative values truncated; 
(3) MAT as 90 mm. The number of iterations is set to 1000. This means that for year 2000, 1000 
values for CR and Tstart are selected from the respective stipulated distributions. These initial 
values are used in calculations for the year 2000 and all the subsequent years.  
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Figure 2: Screenshot of inputs and outputs of the corrosion model 
For every year, equation (2) is used to calculate the annual probability of failures. For example, 
in the year 2013, 
 
TcTstart  8.94 , where 94.8 in effect represents the mean of 1000 iterations; 
MATTc  too has 1000 values. 
15 
The algorithm counts the number of times MATTc  is negative or zero; in this case 7 times out of 
a total of 1000 iterations. These are the times when, as per equation (2), .0RL  Percentage 
values give )0( RLP   as shown in column 5 in figure 2. 
 
This annual probability of failure (failure rate) versus time curve is used in the next stage in 
which the timing of an action (repair/ replacement) can be optimised such that financial benefit is 
optimised.  
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Figure 3: The annual probability of failure versus time curve 
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4. Risk based financial optimisation of maintenance action given a failure trend 
The need for financial criterion in maintenance decision making 
Maintenance projects are increasingly being evaluated by decision makers who need to 
understand the implications of various options in financial terms. Although predictive 
maintenance techniques have matured, the predictions are in engineering terms. Thus, there is a 
need to express the effects of engineering wear and tear in financial terms. In the current context, 
this is done by evaluating the cost of the consequences of failure owing to wear and tear of plant 
and machinery. 
The drivers for a consistent decision making methodology in maintenance 
Many old plants, structures, capital equipment or components are in their Ageing period of life. 
However, increasing competition means many of them cannot be replaced and need to have their 
useful life extended. In addition, new components are often designed to operate with maximum 
efficiency, and are designed with lower “margins of error” against assumed operating conditions. 
Each action (or project) has costs associated with it. These costs are, in essence, investments 
made by the concerned asset owner with the expectation of certain return on the investment(s). 
The decision maker will normally be faced with a number of projects competing for such 
investments, and therefore needs to take decisions that maximise the returns on these investments 
within the constraints that apply (Tam and Price, 2008).The most widely understood financial 
techniques to evaluate projects include ‘return on investment’, ‘pay-back period’ and ‘discounted 
cash flow (DCC)’ methods (Brealey, Myers 1991). These techniques have various strengths and 
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weaknesses. The methodology here employs the net present value (NPV) technique that is a form 
of DCC analysis 
 
 NPV in financial analysis 
In the current discussion, it is assumed that a project with a higher NPV is a better investment 
than a project with a lower NPV. The NPV of a project is the present (current) value of the total 
future cash flows, i.e. the net of both positive (income) and negative (cost) cash flows.  NPV 
considers the time value of money by discounting all the cash flows, and it is calculated as 
follows: 
 
NPV =  t
N
t
t rC )1()(
0


  (8) 
N = project life (years); t = timing of cash flow (year); r = interest rate, or discount rate; and Ct = 
cash flow in year t. 
The future cash flows are ‘expected’ cash flows, as they do not occur with certainty. The 
uncertainty arises in the engineering analysis to calculate the probability of failure over time for 
the damage mechanism(s) of interest. 
The risk associated with any project is expressed in terms of its NPV by using expected values 
(EV). The EV of a failure event is the product of the probability of an event occurring and the 
cost of consequence of that event. The probability of an event and the cost of the consequence(s) 
of that event is directly assessed from prior quantitative  analyses; the consequence cost is 
expressed in financial terms. 
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Thus, the NPV of a project with uncertain outcomes is the sum of the expected values of all 
future discounted cash flows, as follows: 
 
                 



N
t
t
tt rCp
0
)1()(
 (9)   
 
where, pt = the probability of the event occurring at time t. 
 
 The risk-based optimisation model 
The optimisation maximises the NPV of the action (repair/replacement) under consideration. In 
this case, the optimisation finds the least negative value of NPV. Cash inflows are treated as 
positive and cash outflows as negative: 1) money spent on an action is negative, 2) failure 
consequence costs ((unplanned) outages due to failure mainly production loss considered here, 
for simplicity) is also negative, but 3) failure costs avoided by undertaking the action under 
consideration are considered positive. 
 
Consider that our planning period is from t=0 to t=N and the year of assessment is t=0. Let us 
consider the NPV of an action undertaken in any year t=n. It is given by: 
 
NPV= (Expected present value of action undertaken in year t=n) + (Expected present value of 
costs due to outages prior to the action) + (Expected present value of costs due to outages 
avoided due the action) (10) 
NPV= 
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The first two terms in equation (10) are negative, the third is positive.  
 
Hence,  
 
NPV = { ])1()([ t
Nt
nt
Pt rC   

 +   [- t
nt
t
Btt rCp )1()(
0
 

 ]} + { t
Nt
nt
Btt rCp )1()(
1
 

]   }  (11) 
 
In equation (11), for the NPV of an action taken at time t=n, the following can be defined: 
 
CBt = Cash flows associated with production in year t; 
CPt = Cash flows associated with implementing the project in year t, including any tax credits 
(positive cash flow) on depreciation costs (Collier & Glagola, 1998);  
N = the maintenance planner’s strategic planning period, i.e. from t=0 to t=N; 
n = year in which the action is proposed to be undertaken; 
pt = probability of the event (failure leading to the particular consequence) occurring in year ‘t’; 
and 
r = interest rate, i.e. the cost of money (finance). 
 
The optimisation algorithm calculates the year of maintenance action for which the NPV is 
maximum (least negative, in this case), subject to stipulated constraints.  
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The maintenance action may be replacement or repair. In both cases, it is assumed that the cost of 
action includes the cost of initial problems (teething problems) and that once the equipment or 
structure is in place and functional, it begins its life cycle at a relatively very low failure rate. 
 
The key inputs to the optimisation model are as follows: 
 
(a) The annual probability of failure versus time values using which expected values are derived 
as per the formula discussed above; the failure trend is obtained from quantitative 
assessments. 
(b)  The consequence cost of failure (unplanned outage). 
(c)  Interest rates and depreciation as applicable. 
(d)  Any financial constraints, such as the annual maintenance budget limit. 
(e)  Although not shown in the calculations here, any non-financial constraints, e.g. those on 
failure rates due to safety regulations. 
 
5. Demonstration of the model 
The approach described above is demonstrated by evaluating three offshore wind turbine tower 
structures - structure 1, structure 2 and structure 3. The failure trend from a probabilistic 
corrosion model is presented in figures 2 (spreadsheet calculations) and 3 (graphical 
presentation). How the Action NPV (depicted by the curve with triangles) changes with the 
failure trend (curve with square boxes; the same curve as shown in figure 3) is shown figure 4. 
The values are obtained by using equations 10 and 11 for each year in the planning period. 
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The NPV of an action to mitigate the probability of failure over the operating life of a 
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Figure 4: The optimum time of replacement of structure 1, given the cost of such action and 
the annual probability of failure over its operating life 
 
The optimised replacement time for structure 1- year 2016- is shown in figure 4. This is the year 
in which the ‘Action NPV’ is the least negative.  
 
The figure depicts the application of risk based approach to undertaking run-repair-replace 
decision-making for structure 1. The probability of failure versus time curve derived from 
remaining life estimates on its own is often incomplete information to the decision maker. The 
Action NPV versus time curve generated by the risk based approach enables one to make a more 
informed maintenance decision by considering the consequences of failure too. Thus the context 
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in which the structure is operating and the implications of it failing feed into the process of run-
repair-replace decision-making.   
 
The optimised action years for the other two structures are derived in the same way. This is 
shown in figure 5. It is seen that both structure 1 and structure 2 have the same year of 
replacement- 2016, and structure 3 has 2012 as the year of replacement. The figure shows a 
scenario in which the budget for repair/ replacement of structures in a wind farm is set to 
maximum of £ 6400,000 in any given year with an increase of 0.05 % every year. It is assumed 
that if this budget is not used in a given year on asset management actions within this wind farm, 
it is used elsewhere- there is no facility for a rollover. Due to this limit on expenses, if actions are 
taken as calculated, there would be deficits in the years in which the actions are taken.  
To address this, optimisation is carried out again (using Solver in Microsoft Excel). The re-
scheduled time of action is shown in figure 6. All actions are now within the allocated budget. 
However, the change in schedule comes at a price: the NPV decreases from the previously 
optimised value of - £ 7118677 to -£ 7148132. To take the analyses one step further this loss in 
NPV could be compared to the expected cost of borrowing to see if actions can be taken in the 
years as originally identified as the most optimum time. 
 
In-service inspection optimisation 
The model could be extended to inspection actions. Instead of the replacement cost of the 
component, the cost of in-service inspection would be considered. Since such actions (projects) 
are usually accounted for as ‘expenses’ in the year in which they occur, rather than as 
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‘investments’ (which would then be written-off over several years), tax credits from depreciated 
costs do not arise. Since inspection costs are relatively low compared to production loss it is 
expected that the model would suggest the optimum year of inspection to be the first year of the 
planning period. To address this, to optimise in-service inspection dates: 
 
1. Optimise the action date as if the action was replacement, 
2. Inspect the equipment before this calculated replacement date, 
3. Compare the actual component damage found during inspection, to the projected conditions, 
and then 
4. Replace the component if necessary, or re-calculate a new optimised replacement date. 
 
6. Discussion  
In the RBLM optimisation model presented above, the following points warrant further 
discussion: 
(1) Multi-component optimisation 
It has been shown that the optimum year of replacement can be calculated when the net present 
value (NPV) of the maintenance action is maximised. If in a system of structures there is a 
budgetary constraint that does not allow for a series of actions to be undertaken in a given 
strategic planning period, further optimisation can be undertaken using the approach. 
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(2) Quantitative inputs 
The technique requires a quantitative assessment of degradation/ damage. This is at times 
expensive, time consuming and requiring simplifying assumptions to be made. 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Optimised action schedule leading to budget deficit arising due to two structures 
being replaced in the same year (2016) 
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Figure 6: Re-scheduling the year of action such that the costs lie within allocated budget 
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 (3) RBLM models in complex systems 
For more complex systems with increasing number of components and constraints, non-linear 
optimisation tools (e.g. those based on genetic algorithms) that are more powerful than the linear 
Solver in Microsoft Excel may be required; 
 (4) Direction of future relevant work 
There is scope for further work on deriving failure estimates using expert elicitation and 
combining failure probabilities using Bayesian methods to update prior probability distributions 
with other data sources, e.g. combining specific failure databases with expert knowledge. More 
research is needed in assessing the use of genetic algorithms for optimisation in complex 
systems. Finally, further work is needed to incorporate a wider range of in-service equipment 
damage mechanisms to optimise RBLM actions.  
 
7. Conclusions 
The paper presents a quantitative risk analysis model to undertake run-repair-replace decisions in 
asset integrity management. The model implements an approach that ultimately minimises the 
risks associated with failures by optimally targeting resources at those components (within the 
asset system) identified as high risk. 
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APPENDIX E: SOME TECHNIQUES FOR SYSTEM 
ANALYSIS 
E1: EVENT TREE ANALYSIS (ETA) 
 
Event Tree Analysis (ETA) is most suitable when the successful operation of a component 
depends on discrete (chronological) set of events. The initiating event is followed by other 
events, leading to a set of outcomes (consequences). Figure E-1 gives an example of an ETA. 
The initiating event is the starting of fire. Possible events that follow this initial event are 
graphically depicted as shown in the figure. The analysis becomes quantitative when 
probabilities are assigned to each of these events. The probability of final outcomes can then 
be assessed by the rules of probability. 
 
 
 
Figure E-1: Event Tree Analyses (IET Health & Safety Briefing). 
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ETA is an effective tool for major accident risk analysis. The focus in an ETA is on the 
consequences of an initial event (failure) occurring and the likelihood of these consequences 
(in a quantitative model). However, the analysis can grow complex as the tree grows 
exponentially as more scenarios are considered. Hence ETA is generally used for a system 
with smaller number of components. 
 
E.2: FAULT TREE ANALYSIS (FTA) 
In a Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), the most serious outcome is selected as the top event. The 
fault tree is then constructed by relating the sequence of events which, individually or in 
combination could lead to the top event. A fault free is shown in figure E-2.  A qualitative 
fault tree in itself provides a better understanding of various features of a system. Given 
failure (event) rates, the tree becomes quantitative. 
 
FTA is mainly aimed at deriving the occurrence probability of the top (failure) event, given 
the probabilities for various events leading to it. Boolean algebra is used to connect the 
probabilities of events to get the probability of the top event. These probabilities are used in 
calculations using standard reliability principles that involve identifying cut sets (list of failure 
events such that if they occur so does the top event) and minimal cut sets (list of minimal, 
necessary and sufficient conditions for the occurrence of the top event).  
 
FTA, like ETA, is an effective tool to analyse a system for an initial risk assessment. As 
described above, FTA is mainly used to ascertain the probability of failure of the top event. 
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However, this requires proper failure data that may at times not be available thereby 
restricting the use of FTA. 
 
 
 
 
Figure E-2: Fault Tree Analysis illustration 
E.3: FAILURE MODES, EFFECTS (AND CRITICALITY) ANALYSIS (FMEA) 
A FMEA answers the following basic questions: 
 How can each component fail?  
 What might cause these modes of failure? 
 How often can the component fail in a particular mode? 
Tank over 
pressurised 
Pump operates too long Safety System Failure 
Timer 
Contacts 
fail to 
open 
P(TIM) 
Failure to stop pump 
Op fails to 
observe  
Gauge  
P(OP) 
Switch gear fails 
P(SG) 
Pressure gauge 
stuck  
P(PG) 
Relief valve fails to 
open  
P(RVAL) 
= And Gate 
 
 
=OR Gate 
where, 
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 What could be the effects if the failures occur? 
 How critical are these failure modes?  
 How is each mode detected? 
 
A FMEA is often taken to a more advanced level – components within a system are ranked in 
terms of their criticality. This ranking may be qualitative or quantitative. The analysis then is 
called a FMECA. 
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) or Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality 
Analysis (FMECA) are methodologies designed to identify potential failure modes for a 
product or process, to identify factors affecting the risk associated with those failure modes, to 
rank the issues in terms of importance and to identify corrective actions to mitigate the 
concerns. The FMEA required the identification of the following basic information: 
 
 Components. 
 Function of each component. 
 Possible damage mechanisms and locations. 
 Causes of damage mechanisms. 
 Consequences of a failure. 
 Current control. 
 Possible mitigating actions. 
A scheme for an FMEA is shown in figure D-3. 
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FMEA 
 
Component Name: 
Function: 
Failure rate: 
 
Failure 
Mode 
No. 
Failure 
Mode 
Rate 
Failure mode Potential 
Causes 
Effects on 
system 
Detecting 
method 
Severity 
   
Fatigue 
Collapse 
 
Crack 
 
Performance 
Deterioration 
 
Deformation 
 
Corrosion 
 
Buckling 
 
Sag 
 
Misalignment 
 
Leaking 
 
Falls off 
 
Vibrating 
 
Burnt 
 
 
 
 
Incorrect 
Material 
 
Poor Weld 
 
Corrosion 
 
Assembly error 
 
Error in 
dimension 
 
Over stressing 
 
Bad 
Maintenance 
 
Error in heat 
treatment 
 
Crack 
formation 
 
Out of Balance 
 
Tooling marks 
 
Human Error 
  
Routine 
Inspection 
 
Maintenance 
 
 
 
Critical 
 
Negligible 
 
Marginal 
 
Catastrophic 
 
 
 
Figure E-3: FMEA format. 
 
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) or Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality 
Analysis (FMECA) are methodologies designed to identify potential failure modes for a 
product or process, to identify factors affecting the risk associated with those failure modes, to 
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rank the issues in terms of importance and to identify corrective actions to mitigate the 
concerns. The FMEA required the identification of the following basic information: 
 
 Components. 
 Function of each component. 
 Possible damage mechanisms and locations. 
 Causes of damage mechanisms. 
 Consequences of a failure. 
 Current control. 
 Possible mitigating actions. 
 
By identifying this information it is then possible to understand what components need to be 
considered in a management plan and how they are operated (e.g. environments, loading 
conditions). From knowledge of the service conditions it is then possible to identify how the 
life of the components may be consumed (What damage mechanisms may act on the 
component within the possible identified service conditions). Once we know how a 
component could fail it is then possible to look at what may be the consequences if it did 
actually fail. By understanding what fails, how it fails, what conditions affect the damage 
mechanisms, and what the consequences might be, it is possible to identify ways that these 
factors can be managed. 
 
By having this thorough knowledge it is then possible to construct more generic techniques 
for assessing the risk of failure by qualitative or quantitative methods.   
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APPENDIX F: QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS: THE RISK 
MATRIX APPROACH 
The risk matrix Approach 
 
This is a common technique for risk analysis in which system components are broadly ranked 
(in qualitative terms) depending on their likelihood of failure and the consequence of failure. 
An example risk matrix is shown in figure F-1. 
 
VH
Gear Box failure
H
Failu re  Probability
M T urbine failu re
L
VL
VL L M H VH
 C onsequence  Severity  
 
Figure F-1: Example of a risk matrix. 
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On the horizontal axis Consequences are qualitatively ranked as VL, L, M, H and VH 
representing Very Low, Low, Medium, High and Very High respectively. The vertical axis 
has the failure probability or the likelihood of failure in identical ranking terms. Risk 
increases as one moves away from the bottom left corner of the matrix. The risk could be 
because of a relatively high likelihood of failure or a high consequence value or, indeed, both. 
It must be noted that the ranking is relative to each other.  
 
For example,  
 
A possible qualitative ranking scheme for estimating the failure probability for components is 
shown below:  
Table F-1: Ranking based on the likelihood of failure 
Rank Description (expected frequency of failure of the component during its lifetime) 
Very high 
(Frequent) 
Failures continuously experienced (≥ 10-1) 
High 
(Probable) 
Failures occur frequently (Between/Including 10-2 and 10-1) 
Medium 
(Occasional) 
Failures occur several times (Between/Including 10-3 and 10-2) 
Low 
(Remote) 
Unlikely but possible to occur during lifespan (Between/Including 10-3 and 10-6) 
Very Low 
(Improbable) 
Very unlikely; occurrence may not be experienced at all (≤ 10-6) 
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A possible qualitative ranking scheme for estimating the severity of the consequence of 
failure of a component within a ship is shown below:  
 
} 
Rank Description (expected cost of the consequence of failure) 
Very high Failure has a knock down effect on the entire operation thus causing massive 
operational loss apart from rectification costs e.g. event involving loss of lives, 
Ship, Cargo, and spillage of Cargo causing widespread environmental damage. This 
would involve certain intangibles such as reputational loss etc. 
High Failure results in a stand-alone loss of operation apart from rectification costs. E.g. 
Ship becomes unavailable for sometime and Cargo is damaged 
Medium Failure results in Cargo damage and/or pollution 
Low Failure results in partial operational loss; damage may be rectified soon- no 
substantial loss of operation 
Very low Failure results in a very temporary production loss; damage is rectified 
 
The analysis can become semi-quantitative if the Likelihood of Failure or Consequences are 
quantified to some extent. An example of how this could be achieved is shown below. 
 
A variant of the above technique can be a ‘risk histogram’ that assigns relative likelihood and 
consequence values and normalizes them. The product of these values is then used to get a 
risk number (RN) which is the product of normalized likelihood value and normalized 
consequence value. RN values are used to construct the risk histogram (figure F-2). The 
values for likelihood and consequence can also be then used to construct a risk matrix 
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(figure F-3). It may be noted that the approach here is semi-quantitative and the risk values 
used here are relative and not absolute. Also, there may be circumstances where a simple 
product between relative likelihood and consequence is not appropriate, particularly when 
consequences are high. For example, instead of 
CPR   
where P= the probability of failure and  
C= the consequence of failure, 
a measure of risk could be  
nCPR   
where n is a number that enables risk to be evaluated on a non-linear scale. 
 
Risk matrix and similar techniques are very useful tools to conduct a very preliminary risk 
assessment.  Expert opinion, and not complex calculations or elaborate historical failure data, 
is often the only input that they require. This simplicity is, however, often its weakest point - 
the technique does not take the analysis further to determine how failures occur and what 
factors could mitigate risk. 
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Risk Histogram using Risk Numbers (RN)
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Figure F-2: Example of a using a measure of risk (RN) to highlight critical components 
 
Figure F-3 Risk matrix using Risk Numbers (RN) 
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APPENDIX G: WIND TURBINES 
G.1 A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Wind turbines (WT) are rotating machines that convert kinetic energy of the wind into 
mechanical energy and then electrical energy. WTs are variously called as wind generator, 
wind power unit (WPU) or wind energy converter (WEC). In the current context, the term 
wind turbine (WT) is used and is meant to include the structure on which turbines are 
mounted. If the mechanical energy is directly used by machinery for functions such as 
pumping or grinding, the machine is called a windmill.  
 
Windmills have been used for at least 3000 years for grinding grain or pumping water 
(Burton, 2001). From the thirteenth century, horizontal axis windmills were used as an 
integral part of the rural economy. The use of wind mills abated with the advent of cheap 
fossil-fuelled engines and the spread of rural electrification. The use of wind to generate 
electricity can be traced to the late nineteenth century with the 12KW DC windmill generator 
(WT) constructed by Brush in the USA. For much of the twentieth century, there was not 
much interest in using wind turbines on a large scale for power generation with the notable 
exception of the 1250 KW Smith-Putnam wind turbine constructed in the USA in 1941. This 
remained the largest wind turbine for about 40 years (Putnam, 1948). 
 
In the early 1970s, the sudden increase in the price of oil spurred renewed interest in wind 
energy. Government funding for research, development and demonstration in this area 
became easier. The US, the UK, Denmark, Germany and Sweden were particularly more 
active in pursuing programmes at developing wind turbines. The price of oil has in recent 
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years again increased and there is a strong belief that alternative forms of energy need to be 
developed to reduce the dependence on oil.   
 
Other factors at play are: 
 
 Increased awareness regarding the finiteness of earth’s fossil fuel reserves 
 Increased awareness of the environmental impact of using fossil fuels 
 Realization about wind as an abundant source of energy 
 Technological capacity 
 The vision and the political will to use wind in energy generation 
 
G.2 MODERN DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION 
 
The principle of operation 
 
A wind turbine is a machine that converts the power in the wind into electricity. As generators 
of electricity, wind turbines need to be connected to some electrical network to be 
‘transported’ from the point of generation to the point of consumption. Wind turbines these 
days usually range from 0.5 MW to 5 MW capacity.  
 
The energy conversion process uses the basic aerodynamic force of lift to produce a net 
positive torque on a rotating shaft, resulting in the production of mechanical power at first and 
then in its transformation to electricity in a generator.  Wind turbines can generate power in 
response to wind that is immediately available and it is not possible to store wind the way 
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conventional fuels can be stored. The output of a wind turbine is hence inherently fluctuating. 
The most one can do is to limit the output of a wind turbine to a level below what is possible 
for the wind to generate. Thus any system to which the wind turbine is connected must be 
capable of taking this variability into account.  
 
Wind turbine systems when connected to larger systems serve to reduce electrical load to 
conventional generators enabling lesser consumption of conventional fuels. In smaller 
systems, there may be some energy storage with backup generators.  
 
Modern wind turbine design 
 
The most common wind turbines these days are the Horizontal Axis Wind Turbine (HAWT) 
in which the axis of rotation is parallel to the ground. A further classification is according to 
the rotor orientation - upwind or downwind of the tower, hub design (rigid or teetering), rotor 
control mechanism (pitch Vs stall, number of blades (usually two or three blades), and how 
they are aligned with the (free yaw or active yaw). 
 
Main sub-systems within a Horizontal Axis Wind Turbine (HAWT) 
 
 The main components of the HAWT are shown in the figure F-1.   
 
The principal subsystems of a typical horizontal axis wind turbine shown in the figure are: 
 
 The rotor that in the current context includes the blades and the supporting hub; 
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 The drive train, which includes the rotating parts of the wind turbine (excluding the 
rotor). It usually comprises shafts, gearbox, coupling, a mechanical brake, and the 
generator; 
 The nacelle and mainframe, including wind turbine housing, bed plate, and the yaw 
system; 
 The tower and the foundation; 
 The machine controls; 
 The balance of the electrical system, including power cables, switchgear protection, 
transformers and power converters. 
 
The following variations in wind turbine design can be found: 
 
 Number of blades (usually two or three); 
 Rotor orientation, downwind or upwind of tower; 
 Blade material, construction method, and profile; 
 Hub design- rigid, tethering or hinged; 
 Power control- aerodynamic control (stall control) or variable pitch blades (pitch 
control); 
 Fixed or variable rotor speed; 
 Orientation by self aligning action (free yaw), or direct control (active yaw); 
 Synchronous or induction generator; 
 Gearbox or direct drive generator. 
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Figure G-1: Schematic of a typical horizontal wind turbine 
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G.3 KEY COMPONENTS 
Key Wind Turbine Components include:  
 
(a) Rotor 
 
The rotor consists of the blades and the hub of the wind turbine. These constitute the most 
important components within the wind turbine from the point of view of performance as well 
as cost. Most wind turbines these days have an upwind rotor with three blades although some 
down wind rotors and two blade rotors has been in existence. Single blade turbines have also 
been built in the past. Most intermediate sized wind turbines, especially those from Denmark, 
have fixed blade pitch and stall control. However, now the emerging trend is towards pitch 
control for larger machines. The blades are made of composite material- primarily fibre glass 
reinforced plastics, but sometimes wood/ epoxy laminates are also used. 
 
(b) Drive Train 
 
The drive train consists of all the rotating parts of a wind turbine with the exception of the 
rotor blades. There is a low speed shaft on the rotor side, a gear box, and a high speed shaft on 
the generator side. Other drive train components include the support bearings, one or more 
couplings, a brake, and the rotating parts of the generator. The gearbox increases the rate of 
rotation of the rotor from a low value, of the order of tens of rpm (rotations per minute), to the 
order of hundreds or thousands of rpm as required by the generator to generate electrical 
power. Some wind turbines, however, have specially designed generators that can operate at 
low speeds thereby obviating the need of a gear box. In WTs in which power is generated at a 
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higher machine rpm (i.e. turbines with gears) there is a low speed shaft leading up to the gear 
box, and a high speed shaft between the gear box and the generator.  
 
(c) Generator 
 
The generators take in mechanical power as input to give electrical power as the output. There 
are mostly two types of generators in use- induction generators and synchronous generators. 
Most of the turbines that are connected to the grid use induction generators. The main 
advantage of induction generators are that they are rugged, inexpensive, and easy to connect 
to the electrical network. However, an induction generator operates in a narrow band of 
speeds at slightly higher than the synchronous speed of the machine. 
The synchronous generator offers some advantages over the induction generator- it is a 
variable speed machine which can operate in a wider range of wind speeds thus increasing 
energy capture. There is a general reduction in the wear and tear of the WT system by using 
synchronous generators. However, the generator itself is more complex than the induction 
machine requiring more of maintenance attention. 
 
(d) Nacelle and Yaw System 
 
This system includes the wind turbine housing, the machine bedplate or main frame, and the 
yaw orientation system. The mainframe provides for the mounting and the proper alignment 
of the drive train components and the nacelle cover protects the contents from the weather. 
The yaw mechanism aligns the rotor shaft such maximum energy from the wind can be 
harvested. The main component here is a large bearing that connects the main frame to the 
tower. Upwind wind turbines mainly use an active yaw drive, comprising a number of yaw 
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motors, each of which drives a pinion gear against a bull gear attached to the yaw bearing. 
This mechanism is controlled by an automatic yaw control system to which is connected a 
sensor to detect the wind direction. The system may also have a brake to hold the nacelle in 
the aligned position. Free yaw mechanisms, on the other hand, are commonly used on 
downwind wind turbines to self-align rotor with the wind. 
 
(e) Tower and Foundation 
 
This system includes the tower structure and the supporting foundation. There are mainly two 
types of towers (1) free standing types using steel tubes, lattice towers, and concrete towers 
and (2) guyed towers that are used for smaller turbines. The height of the tower is usually 1 to 
1.5 times the rotor diameter, but in any case is normally 20 m (Manwell, J.F.; McGowan, 
J.G.; Rogers, A.L.; 2005)  
 
Tower selection is influenced by the characteristics of the site. The stiffness of the tower is a 
major factor in wind turbine system dynamics because of the possibility of coupled vibrations 
between the rotor and the tower.  
 
(f) The control system 
 
The control system in general includes the following: 
 
 Sensors e.g. Anemometer, Wind Vane, Rotor speed Sensor, Electrical power 
sensor, Pitch position sensor, vibration sensors, temperature and oil level 
indicators, etc. 
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 The Controller that is a system of hardware and software processing input signals 
from the sensors and generating output signals for the actuators 
 Actuators included hydraulic or electric pitch actuator, generator contactors, 
switches for activating shaft brakes, yaw motors, etc. 
 
The functions of a WT controller can be broadly classified into: 
 
 Supervisory control that brings the turbine from one operational state to another 
for e.g., stand-by, start-up, stalling, shutdown, stop with a fault. 
 Closed loop control which is usually a software based feedback mechanism that 
adjusts the operational state of the turbine such that it remains within pre-defined 
operating parameters 
 The safety system that brings the system to a safe condition (usually in a state of 
rest) to pre-empt failure for e.g., the safety system might be tripped due to rotor 
over speed, excessive vibration, and other events such as a lightening strike. 
 
(g) Clutches and Brakes 
 
Clutches transmit torque when applied and do not do so when they are released.  Clutches are 
typically applied by spring pressure and released through an active mechanical or 
electromechanical mechanism. Brakes function to bring a drive train or the yaw mechanism, 
for example, to a halt. The main difference between a clutch and a brake is that heating is a 
more important factor in a brake than a clutch. 
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G.4 RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE WIND TURBINE SECTOR: 
Current drivers for interest in wind farms are mainly the high cost of fossil fuels and the 
carbon emissions associated with the use of fossil fuels. 
  
The UK Government’s Third Annual Report released in July 2006 on the implementation of 
the Energy White Paper (2003) underlines its policy to cut UK’s carbon emissions by 60% by 
the year 2050, with real progress by the year 2020 (DTI, 2002). 
 
A shift from fossil based energy generation, which is responsible for a substantial proportion 
of CO2 emission, to the relatively clean energy generated from renewable sources is one of 
measures envisaged towards reducing carbon emissions. Wind energy is widely believed to be 
an abundant indigenous source of energy in the UK, and it is estimated that much of this 
renewable energy shall come from wind farms. Low CO2 emissions over the entire life cycle 
of wind turbine (and structure) manufacture, installation, operation and de-commissioning, 
have the potential to help limit climate change.  
 
There continues to be progress in a number of areas in wind turbine technology: the rating of 
WT generators (in terms of the power output) has increased; there is better condition 
monitoring and better protection devices installed; two blade wind turbines are also being re-
considered; factors such as noise pollution, aesthetics and yield have encouraged an 
increasing trend in locating Wind Farms offshore; floating Wind Turbines (obviating the need 
for foundations in the sea bed) are also being tested.  
 
